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Telecommunication Markets pp 481–501Cite as

Surveying Regulatory Regimes for EC Communications Law

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Part of the book series: Contributions to Economics ((CE))

Abstract

This paper discusses what institutional model is best able to address identified deficiencies in the enforcement of the 2002 EC Electronic Communications Framework, ie a lack of consistency in the application of the legal rules and the lack of independence of the front-line institutions for the daily administration of EC law: the national regulatory authorities (NRAs). An examination of the three paradigm models otherwise available in European law reveals that the current ‘network-based’ model is basically sound. While it should be strengthened and supplemented, it should not be replaced. It is argued that it is time to move beyond these ‘basic’ questions of institutionalization to the more fundamental question of the constitutionalization of this model, through a debate on the legitimacy and accountability of its central construct: the European Regulators Group (ERG).

* A more extended version is available as TILEC Discussion Paper 2007-028 at <http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/publications/discussionpapers/>. This article reflects the state of the law at 31 December 2007.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    1 SPEECH/06/795, 3.

  2. 2.

    2 The first legislative measures in the sector challenged existing legal monopolies to bring about liberalization. The 1998 ONP framework was directed at the ‘original sin’ of the former incumbent to allow the development of a genuinely competitive market. The current 2002 framework is premised upon a fully liberalized and competitive sector. A recent example of the perceived need to adapt substantive rules to technological evolution is the discussion on next generation networks.

  3. 3.

    3 Dir 88/301/EEC and Dir 90/388/EEC. Further: Larouche (2000).

  4. 4.

    4 Commission (1999a, 9). In particular, they were in charge of applying the SMP regime.

  5. 5.

    5Dir 2002/21/EC.

  6. 6.

    6The Reports are available at DG INFSO’s website.

  7. 7.

    7 <http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/index_en.htm> accessed 9 July 2007.

  8. 8.

    8 Commission (2006a, 2007a, b); SPEECH/06/795; SPEECH/06/442; SPEECH/07/86; Hogan & Hartson and Analysys 2006 and numerous responses to the Commission consultation process, accessible at the website of DF INFSO.

  9. 9.

    9 E.g. Commission (2006b, 10).

  10. 10.

    10 Larouche (2005).

  11. 11.

    11 Majone (1996, 277).

  12. 12.

    12  Of course, these are complemented by the generalist consistency tools laid down in Arts 234 and 226 EC, cf. Case C-478/93 Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission [1995] ECR I-3081 [38].

  13. 13.

    13 Art 7(3) Framework Directive.

  14. 14.

    14 Art 7(4) Framework Directive. The Commission must consider that the measure would create a barrier to the single market or have serious doubts as to the measure’s compatibility with EC law. Thus far, five veto decisions have been adopted: Commission Decision C(2004)527final in Cases FI/2003/0024 and FI/2003/0027, Commission Decision C(2004)3682final in Case FI/2004/0082, Commission Decision C(2004)4070final in Case AT/2004/0090, Commission Decision C(2005)1442final in Case DE/2005/0144 and Commission Decision C(2006)7300final in Cases PL/2006/0518 and PL/2006/0514.

  15. 15.

    15 Commission Recommendation 2003/311/EC.

  16. 16.

    16 Commission Guidelines 2002/C165/03.

  17. 17.

    17 Commission Decision 2002/627/EC establishing the European Regulators Group as amended by Commission Decision 2004/3445/EC. The ERG’s website can be found at <http://erg.ec.europa.eu/>.

  18. 18.

    18 Art 7(2) Framework Directive. National courts are left out of this network for obvious constitutional reasons.

  19. 19.

    19 Further: Art 10(7) Framework Directive and Art 2 Dir 2002/77/EC.

  20. 20.

    20 Art 6 and Recital 15 Framework Directive and paras 144, 145 of the Commission Guidelines 2002/C165/03.

  21. 21.

    21   E.g. Commission (2007b, 14); SPEECH/06/795.

  22. 22.

    22 IP/06/1798, MEMO/06/487, IP/07/888, MEMO/07/255.

  23. 23.

    23 IP/05/430, IP/05/875, IP/05/1296, MEMO/05/372, MEMO/05/242, MEMO/05/478, IP/06/464, IP/06/948, IP/06/1798, MEMO/06/158, MEMO/06/271, MEMO/06/487.

  24. 24.

    24 Independence as a solution to the ‘commitment problem’ has been advocated strongly by Majone, e.g. Majone (1997, 2000, 2002). Baldwin and Cave (1999, 70) also note that independence allows the authority to develop a high level of expertise necessary to make decisions on complex questions.

  25. 25.

    25 Maher (2004, 228).

  26. 26.

    26 Art 3(2) first sentence Framework Directive.

  27. 27.

    27 Also Case C-91/94 Criminal Proceedings against Thierry Tranchant and Téléphone Store SARL[1995] ECR I-3911, Joined Cases C-46/90 and C-93/91 Procureur du Roi v Jean-Marie Lagauche and others [1993] ECR I-5267, Case C-69/91 Criminal Proceedings against Francine Gillon, née Decoster [1993] ECR I-5335 and Case C-92/91 Criminal Proceedings against Annick Neny, née Taillandier [1993] ECR I-5383.

  28. 28.

    28 E.g. §4 Gesetz über die Bundesnetzagentur (Germany), Art L.131 Code des postes et des communications électroniques (France), Art 4(1)(c) Wet OPTA (the Netherlands), Members’ Code of Conduct (Ofcom), available at <http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/csg/ofcom_board/code/> (accessed 9 July 2007).

  29. 29.

    29 Arts 3(2) second sentence and 11(2) Framework Directive.

  30. 30.

    30 Stevens and Valcke (2003, 169) submit that the trigger should be interpreted to encompass not only a majority, but also a minority interest in, or control over, an undertaking active in the eCommunications field.

  31. 31.

    31 Reg 17/62, now replaced by Reg 1/2003. For a detailed examination of the origins of the competition rules, Goyder (2003).

  32. 32.

    32 Arts 87-89 EC.

  33. 33.

    33 Reg 139/2004.

  34. 34.

    34 Arts 131-134 EC.

  35. 35.

    35 Baldwin and Cave (1999, ch. 5).

  36. 36.

    36 Art 213(1) EC.

  37. 37.

    37 Goyder (2003, 31).

  38. 38.

    38 Forrester (2003).

  39. 39.

    39Art 202 third indent EC. Comitology committees are forums for discussions, consist of representatives from Member States and are chaired by the Commission. Consider Bergström (2005), Joerges and Vos (1999), Craig (2006), Andenas and Turk (2000).

  40. 40.

    40Joerges and Vos (1999, 53), Bergström (2005, 10).

  41. 41.

    41The Community lacks the competence to directly legislate on, let alone harmonize, national procedure. Indeed, Member States have strong national traditions in the field and will be loathe to accept too many intrusions, Schwarze (1996).

  42. 42.

    42Member States must adopt rules that are effective and equivalent to domestic laws, Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989. For an example in telecommunications Case C-462/99 Connect Austria Gesellschaft für Telekommunikation GmbH v Telekom-Control-Kommission and Mobilkom Austria AG [2003] ECR I-5197. Also, they must behave loyally towards the Community institutions pursuant to Article 10 EC.

  43. 43.

    432003. This is referred to by Nicolaides et al. (2003) as ‘the implementation deficit’ and by Majone (2000, 279) as ‘the institutional deficit’. In a way, we can of course also qualify the main problem of centralized governance as an implementation/institutional deficit. After all, the insufficiency of resources also resulted in defective implementation of the relevant legal rules. Keeping in with normal European parlance however, we will reserve references to the implementation deficit to discussions on decentralized governance.

  44. 44.

    44Cases C-6 & 9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357, Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-1029, Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-10239, Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v Repubblica italiana [2006] ECR I-5577.

  45. 45.

    45 Also Scott and Trubek (2002).

  46. 46.

    46 The typology followed here derives from Vos (2003, 119). Other taxonomies are proposed by inter alia Commission (2002), Craig (2006, 154ff) and Geradin and Petit (2005).

  47. 47.

    47 E.g. CEDEFOP, EUROFOND, ETF.

  48. 48.

    48 E.g. EEA, EU-OSHA, EMCDDA.

  49. 49.

    49 E.g. OHIM, CPVO, EMEA, EFSA.

  50. 50.

    50  They may also include members appointed by the European Parliament or representatives of the social partners or other relevant stakeholder groups. These members commonly do not have the right to vote.

  51. 51.

    51 Here we must not think solely of the threat of infringement proceedings or perhaps even Member State liability, but also – and arguably primarily – of a loss of face towards other Member States or the Commission.

  52. 52.

    52 Cf. Baldwin and Cave (1999).

  53. 53.

    53 Further the text between (n 89) and (n 90).

  54. 54.

    54 Case 9/56 Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v High Authority [1957] ECR 133.

  55. 55.

    55 Commission (2001, 2002). There are however tensions within the Commission regarding the topic, with some members wishing to move beyond Meroni and create true regulatory agencies, cf. Majone (2002).

  56. 56.

    56  Commission (2002, 1).

  57. 57.

    57 Craig (2006, 163).

  58. 58.

    58 Majone (1997, 3).

  59. 59.

    59 Eurostrategies/Cullen International (1999), Forrester et al. (1996); the Commission’s Annual Implementation Reports.

  60. 60.

    60 Arts 85(1) and 87–89 EC respectively.

  61. 61.

    61 In large part because competition rules and institutions in the then six Member States were in a primitive state, Gerber (1994, 103), Goyder (2003, 28).

  62. 62.

    62 The importance of telecommunications for the economic development of national sovereign states required, or so it was believed, political control. The need to ensure complete national coverage at equal and affordable prices was used as an additional argument.

  63. 63.

    63 In 1992, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) introduced a chapter on Trans-European networks (TENs). Article 154 EC states that the Community has the task of contributing to ‘[T]he establishment and development of trans-European networks in the areas of (..) telecommunications (..) infrastructures’. This has however never taken off in the field of telecommunications.

  64. 64.

    64 Case C-202/88 France v Commission (Terminal Equipment) [1991] ECR I-1223 and Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90 and C-289/90 Spain v Commission [1992] ECR I-5833, directed at Dir 88/301/EEC and Dir 90/388/EEC respectively.

  65. 65.

    65 Art 8 Dir 97/51 and Art 22 of Directive 97/33.

  66. 66.

    66 Eurostrategies/Cullen International 1999. This study followed two earlier reports dealing at least partially with the issue of the establishment of an ERA: Forrester et al. (1996), especially 51-82 and NERA/Denton Hall (1997).

  67. 67.

    67 Commission (1999b, 9).

  68. 68.

    68 Commission (2007c). The proposal closely follows Commission (2005).

  69. 69.

    69 <http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/escb/html/index.en.html>.

  70. 70.

    70 <http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page = home&mac = 0&id=>.

  71. 71.

    71 <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/index_en.html>.

  72. 72.

    72 Annex 1 to the ERG advice to the Commission in the context of the Review. See the entire process of correspondence between the Commission and the ERG (accessible through the DG INFSO and ERG website) for other institutional proposals.

  73. 73.

    73 These are aimed in particular in fleshing out the ‘proper’ application of ERG(06)33.

  74. 74.

    74 The ERG gives the example of the Bundesnetzagentur who requested such a group for its leased line market notification. The group’s recommendation was for the Bundesnetzagentur to withdraw its notification. NRAs can also seek informal peer review of their analysis prior to finalization and notification.

  75. 75.

    75 Commission (2006c, 9) and accompanying Staff Working Document. For a more elaborate version of this argument, Larouche and De Visser (2006).

  76. 76.

    76 Art 4 fourth al. ERG Decision; ERG (03)07 Arts 1.4 and 5.6.

  77. 77.

    77 ERG (05)16 1. This much is also evident from the language used in the Conclusions of ERG Plenary Meetings, referring e.g. to ‘complementarity of activities’ or ‘that there will be close coordination with Commission services’. In addition, the Commission reports its efforts on the same matters as NRAs are dealing with and gives information on its activities, COCOM meetings and policy proposals.

  78. 78.

    78 Akin to what the ECN is for the Commission and the national competition authorities (NCAs) for the notification of draft decision and possible ousting of jurisdiction under Art 11 Reg 1/2003. Consider the ERG’s comments in Annex 1 of its advice to the Commission (n 72) 2.

  79. 79.

    79  <http://irgis.anacom.pt/site/en/irg.asp>, ERG(06)03. The IRG is an unofficial forum of NRA heads, established in 1997 and used for informal strategic discussions which do not involve the Commission.

  80. 80.

    80 For instance, the IRG could issue separate documents where the views of the NRAs and the Commission do not align or take over the advisory tasks of the ERG.

  81. 81.

    81 E.g. under dispute settlement, Arts 20 and 21 Framework Directive or where competitors institute damage actions for an undertaking’s failure to comply with an NRA decision.

  82. 82.

    82 Art 15 Reg 1/2003, Commission Notice on the cooperation between the Commission and national courts.

  83. 83.

    83 C-2/88 Criminal Proceedings against JJ Zwartveld and Others [1990] ECR I-3365 [17]-[22]. Examples of assistance mentioned by the Court include the production of documents and having Commission officials give evidence in national proceedings.

  84. 84.

    84 The non-confidential versions of those judgments that have been voluntarily submitted can be found at.<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/article_7.2/national_judiciaries/index_en.htm>. In terms of scope and accessibility, contrast with those sent under the competition regime:<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/national_courts/index_en.html>.

  85. 85.

    85 The fact that the eCommunications regime is laid down in directives arguably exacerbates matters, as it obscures its Community origins and Internal Market imperatives.

  86. 86.

    86 In particular, their broad and discretionary competences.

  87. 87.

    87 Commission 2007d Art 4(1). A proposal to this effect was already made during the negotiations on the current regulatory framework: European Parliament, A5-0053/2001FINAL amendment 22, A5-0435/2001/FINAL amendment 27.

  88. 88.

    88 Majone (1996, ch. 12) arrives at a similar conclusion, albeit from a different premise. His starting point is the ‘commitment problem’ of national governments towards regulatory policies, and the credibility of national agencies to address this problem. Majone argues that the credibility of these agencies, and their commitment to regulatory policies can be strengthened through teamwork.

  89. 89.

    89As with the conditions for suspension, suggestions to this effect were already made by Parliament in the negotiations on the current version of the Framework Directive, (n 87) amendment 10.

  90. 90.

    90 Dir 89/522/EC as amended. The proposal can be found at Commission 2007e Art 23b(2).

  91. 91.

    91 Admittedly, the Commission mentions some of these in its letter of request to the ERG (n 72), but seems to perceive their relevance only in relation to the far-reaching institutional scenario of transforming the ERG into some sort of regulatory agency. It is argued here that these questions are also relevant if the current state of institutional play remains in place.

  92. 92.

    92 On the Continent, a number of legal systems do not readily admit that independent authorities be given wide, discretionary powers, usually for reasons of a constitutional nature. Under the 1998 framework, it could thus be noted that the status of NRAs was often dubious, that Ministries tended to keep important competences to themselves and that the court were overly strict in reviewing NRA decisions, focusing too much on competence, e.g. Eurostrategies/Cullen International Report 1999, Commission. Annual Implementation Reports.

  93. 93.

    93 Consider the text between (n 39) and (n 41).

  94. 94.

    94 E.g. Andersen and Eliassen (1996), Craig and Harlow (1998), Snyder (1996), Weiler (1999).

  95. 95.

    95Art 8 ERG Decision.

  96. 96.

    96A full legitimacy assessment of the ERG can be found in De Visser (2007).

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Authors
  1. Maartje de Visser
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Strathclyde Business School, University of Strathclyde, George St. 40, Glasgow, G11QE, United Kingdom

    Peter Curwen

  2. Fak. Wirtschaft- und Sozialwissenschaft, Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Lange Gasse 20, Nürnberg, 90403, Germany

    Justus Haucap

  3. Wirtschaftswissenschaften (ZBW), Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für, Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, Hamburg, 20354, Germany

    Brigitte Preissl

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de Visser, M. (2009). Surveying Regulatory Regimes for EC Communications Law. In: Curwen, P., Haucap, J., Preissl, B. (eds) Telecommunication Markets. Contributions to Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2082-9_27

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