This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Anupindi R. and Y. Bassok (1998). Supply Contracts with Quantity Commitments and Stochastic Demand, Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management, Tayur S., M. Magazine and R. Ganshan (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA.
Araman V., J. Kleinknecht and R. Akella (2003). Coordination and Risk-Sharing in E-Business, Working Paper, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
Ayres I. and R. Gertner (1992). Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale Law Journal, 729–73.
Arrow K.J. (1971). Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing, Markham, Chicago.
Barnes-Schuster D., Y. Bassok and R. Anupindi (2000). Coordination and Flexibility in Supply Contracts with Options, Working Paper, University of Chicago.
Candela G. and P. Figini (2003). Economia del turismo, McGraw-Hill, Milano.
Candela G. and P. Figini (2005). Economia dei sistemi turistici, McGraw-Hill, Milano.
Candela G. and R. Cellini (2004). Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of Differentiated Oligopoly, Working Paper, Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Electronic Paper Collection, No. 20.2004, Fondazione Enrico Mattei Research Paper Series, Milano.
Cheung Steven N.S. (1969). Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements, Journal of Law and Economics 12, 23–46.
Cooper C.P., J. Fletcher, D. Gilbert, R. Shephard and S. Wanhill (1998). Tourism: Principles and Practice, Addison Wesley Longman Publishing, New York.
Cooter R. and T. Ulen (2004). Law and Economics, Pearson Addison Wesley.
Faure M. and S. Goran (2003). The Economic Analysis of Environmental Policy and Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, UK.
Diamond P. and M. Rothschild (1978). Uncertainty in Economics: Readings and Exercises, Academic Press, New York.
Fisher F.M. (1983). Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics, New York, Cambridge University Press.
Hahn F.H. and T. Negishi (1962). A Theorem on Non-Tatônement Stability, Econometrica, 30, 463–69.
Hart O.D. and B. Holmstrom (1987). The Theory of Contracts, Advances in Economic Theory, T.R. Bewley (eds.), Fifth World Congress, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 369–98.
Hirshleifer J. and J.G. Riley (1992). The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Holmstrom B. and J. Tirole (1989). The Theory of the Firm, Handbook of Industrial Economics, Schmalensee R. and R.D. Willig (eds.), New York, Elsevier Science Publishing, 61–133.
Li C. and P. Kouvelis (1999). Flexible and Risk-Sharing Supply Contracts Under Price Uncertainty, Management Science, 45, 10, 1378–1398.
Macaulay S. (1963). An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wisconsin Law Review, 465–482.
Machina M. (1987). Choice under uncertainty: Problems solved and unsolved, The Journal of Perspectives, 1: 121–54.
Mas-Colell A., M.D. Whinston and J.R. Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford.
Masten S.E. (1988). Equity, Opportunism, and the Design of Contractual Relations, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 144, 180–195.
Masten S.E. (1999). Contractual Choice, Encyclopaedia of Law & Economics, B. Boukaert and G. De Geest (eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, U.K.
McKenna C.J. (1986). The Economics of Uncertainty, Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton.
Moutinho L. (1987). Consumer Behavior in Tourism, European Journal of Marketing, 21 (10): 5–44.
Quandt R. (1988). The Econometrics of Disequilibrium, Basil Blackwell Ltd, Oxford, UK.
Rothschild M. and J. Stiglitz (1970). Increasing risk I: A definition, Journal of Economic Theory, 2: 225–43.
Shavell S. (1984). The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 121–148.
Shelanski H. and P.G. Klein (1995). Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11, 335–61.
Schwartz A. (1992). Legal Contract Theories and Incomplete Contracts, Contract Economics, Werin L. and H. Wijkander (eds.), Cambridge, MA, Basil Blackwell, 79–108.
Stiglitz J. (1974). Incentives and Risk-Sharing in Sharecropping, Review of Economic Studies, 41, 219–255.
Telser L.G. (1980). A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 Journal of Business, 27–44.
Tirole J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, Mass.
Tirole J. (1994). Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, Walras-Bowley lecture, delivered at the North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, Quebec City.
Tisdell C. (2000). The Economics of Tourism, Elgar Reference Collection, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Cheltenham, UK.
Tsay A. (1999). The Quantity Flexibility Contract and Supplier-Customer Incentives, Management Science, 45, 10, 1339–1358.
Werin L. and H. Wijkander (1992). Contract Economics, Cambridge, MA, Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Williamson O.E. (1979). Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, Journal of Law and Economics, 22, 233–262.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Physica-Verlag
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Castellani, M., Mussoni, M. (2007). An Economic Analysis of Tourism Contracts: Allotment and Free Sale*. In: Matias, Á., Nijkamp, P., Neto, P. (eds) Advances in Modern Tourism Research. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1718-8_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1718-8_4
Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-1717-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-7908-1718-8
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsBusiness and Management (R0)