The Strategic Importance of Relations between Turkey and the European Community

  • Maurizio Cremasco
Part of the Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts book series (ORIENT)


An analysis of the strategic relevance of relations between Turkey and the European Community presents special methodological and substantive difficulties.


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  1. 1.
    In that period the Soviet Mediterranean fleet consisted of 53 units, the highest number since 1977.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Cf. Maurizio Cremasco and Stefano Silvesti, II Fianco Sud della Nato (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1980), p. 81Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    The text of the Montreux Convention is reproduced in Appendix B of the book by Jesse W. Lewis, The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976).Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    The exact size of the Soviet navy when the hostilities broke out has not been officially made public. For an estimate cf. R.G. Weinland, Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War: A Case Study (Washington: Washington Paper No. 61, 1979) p. 76.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Cf. Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch. A Memoir (New York: 1976), p. 447.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Cf. Duygu B. Sezer, Turkey’s Security Policies (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers No. 164, 1981), p. 15.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean, 95th Congress. 27 March 1977 (Washington: USGPO, 1977).Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Cf. The Military Balance 1982 - 1983 (London: IISS, 1982), p. 15.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Sir Bernard Burrows, “The security dimension for Western Europe”, paper Presented at the TEPSA/IEP Conference on Turkey and the Community, Bonn, 28 - 29 November 1980, p. 1.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    The category 3 divisions are at a quarter of their full war strengh in terms of personnel, possibly com-plete with fighting vehicles (some obsolescent). Cf. The Military Balance 1982 - 1983, p. 15.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    The deployment of forces in these military districts is as follows: Kiev, 11 divisions (6 tank, 4 motor rifle, 1 artillery); Moscow, 7 divisions (2 tank, 4 motor rifle, 1 airborne); Volga, 3 motor rifle divi-sions; Turkestan, 6 divisions (5 motor rifle, 1 artillery).Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Cf. The Military Balance 1982 - 1983, p. 20.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Cf. International Herald Tribune, 29 November, 1978.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    All data on the Turkish armed forces is from The Military Balance 1982 - 83, cit., p. 44.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    For the financial data and a complete list of the planned purchases, cf. Senate Delegation Report, Per-spectives on NATO’s Southern Flank, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 3 - 13 April 1980 (Washington: USGPO, 1980), p. 16.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    For the fiscal year 1981, the U.S. Congress approved 250 million dollars for the Foreign Military Sales Program and 200 million for the economic aid program and about 2 million for the International Mili-tary Education and Training (IME) program. For fiscal year 1982, the United States increased its aid to 700 million dollars (300 million in economic aid and 400 in military aid). Of the 400 million in mili-tary aid, 250 were provided at low interests rates. In addition, the aid for the IMET program was to be increased form 1.6 to 3.5 million dollars. Cf. International Communication Agency, Daily Wireless File, No. 53, 18 March 1981.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    In the course of 1982 the Iraqi pipeline through Syria was frequently sabotaged. On Iraqi oil output, cf. Financial Times 4 January 1982, p. 1; 8 January 1982, p. 14; 1 June 1982, p. 3; and 3 December 1982, p. 3.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    On the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean, cf. Andrew Mison, The Aegean Dispute (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers No. 155, 1980).Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Greece’s insistence and the impossibility of finding a compromise formula prevented the formulation and issue of a final communique for the first time in the Alliance’s history.Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Cf. Der Spiegel, 4 February 1980, pp. 33 - 34.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Leske Verlag + Budrich GmbH, Opladen 1990

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  • Maurizio Cremasco

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