Abstract
Phenomenological interview methods (PIMs) have become important tools for investigating subjective, first-person accounts of the novel experiences of people using neurotechnologies. Through the deep exploration of personal experience, PIMs help reveal both the structures shared between and notable differences across experiences. However, phenomenological methods vary on what aspects of experience they aim to capture and what they may overlook. Much discussion of phenomenological methods has remained within the philosophical and broader bioethical literature. Here, we begin with a conceptual primer and preliminary guide for using phenomenological methods to investigate the experiences of neural device users.
To improve and expand the methodology of phenomenological interviewing, especially in the context of the experience of neural device users, we first briefly survey three different PIMs, to demonstrate their features and shortcomings. Then we argue for a critical phenomenology—rejecting the ‘neutral’ phenomenological subject—that encompasses temporal and ecological aspects of the subjects involved, including interviewee and interviewer (e.g. age, gender, social situation, bodily constitution, language skills, potential cognitive disease-related impairments, traumatic memories) as well as their relationality to ensure embedded and situated interviewing. In our view, PIMs need to be based on a conception of experience that includes and emphasizes the relational and situated, as well as the anthropological, political and normative dimensions of embodied cognition.
We draw from critical phenomenology and trauma-informed qualitative work to argue for an ethically sensitive interviewing process from an applied phenomenological perspective. Drawing on these approaches to refine PIMs, researchers will be able to proceed more sensitively in exploring the interviewee’s relationship with their neuroprosthetic and will consider the relationship between interviewer and interviewee on both interpersonal and social levels.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
A broad definition or frame is offered by Høffding, Martiny, Roepstroff (2022): “There is nothing particularly phenomenological about the phenomenological interview itself. It is a shorthand term for a phenomenologically informed or phenomenologically enhanced qualitative interview.”.
- 4.
The terms “experiencing” and “felt sense” are very close to each other in Eugene Gendlin’s work. “Experiencing” means a pre-conceptual, physically perceptible, but still undifferentiable experience from which meanings and feelings can be explicated. The experience in the very respective moment is called “felt sense”. It is a spontaneously emerging experience, not explicit feelings or personal patterns. “Felt sense” is also sometimes addressed as “felt meaning” or bodily comprehension (Gendlin 1962/1997).
- 5.
In this sense, PIMs are more science oriented than psychology/psychotherapy oriented. Psychotherapy is focused on the subject as a particular person and may appeal to introspection in its concern about the way and the why of the person’s experience of the world, here and now. (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008).
- 6.
A more detailed description about the difference of “person-centered” and “phenomena-centered” approaches in first person perspective methodologies is provided by Lumma and Weger (2021).
- 7.
Petitmengin (2006).
- 8.
As Høffding and Martiny (2016) point out, in an interview, two autonomous subjects, capable of producing accounts of themselves and their worlds, interact together in an ever-developing conversation. The interviewer needs to take an empathic second-person position in order to generate or enable resonance between the interviewer and interviewee in order to explicate and understand the chosen experience (Varela and Shear 1999).
- 9.
Epoché is a methodological step in Husserl’s phenomenological reflection and enables the “phenomenological attitude”: Epoché means that the assumption of the validity of reality and everyday consciousness (“natural attitude”), is bracketed. Through this bracketing, pure consciousness becomes the subject of reflection. Through this methodological step, no prior empirical knowledge is used.
- 10.
Accordingly, it seems unlikely that phenomenological interviewing is aiming (and able) to replace qualitative methods completely as it depends entirely on the research question or case whether using a phenomenologically grounded approach makes sense or not.
- 11.
In Bevan (2014) and Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), the phenomenological reduction is undertaken by the interviewer in order to abstain from the use of personal knowledge, theory, or beliefs. Benner (1994) recommends that the interviewer, as a kind of phenomenological reduction, mirrors the language and vocabulary of the interviewee and listens actively in order to clarify and probe what has been said. Varela and Shear (1999) frame the position of the interviewer as “not that of a neutral anthropologist; it is rather one of a coach or a midwife. His/her trade is grounded on a sensitivity to the subtle indices of his interlocutor’s phrasing, bodily language and expressiveness, seeking for indices (more or less explicit) which are inroads into the common experiential ground.”.
- 12.
Depending on the method, video recording or a second interviewer person can be useful in order to capture bodily gestures, moods, facial expressions, hesitation, characteristics of the interview room and to translate this into the interview transcript as well.
- 13.
A detailed overview on phenomenological interview methods is provided f.e. in the paper of Lumma & Weger (2021).
- 14.
The name of the method changed several times: phenomenological psychological method, the existential-phenomenological psychological method, the qualitative phenomenological method, human science psychology (Englander & Morley 2021).
- 15.
IPA also acknowledges a debt to symbolic interactionism with its concern for how meanings are constructed by individuals within both a social and a personal world. Smith & Osborn (2007).
- 16.
“In our, view the question of experimenting with phenomenology (or naturalizing it) need not involve a large ideological controversy. It is rather a strictly methodological question. Can phenomenological methods, or the results produced by following the phenomenological method, be methodologically integrated into experimental settings? That is, the question is not about phenomenological method, or phenomenology per se, but about the methodological procedures that would allow phenomenology to be used in the behavioral and cognitive neurosciences” (Gallagher & Brøsted Sørensen (2006), 130). Also, front-loaded phenomenology does not require participant training and starts with previously obtained phenomenological insights that inform the interview. Gallagher, S. (2003).
- 17.
In many ways, Gendlin is a pioneer of contemporary philosophy rediscovering the importance of an actual philosophical practice by inventing methods like ‘‘Focusing’’ and ‘‘Thinking-At-the-Edge’’.
- 18.
We find this in French phenomenology particularly in Merleau-Ponty’s work.
- 19.
Iris Marion Young “Throwing Like a Girl” is among the earliest texts in this regard and can be read as the initiation text of a feminist phenomenology that draws on Merleau-Ponty. Another example is the work of Luce Irigaray who was influenced by Levinas and focuses on difference and alterity and defends an asymmetry of the sexes based on a theory of lived gender.
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Acknowledgements
The work of authors Vera Borrmann, Erika Versalovic, Eran Klein and Sara Goering were partly supported by a grant by the National Institutes of Health, USA (no. RF1MH117800). The work of author Philipp Kellmeyer was partially supported by a grant (no. 00.001.2019) from the Klaus Tschira Foundation, Germany. We would like to thank the Neuroethics Research Group at the University of Washington for valuable feedback.
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Borrmann, V. et al. (2024). Situated and Ethically Sensitive Interviewing: Critical Phenomenology in the Context of Neurotechnology. In: Heinrichs, JH., Beck, B., Friedrich, O. (eds) Neuro-ProsthEthics. Techno:Phil – Aktuelle Herausforderungen der Technikphilosophie , vol 9. J.B. Metzler, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-68362-0_10
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