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Bilanzpolitik – Grundlagen

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Vgl zu einer solchen Definition etwa Healy/Wahlen (1999), S. 368.

  2. 2.

    Nach IFRS 16 wird dagegen bei einem Sale and Lease Back das zurückbehaltene Nutzungsrecht weiterhin mit dessen Buchwert angesetzt. Ein Gewinn oder Verlust wird damit nur für die sonstigen übertragenen Rechte realisiert.

  3. 3.

    Vgl zB Stein (1993), S. 983 ff.

  4. 4.

    Vgl Walker (2013), S. 457.

  5. 5.

    Glaum/Landsman/Meyer (2022) zeigen, dass big bath accounting weltweit verbreitet und positiv mit dem Umfang der in einem Land eingeräumten bilanzpolitischen Spielräume assoziiert ist.

  6. 6.

    Vgl Beidleman (1973), S. 653.

  7. 7.

    Vgl dazu Trueman/Titman (1988).

  8. 8.

    Vgl Ronen/Sadan (1981), S. 9 f.

  9. 9.

    Vgl Fudenberg/Tirole (1995) und entsprechende empirische Analysen bei DeFond/Park (1997).

  10. 10.

    Vgl zB Wagner (2005), S. 497 f.

  11. 11.

    Vgl dazu im Überblick Dechow/Skinner (2000), S. 244 f.

  12. 12.

    Vgl auch Baetge/Ballwieser (1978), S. 518 ff.

  13. 13.

    Eine Liste von Indizien für das Vorliegen von Unrichtigkeiten und Manipulationen in der Bilanz aus Sicht des Abschlussprüfers findet sich zB im Prüfungsstandard PS 210 des IDW.

  14. 14.

    So Guay/Kothari/Watts (1996), S. 86; zum Folgenden S. 87.

  15. 15.

    Vgl zur Diskussion zB Healy/Wahlen (1999), S. 374 f.

  16. 16.

    Vgl Dechow/Sloan/Sweeney (1996), S. 27.

  17. 17.

    Vgl dazu Aboody (1996). Die Abschreibungsverpflichtung unterscheidet sich in den USA nach der Bilanzierung der Explorationskosten mit full cost (die gesamten Explorationskosten werden aktiviert) oder successful effort (nur die Explorationskosten der erfolgreichen Aufsuchungen werden aktiviert). Letztere müssen bestimmte außerplanmäßige Abschreibungen, die erstere bilanzieren, nur im Anhang angeben. Aboody zeigt, dass die Kapitalmarktreaktion bei Angabe im Anhang praktisch null ist, während sie sich bei Bilanzierung sehr wohl auswirkt.

  18. 18.

    Vgl Imhoff/Lipe/Wright (1995).

  19. 19.

    Vgl zB Watts/Zimmerman (1986), S. 71 ff.

  20. 20.

    Vgl zB Küting/Weber (2012), S. 406 ff.

  21. 21.

    Vgl zB Dechow/Sloan/Sweeney (1995), Dechow/Schrand (2004).

  22. 22.

    Vgl Dechow/Sloan/Sweeney (1995).

  23. 23.

    Vgl McNichols (2000), Dechow/Richardson/Tuna (2003).

  24. 24.

    Vgl Kothari/Leone/Wasley (2005).

  25. 25.

    Vgl Thomas/Zhang (2000), S. 350.

  26. 26.

    Vgl Ball (2013), S. 851 f.

  27. 27.

    Vgl Chen/Hribar/Melessa (2018).

  28. 28.

    Vgl Dechow/Ge/Schrand (2010), S. 371–376.

  29. 29.

    Für die Querschnittsanalyse werden noch mehrere Kontrollvariablen für Unterschiede zwischen den Unternehmen eingeführt.

  30. 30.

    Vgl Degeorge/Patel/Zeckhauser (1999).

  31. 31.

    Vgl zB Dechow/Richardson/Tuna (2003).

  32. 32.

    Vgl Hemmer/Labro (2019).

  33. 33.

    Umfassende Überblicke über solche Studien finden sich zB in Fields/Lys/Vincent (2001), Armstrong/Guay/Weber (2010), Dechow/Ge/Schrand (2010), Walker (2013).

  34. 34.

    Vgl Loughran/Ritter (1995).

  35. 35.

    Vgl Dechow/Skinner (2000), S. 245 f.

  36. 36.

    Vgl Watts/Zimmerman (1986), S. 208.

  37. 37.

    Vgl Healy (1985), S. 90 f, ähnlich auch Degeorge/Patel/Zeckhauser (1999), S. 8 ff.

  38. 38.

    Vgl Watts/Zimmerman (1986), S. 216.

  39. 39.

    Vgl Fields/Lys/Vincent (2001).

  40. 40.

    Vgl zB Beatty/Weber (2003).

  41. 41.

    Vgl Miller/Skinner (1998), S. 218 f.

  42. 42.

    So Dechow/Sloan (1991), S. 75.

  43. 43.

    Vgl kritisch dazu Murphy/Zimmerman (1993), S. 307 ff.

  44. 44.

    Vgl zB Beaver/Ryan/Wahlen (1997).

  45. 45.

    Stein (1993), S. 992, mit Verweis auf Rückle (1983), S. 207.

  46. 46.

    Haller/Park (1995), S. 104 f.

  47. 47.

    Murphy/Zimmerman (1993), S. 305.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Graz, Österreich

    Alfred Wagenhofer, Ralf Ewert & Georg Schneider

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  1. Alfred Wagenhofer
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Literaturempfehlungen

Literaturempfehlungen

1.1 Allgemeine Literatur

  • Dechow, P.M./Skinner, D.J.: Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators, Accounting Horizons 2000, S. 235–250.

  • Walker, M.: How Far Can We Trust Earnings Numbers? What Research Tells Us About Earnings Management, Accounting and Business Research 2013, S. 445–481.

1.2 Spezielle Literatur

  • Dechow, P./Ge, W./Schrand, C.: Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences, Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 (2010), S. 344–401.

  • Ewert, R./Wagenhofer, A.: Earnings Management, Conservatism, and Earnings Quality, Foundations and Trends in Accounting 6 (2011), 2012, S. 65–186.

  • Fields, T.D./Lys, T.Z./Vincent, L.: Empirical Research on Accounting Choice, Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001), S. 255–307.

  • Graham, J.R./Harvey, C.R./Rajgopal, S.: The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, Journal of Accounting and Economics 40 (2005), S. 3–73.

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Wagenhofer, A., Ewert, R., Schneider, G. (2023). Bilanzpolitik – Grundlagen. In: Externe Unternehmensrechnung. Springer Gabler, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-67409-3_6

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