Abstract
Adaptor signatures (AS) are an extension of digital signatures that enable the encoding of a cryptographic hard problem (e.g., discrete logarithm) within the signature itself. An AS scheme ensures that (i) the signature can be created only by the user knowing the solution to the cryptographic problem; (ii) the signature reveals the solution itself; (iii) the signature can be verified with the standard verification algorithm. These properties have made AS a salient building block for many blockchain applications, in particular, off-chain payment systems such as payment-channel networks, payment-channel hubs, atomic swaps or discrete log contracts. Current AS constructions, however, are not secure against adversaries with access to a quantum computer.
In this work, we present \(\mathsf {IAS}\), a construction for adaptor signatures that relies on standard cryptographic assumptions for isogenies, and builds upon the isogeny-based signature scheme CSI-FiSh. We formally prove the security of \(\mathsf {IAS}\) against a quantum adversary. We have implemented \(\mathsf {IAS}\) and our evaluation shows that \(\mathsf {IAS}\) can be incorporated into current blockchains while requiring \(\sim \)1500 bytes of storage size on-chain and \(\sim \)140 ms for digital signature verification. We also show how \(\mathsf {IAS}\) can be seamlessly leveraged to build post-quantum off-chain payment applications without harming their security and privacy.
The full version of this paper is available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1345.
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Acknowledgements
This work has been partially supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Unions Horizon 2020 research (grant agreement No 771527-BROWSEC); by Netidee through the project EtherTrust (grant agreement 2158) and PROFET (grant agreement P31621); by the Austrian Research Promotion Agency through the Bridge-1 project PR4DLT (grant agreement 13808694); by COMET K1 SBA, ABC; by Chaincode Labs through the project SLN: Scalability for the Lightning Network; by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) through the Meitner program (project M-2608) and project W1255-N23.
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Tairi, E., Moreno-Sanchez, P., Maffei, M. (2021). Post-Quantum Adaptor Signature for Privacy-Preserving Off-Chain Payments. In: Borisov, N., Diaz, C. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12675. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64331-0_7
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