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The Limits of Reductionism: Thought, Life, and Reality

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Zusammenfassung

What is the best question reductionists would have to answer but cannot, and why exactly is there no reductionist answer to that question? To answer this question, we need to identify the relevant question.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Dutch National Science Foundation NWO, VENI Grant (grant number 275-20-068). I am grateful to Albert Visser for valuable feedback on an early version.

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Copyright information

© Der/die Autor(en), exklusiv lizenziert durch Springer-Verlag GmbH, DE, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2021

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Utrecht University, Department of Philosophy and Religious StudiesUtrechtNetherlands

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