Abstract
The main argument of this chapter is that ‘originalism’ and ‘legalism’, whether they are consciously or subconsciously present in the work of the International Law Commission, lead to the International Law Commission partaking in enabling states to use International Law in a cynical fashion, mainly by legitimising a conceptualisation of international law characterised by wide-ranging state sovereignty and states as the exclusive norm entrepreneurs. This legitimisation is consequential, owing to the International Law Commission’s standing in international law.
‘Legalism’ describes the ideological belief that law and politics are two fundamentally different and separate things, and politics is inferior to law, while ‘originalism’ is a term borrowed from United States constitutional scholarship, meaning that the US Constitution must be interpreted based on the original understanding at the time of its drafting. Adapted for the context of the International Law Commission, ‘originalism’ describes a static concept of international law, wherein a treaty, convention, or other document, once concluded, can only be interpreted based on the understanding at the time of its drafting.
Examples for the influence of ‘originalism’ and ‘legalism’ in the International Law Commission include the insistence on (artificially) separating codification and progressive development in the work of the Commission, while regularly discouraging the progressive dimension, and the uncritical readoption of decades old legal texts. Further, the tendency towards reducing international law to what has been established as backed by state consent, and the deliberate reduction of topics of work to uncontroversial issues by excluding anything with a political dimension can be understood as resulting from a belief in ‘legalism’ and ‘originalism’.
In conclusion, the chapter argues that the International Law Commission must become more cynical to stay relevant and no longer turn a blind eye on the cynical, self-interest-driven ways of states in using international law.
The author has been an assistant to Dr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina in the International Law Commission from 2015 until 2019. All the views expressed are his own and not endorsed in any way by the Commission. The author thanks the participants at the Cynical International Law conference in Berlin, and of the PhD Roundtable at the Graduate Institute, Geneva, for their helpful critical comments. In particular, the author would like to thank Professor Patrícia Galvão Teles, Professor Nico Krisch, Dr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Daimeon Dean Shanks, Dr. Dana Burchardt, and Dr. Björnstjern Baade for detailed comments and editing.
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Notes
- 1.
Transcription from the oral recording of the author, see for the written record: ILC, Provisional summary record of the 3331st meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Friday, 29 July 2016, at 10 a.m., UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3331 (21 September 2016), p. 12.
- 2.
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cynic. Accessed 7 June 2019.
- 3.
Article 1(1) Statute of the International Law Commission, adopted by UN General Assembly, Resolution 174 (II), UN Doc A/RES/174(II) (21 Nov 1947), last amended by UN General Assembly, Resolution 36/39, UN Doc A/Res/36/39 (18 November 1981).
- 4.
Article 8 Statute of the International Law Commission.
- 5.
Article 3 Statute of the International Law Commission.
- 6.
Article 16(a) Statute of the International Law Commission.
- 7.
UN General Assembly, Resolution 56/83, UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (12 December 2001).
- 8.
Crawford (2006), para. 65.
- 9.
The author was assigned the first and second report on the identification of customary international law, written by Michael Wood, during his LL.M., a non-representative survey among colleagues leads to the conclusion that this practice is widespread.
- 10.
Shklar (1986).
- 11.
- 12.
Shklar (1986), p. vii.
- 13.
Id., p. vii.
- 14.
Marx (2018).
- 15.
West (2003), p. 130.
- 16.
Shklar (1986), pp. vii–viii.
- 17.
Id., p. viii.
- 18.
Id., p. 1.
- 19.
Id., p. 168; see also Rawls (1999), pp. 73 et seq.
- 20.
Carroll and Hattenstone (2014).
- 21.
Eyerman (1981).
- 22.
For the remainder of this text, ‘legalism’ means ‘ideological legalism’, if not indicated otherwise.
- 23.
See for the gender aspects of this distinction Cohn (1993).
- 24.
See also Kammerhofer (2012), p. 366.
- 25.
Shklar (1986), pp. 13 et seq.
- 26.
Moyn (2013), p. 494.
- 27.
Kohlrausch (1910).
- 28.
Marx (2018).
- 29.
- 30.
- 31.
- 32.
See Koskenniemi, M., Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 Apr 2006).
- 33.
- 34.
- 35.
- 36.
- 37.
Lehto (2014), p. 297.
- 38.
Krisch (2014).
- 39.
While it is unclear when precisely only states were the masters of international law-making, it seems that at least during the period of the League of Nations the paradigm of state consent was less contested than today. See for example Tomuschat (1994), p. 210 referencing again the Lotus case; Koskenniemi (2005), p. 309; but also Rommen (1998), p. 131 already positing in 1936 (first publication as Die ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrechts) that ‘[i]nternational law cannot be based solely on the mere self-obligation of sovereign states’.
- 40.
With detailed critique of the persistent objector rule Charney (1993), pp. 538 et seq.
- 41.
See on the limits of reservations, invalid reservations, and the conflict with state consent Goodman (2002).
- 42.
- 43.
Shklar (1986), p. 9.
- 44.
- 45.
- 46.
Zarbiyev (2012), pp. 259–260.
- 47.
Scharf (2014).
- 48.
Brest (1980).
- 49.
Solum (2011), pp. 3 et seq.
- 50.
- 51.
- 52.
- 53.
Baude and Sachs (2019a), p. 816.
- 54.
- 55.
Kaufman (2014), p. 39.
- 56.
Baude and Sachs (2019a), p. 810.
- 57.
Solum (2011), p. 5.
- 58.
Baude and Sachs (2019b), pp. 1490–1591.
- 59.
- 60.
Kaufman (2014), p. 50.
- 61.
See for originalism as ideology in the Hegelian sense Greve (2019).
- 62.
See 557 UNTS 143; 638 UNTS 308; 892 UNTS 119.
- 63.
Kammerhofer (2012), p. 366: ‘The UN Charter does not change because and when the political constellations change.’
- 64.
Solum (2011), pp. 8–9.
- 65.
Under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the travaux préparatoires are only meant to be ‘supplementary means of interpretation’, only to be used if the meaning of a treaty provision would remain unclear, ambiguous, or absurd without their consultation.
- 66.
Referencing Hersch Lauterpacht’s position, Klabbers (2003), p. 277.
- 67.
Articles 1, 15–24 Statute of the International Law Commission.
- 68.
Chen (2010), p. 474.
- 69.
Article 16(a) Statute of the International Law Commission.
- 70.
Ramcharan (1977), pp. 23–24.
- 71.
von Bogdandy and Venzke (2013), pp. 505 et seq.
- 72.
This was particularly evident in, but not limited to, the discussion on the topic of ‘Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction’.
- 73.
See for example the statement by Jesús María Yepes in the debate on the Regime of the High Seas with respect to the continental shelf: ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1950; Volume I: Summary records of the second session 5 June–29 July 1950, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1950 (1958), pp. 216–217.
- 74.
McRae (1988).
- 75.
- 76.
Currently, more than half of the members of the commission are (former) career diplomats, in most cases ambassadors, have served or are still serving in cabinet level positions in government, or as principal/senior legal advisor to the foreign ministry. This is not counting those members who have been occasionally advising governments, served as ad-hoc judges, or represented their country in international judicial proceedings. This development has been ongoing for decades, see Sinclair (1987), p. 18; Schachter (1988), p. 4.
- 77.
A notable exception being Martti Koskenniemi, the living ‘folk hero’ of Critical Legal Studies in International Law, who was a member of the ILC 2002–2006.
- 78.
ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1979. Volume II, Part 2: Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its thirty-first session, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.l (Part 2) (1980), p. 186.
- 79.
See Tladi D, First Report on Jus Cogens, UN Doc A/CN.4/693 (8 March 2016).
- 80.
ILC, Report of the International Law Commission: Seventy-first session (29 April–7 June and 8 July–9 August 2019), UN Doc A/74/10 (2019), Chapter V.
- 81.
See in the report itself Tladi, supra note 79, para. 53.
- 82.
Id., para. 11.
- 83.
Id., para. 59.
- 84.
Id., para. 73.
- 85.
Koskenniemi (2005), p. 324; although the report frames it as part of the debate between positivism and natural law, see Tladi, supra note 79.
- 86.
Tladi, supra note 79, para. 53.
- 87.
ILC, Report 2019, supra note 80, p. 142.
- 88.
Tladi, supra note 79, para. 61.
- 89.
Apart from the statement by Dr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, which had been co-authored by the author of this chapter, this included notably Donald Malcolm McRae, see ILC, Provisional summary record of the 3315th meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 5 July 2016, at 10 a.m., UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3315 (10 August 2016), pp. 6 et seq.
- 90.
ILC, Provisional summary record of the 3369th meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 4 July 2017, at 10 a.m., UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3369 (8 August 2017), p. 5.
- 91.
Tladi D, Fourth Report on Peremptory Norms of General International Kaw (Jus Cogens), UN Doc A/CN.4/727 (31 January 2019), pp. 24–63.
- 92.
This includes notably the commentaries and travaux préparatoires for the VCLT, see ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966. Volume II: Documents of the second part of the seventeenth session and of the eighteenth session including the reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l (1968); which are themselves reproduced in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, see ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001. Volume II, Part Two: Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (2007), p. 112 (footnote 641); both commentaries are referenced again in the present work of the Commission on peremptory norms.
- 93.
ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2007. Volume II, Part 2: Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-ninth session, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2007/Add.1 (Part 2) (2014), p. 98.
- 94.
ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2012. Volume II, Part 2: Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its sixty-fourth session, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2012/Add.1 (Part 2) (2018), p. 85.
- 95.
See for the roll call vote ILC, Provisional summary record of the 3378th meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 20 July 2017, at 10 a.m., UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3378 (18 August 2017), p. 13, the discussion preceding the vote commences at p. 9 of the same document; for the follow up discussion at the adoption of the yearly report see: ILC, Provisional summary record of the 3387th meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 3 August 2017, at 10 a.m., UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3378 (4 September 2017), pp. 8 et seq.
- 96.
See for example ILC, Provisional summary record of the 3481st meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 16 July 2019, at 10 a.m., UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3481 (26 August 2019), pp. 16–17; Provisional summary record of the 3483rd meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 17 July 2019, at 10 a.m., UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3483 (26 August 2019), pp. 3–4; for the discussion in the Sixth Committee see: UN General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 19th meeting: Sixth Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 24 October 2017, UN Doc A/C.6/72/SR.19 (20 November 2017); Summary record of the 21st meeting: Sixth Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 25 October 2017, UN Doc A/C.6/72/SR.21 (6 November 2017); Summary record of the 22nd meeting: Sixth Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 26 October 2017, UN Doc A/C.6/72/SR.22 (27 November 2017); Summary record of the 23rd meeting: Sixth Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 27 October 2017, UN Doc A/C.6/72/SR.23 (17 November 2017); Summary record of the 24th meeting: Sixth Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 27 October 2017, UN Doc A/C.6/72/SR.24 (30 November 2017); Summary record of the 25th meeting: Sixth Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 31 October 2017, UN Doc A/C.6/72/SR.25 (24 November 2017); Summary record of the 26th meeting: Sixth Committee, held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 1 November 2017, UN Doc A/C.6/72/SR.26 (5 December 2017).
- 97.
ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2013. Volume II, Part 2: Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its sixty-fifth session, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2013/Add.1 (Part 2) (2018), p. 79.
- 98.
Id., p. 79.
- 99.
See for example these instances only (!) from the 2016 session: ILC, Provisional summary record of the 3307th meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 31 May 2016, at 10 a.m., UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3307 (8 July 2016), pp. 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19; ILC, Provisional summary record of the 3308th meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 1 June 2016, at 10 a.m., UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3308 (1 May 2017), pp. 4, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18; Provisional summary record of the 3311st meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 7 June 2016, at 10 a.m., UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3311 (8 July 2016), pp. 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 16; Provisional summary record of the 3314th meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Monday, 4 July 2016, at 3 p.m., UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3314 (28 April 2017), p. 19.
- 100.
ILC, Provisional summary record of the 3308th meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 1 June 2016, at 10 a.m., A/CN.4/SR.3308 (1 May 2017), pp. 11, 13, 16, 17.
- 101.
McRae supra note 1.
- 102.
Kaufman (2014), p. 51.
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Kleine, K. (2021). The International Law Commission as a Club of Cynics? Originalism and Legalism in the Commission’s Contemporary Work. In: Baade, B., et al. Cynical International Law?. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 296. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62128-8_5
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