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Cynical International Law? pp 37–57Cite as

Beyond Cynicism and Critique: International Law and the Possibility of Change

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Part of the book series: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht ((BEITRÄGE,volume 296))

Abstract

In this chapter, I seek to map and analyse potential negative consequences of cynicism and critique in international law scholarship. Clearly, there is a lot to be cynical and critical about and many reasons for wanting to change the world. But I argue that for real change both discursive practices can have the unintended effect of contributing to the legitimation of the status quo. Using examples from international criminal law, I show how cynicism and critique are not productive as such. I also demonstrate, among other consequences, that the more one uncovers the hidden mechanisms and structures of power in international law, the fewer alternatives cynics as well as critics are able to identify, leading them to believe that reality—while lamentable—is still the best of all possible worlds. To overcome this fatalism, I call for imagining new strategies for change that go beyond existing categories of law and legal institutions. As an illustration, I present an alternative programme for international criminal law that focuses on removing the structural root causes of violence rather than mitigating only individual symptoms.

The author would like to thank Janne Nijman, Dana Burchardt and Linus Mührel for very valuable comments on earlier drafts of this chapter and Oleksandra Novikova for excellent research assistance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Chomsky (2017), p. 196.

  2. 2.

    Kennedy (2016), pp. 31–32.

  3. 3.

    Schwöbel (2014), p. 8, already raised this issue in relation to critique of international criminal law asking ‘[i]n how far does an engaged critique (a dialectic between practice and theory) strengthen precisely those structures which it aims to unsettle?’

  4. 4.

    Baloyra (1979), p. 994.

  5. 5.

    Sloterdijk (1987), pp. 5–6. For a discussion of the different concepts of cynicism, see Björnstjern Baade et al., ‘How (Not) to Be Cynical’, in this volume; and Hengameh Saberi, ‘Cynicism as a Modus of Political Agency: Can It Speak to International Law’, in this volume.

  6. 6.

    This is very well captured in Brecht’s Threepenny Opera: ‘Wir wären gut, anstatt so roh, / Doch die Verhältnisse, sie sind nicht so!’ (‘We’d like to be good instead of so mean, but the conditions just won’t allow it’.).

  7. 7.

    Christine Schwöbel uses a distinction within critics: ‘effectiveness critique’ on the one hand, dealing merely with the question of how to make the existing institutions more effective and ‘assumptions critique’ on the other hand, that seeks to question the underlying assumptions of the usefulness of institutions in the first place, see Schwöbel (2014), pp. 3–4. The arguments advanced here apply to both forms of critique.

  8. 8.

    MacAskill (2017), p. 2; Singer (2015), pp. 4–5.

  9. 9.

    I am here mostly influenced by Judith Shklar’s view on legalism as ideology, see Shklar (1986). See also Posner (2009), Hurd (2017). On the limitation of knowing due to differing social positions that generate variable constructions of reality and afford different perspectives on the world, see generally Alcoff (2007).

  10. 10.

    Rudolph (2017), pp. 89–112.

  11. 11.

    Id.

  12. 12.

    Alcoff (2007).

  13. 13.

    https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-to-icc-assembly-of-states-parties-17th-session. Accessed 30 April 2020.

  14. 14.

    See for an overview of the International Criminal Court’s problems, Guilfoyle (2019). On the problem of double standards at the International Criminal Court, see Lentner (2020).

  15. 15.

    Chimni (2004), pp. 13–14.

  16. 16.

    Doudou Thiam (Special Rapporteur), Third Report on the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, UN Doc A/CN.4/387 (8 Apr 1985), paras. 157–162.

  17. 17.

    On the ICC’s actions in Africa, see Branch (2017).

  18. 18.

    https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-july-2017/icc-beyond-threats-withdrawal. Accessed 30 April 2020.

  19. 19.

    See on the status of the preliminary examinations and investigations, https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/pe.aspx. Accessed 30 April 2020.

  20. 20.

    See generally on the ICC’s African dilemmas, Branch (2017).

  21. 21.

    Kennedy and Tennant (1994), p. 427 (comments made by Martti Koskenniemi).

  22. 22.

    Jodoin and Lofts (2014), pp. 333–334.

  23. 23.

    Kennedy (2016), p. 32.

  24. 24.

    Id., p. 112.

  25. 25.

    Moyn (2018).

  26. 26.

    Kennedy (2002), pp. 119–120.

  27. 27.

    These questions have, for example, motivated an entire movement of so-called effective altruists who seek to maximise their contribution to make other peoples’ lives better, see Singer (2015).

  28. 28.

    Cooper (2014), p. 217.

  29. 29.

    On the ICC’s progress narrative, see Armenian (2016).

  30. 30.

    See Kennedy (2000), pp. 105–106. For challenging the latter, see Lentner (2018), pp. 10–31. An example of this in foreign policy is the unfulfilled promise of change during the Obama administration. Instead of transformational change of US foreign policy, Obama merely engaged in ‘modest reform under primacy and market liberalism, instead of the transformational change he promised, while rhapsodising about the arc of the moral universe. This … preclud[es] any reassessment of the fundamentals, which are fixed and sound, presupposing the status quo and history’s direction’, Porter (2020).

  31. 31.

    See also Schwöbel (2014), p. 12.

  32. 32.

    Challenging this narrative, see Lentner (2020).

  33. 33.

    Plato (1968), 339a, 16; Bass (2000), p. 9.

  34. 34.

    Kennedy (2016), p. 259.

  35. 35.

    Sypnowich (2014).

  36. 36.

    Anghie (2006), Anghie (2004) and Bowden (2005).

  37. 37.

    Snyder (2018), p. 7.

  38. 38.

    The idea that ‘humanity is moving in the direction of better and more perfect civilization, and that this progression can be witnessed through study of the history of civilization’ itself reaches back to enlightenment thinking, where it replaced religious interpretations of history, see Little (2017).

  39. 39.

    I do not seek to impose this as a requirement of critique. On this point I agree with political theorist Raymond Geuss when he writes about ‘the effort to impose the requirement of “positivity” or “constructiveness” on potential critics: you can’t criticise the police system, the system of labour law, the organisation of the health services, etc., unless you have a completely elaborated, positive alternative to propose. … to accept it is to allow the existing social formation to dictate the terms on which it can be criticised, and to allow it to impose a theoretically unwarranted burden of positive proof on any potential critic’. Geuss (2008), pp. 95–96. However, as a general attitude towards knowledge production, I do advocate investing resources into finding alternatives as part of any critical endeavour.

  40. 40.

    Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-02/17-33 (12 Apr 2019).

  41. 41.

    Schlag (1989/90).

  42. 42.

    Ginsburg and Stephanopoulos (2017), p. 147.

  43. 43.

    d’Aspremont (2020) and Schlag (1989/90).

  44. 44.

    Kennedy (2002), p. 108.

  45. 45.

    See e.g. Nowak (2015).

  46. 46.

    Kennedy (2002), p. 108.

  47. 47.

    Rosen (2006), pp. 4–5.

  48. 48.

    MacCormick (1995), p. 470; Veitch (2007), p. 77. Developing this idea further for the role of international law in international relations, see Hurd (2017).

  49. 49.

    Kahn (1999), pp. 138–139. In a similar vein, see d’Aspremont (2020), p. 10.

  50. 50.

    Alcoff (2007), p. 41 See also Lentner (2019).

  51. 51.

    Hurd (2017), pp. 129–138.

  52. 52.

    Id., p. 129.

  53. 53.

    Id., pp. 132–135.

  54. 54.

    Kennedy (2012), p. 24.

  55. 55.

    Id., p. 24.

  56. 56.

    Id.

  57. 57.

    Id., p. 20.

  58. 58.

    Id., p. 26.

  59. 59.

    Friedman (2016), pp. 97–138.

  60. 60.

    Generally, on prerequisites and factors for deterrence (that when applied to international criminal law does not easily suggest effective deterrence through international criminal law as it stands today) Friedman (2016), pp. 97–138. Doubting deterrent effects of international criminal law, specifically see Lentner (2018), p. 31; Hopgood (2013), p. 14; Tallgren (2002), p. 590; Vinjamuri (2010), pp. 205–206; Mohamed (2015), p. 1639. On the other hand, there are empirical studies that do suggest some effect on prevention of crimes, for an overview of existing studies, see Ford (2020). However, it is important to note the limitations of these empirical studies, as it is difficult to control for all variables that might better explain the phenomenon of reduced atrocity crimes being committed (so-called confounding variables).

  61. 61.

    Nouwen (2013).

  62. 62.

    Trying to fill that gap with a legal duty of states to prevent genocide, see Heieck (2018).

  63. 63.

    Reisman (2007–2009), p. 60.

  64. 64.

    Mohamed (2015), p. 1685. See also Bass (2000).

  65. 65.

    See for the general (polemic) critique of an unwarranted belief in the effectiveness of international courts based merely on their existence in Reisman (1993), p. 414 (‘This is all very discouraging for the incurable judicial romantics who look to courts as a type of deus ex machina, ready to descend, upon the mere utterance of some juridical incantations, and, thanks to mysterious powers inherent in the law, to bring order and justice to the most untidy, even violent political situations. Many judicial romantics subconsciously transpose some of the powerful emotive affects of the symbol “court” in municipal systems, where they have been significant struts of public order, to radically different environments. This can be disappointing and even dangerous. A court, by itself, is only a college of people. Its powers in any setting derive from a political process, of which it is a part, and which enfranchises it.’).

  66. 66.

    Knox (2009), pp. 430–431.

  67. 67.

    Linarelli et al. (2018), pp. 20–21.

  68. 68.

    Koskenniemi (2019), p. 7.

  69. 69.

    Schlag (1989/90) and d’Aspremont (2020).

  70. 70.

    Kennedy (2000), p. 104.

  71. 71.

    See Stiglitz (2001), pp. xv–xvi.

  72. 72.

    Linarelli et al. (2018), p. 18.

  73. 73.

    On the importance of individual prosecutions and actual enforcement of law see generally the empirical work on these questions, Friedman (2016). Punishment is a whole other issue, see Fassin (2018).

  74. 74.

    With respect to human rights law, see Kennedy (2002), p. 123.

  75. 75.

    Cf. Kennedy (2012), p. 20.

  76. 76.

    See e.g. the Report of the UN Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention, UN Doc A/71/1016-S/2017/556 (10 Aug 2017), paras. 13, 20, 24.

  77. 77.

    Lee (2016), p. 113.

  78. 78.

    Id., p. 113.

  79. 79.

    Id., p. 110; Farmer (2004), p. 307. See also Galtung (1969), pp. 167–191. Galtung thought that structural violence could be avoided when people become conscious of the imposition of limitations by social structures. For similar arguments on the connection between structural violence and poverty, see Pogge (2008).

  80. 80.

    Lee (2016), p. 110.

  81. 81.

    Id., p. 110.

  82. 82.

    Mohamed (2015), p. 1685.

  83. 83.

    Kennedy (2002), p. 118.

  84. 84.

    McLoughlin (2014), p. 413.

  85. 85.

    Id., pp. 409–413.

  86. 86.

    Uvin (2010), pp. 170–175.

  87. 87.

    McLoughlin (2014), pp. 422–423.

  88. 88.

    McLoughlin (2014), pp. 433–439.

  89. 89.

    McLoughlin (2014), pp. 424–425.

  90. 90.

    McLoughlin (2015), p. 29.

  91. 91.

    Haraway (1988).

  92. 92.

    Manne (2018), p. 32. See further Haslanger (2012), pp. 11, 411–418.

  93. 93.

    Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach.

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  1. Danube University Krems, Krems an der Donau, Austria

    Gabriel M. Lentner

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Lentner, G.M. (2021). Beyond Cynicism and Critique: International Law and the Possibility of Change. In: Baade, B., et al. Cynical International Law?. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 296. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62128-8_3

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