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Collaborative Platforms and Data Pools for Smart Urban Societies and Mobility as a Service (MaaS) from a Competition Law Perspective

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Smart Urban Mobility

Part of the book series: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law ((MSIP,volume 29))

Abstract

In smart urban settings, all devices and service providers monitor, collect and exchange data whilst device producers and service providers store, distribute, analyse and re-use data on a grand scale. If firms would like to combine such data, they need to give each other access by sharing, trading or pooling the data. On the one hand, the industry-wide pooling of data could increase the efficiency of certain services and contribute to the innovation of other services, e.g. whole transport networks that are available on one platform, or Mobility as a Service (MaaS). On the other hand, firms that pool business data may use the data not to advance their services or products but to collude, to exclude competitors or to abuse their market position. Indeed, by combining their data and collaborating they can gain market power and hence the ability to violate competition law. Platforms can also hoard data and design the data architecture so as to become system leaders in vertical value chains, exclusively obtaining all data from various sources and creating a silo or ecosystem. This chapter will discuss a new platform configuration regarding transport services. The platform is being developed and discussed according to the notion of MaaS. MaaS is a new transport paradigm that integrates existing and new mobility services as well as public and private transport services into one single digital platform, providing customised door-to-door transport and offering personalised trip planning and payment options. The development of integrated multimodal information systems and integrated payment solutions has enabled the MaaS concept to unfold. We will analyse the MaaS concept from a competition law perspective, asking whether the concept might be in violation of EU Competition Law, specifically Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU.

Björn Lundqvist is Associate Professor of Law Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.

Erion Murati is PhD Fellow at the MaaS Project, University of Hamburg, Law Faculty Hamburg, Germany.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Ministry of Transport and Communications of Finland, Act on Transport Services 320/2017 (amendments up to 731/2018 included) (Finnish Act on Transport Services) s 2 n 5 <www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2017/en20170320_20180731.pdf> accessed 30 March 2020.

  2. 2.

    The interoperability of data has been defined in academia as ‘the ability to transfer and render useful data and other information across systems, applications or components’. See Urs Gasser, ‘Interoperability in the Digital Ecosystem’ (ITU 2015) <www.itu.int/en/ITUD/Conferences/GSR/Documents/GSR2015/Discussion_papers_and_Presentations/Discussionpaper_interoperability.pdf> accessed 4 March 2020.

  3. 3.

    See, for example, the issue with accessing in-vehicle data from vehicle manufacturers. Bertin Martens and Frank Mueller-Langer, ‘Access to Digital Car Data and Competition in Aftersales Services’ (JRC EU Commission 2018) <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/jrc112634.pdf> accessed 31 March 2020.

  4. 4.

    Different bodies of law—copyright, patent, privacy, confidentiality and contract law—will be relevant to the collection, storage and dissemination of data. See Anne Fitzgerald, Kylie Pappalardo and Anthony Austin, ‘Understanding the Legal Implications of Data Sharing, Access and Reuse in the Australian Research Landscape’ in Brian Fitzgerald (ed), Legal Framework for e-Research: Realising the Potential (Sydney University Press 2018) 161-188.

  5. 5.

    Göran Smith, Jana Sochor and MariAnne Karlsson, ‘Public-private Innovation: Barriers in the Case of Mobility as a Service in West Sweden’ (2019) 21 Journal Public Management Review 116.

  6. 6.

    Sonja Heikkilä, ‘Mobility as A Service: A Proposal for Action for the Public Administration Case Helsinki’ (Master Thesis, Aalto University 2014) <https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/13133> accessed 31 March 2020.

  7. 7.

    Trafi, ‘Trafi & BVG’S All in One Mobility App Jelbi Goes Live in Berlin’ (Traffi, 11 June 2019) <www.trafi.com/site/press-release/trafi-bvgs-all-in-one-mobility-app-jelbi-goes-live-in-berlin> accessed 22 March 2020.

  8. 8.

    See Trafi, ‘MVG and Trafi to Launch Mobility as a Service Solution in Munich’ (Medium, 11 June 2019) <https://medium.com/trafi/mvg-and-trafi-to-launch-mobility-as-a-service-solution-in-munich-9a2c0f0ada9e> accessed 22 March 2020.

  9. 9.

    Maria Kamargianni, Weibo Li and Melinda Matyas, ‘A Comprehensive Review of “Mobility as A Service” Systems’ (Transportation Research Board 95th Annual Meeting, Washington DC, 10-14 January 2016).

  10. 10.

    Jana Sochor, Helena Strömberg and MariAnne Karlsson, ‘Implementing Mobility as a Service: Challenges in Integrating User, Commercial, and Societal Perspectives’ (2015) 2536 Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board 1; see also, Jana Sochor, MariAnne Karlsson and Helena Strömberg, ‘Trying Out Mobility as a Service: Experiences from a Field Trial and Implications for Understanding Demand’ (2016) 2542 Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board 57.

  11. 11.

    Markku Tinnilä, ‘Towards Servitization of Mobility: Mobility as a Service’ (2016) 8 International Journal of Research in Business and Technology 958.

  12. 12.

    The MaaS platform is the IT structure used by the MaaS operator to provide the final service of mobility to end-users. The MaaS platform is split into two elements, the front-end and the back-end, both of which are made up of components developed by the IT providers. The front-end is the customer-facing element. It is a digital interface such as a mobile and/or web application which customers interact with to purchase and use MaaS products. The back-end is the internal support element that enables the delivery of MaaS. It is a collection of components which perform integral functions such as data import, data storage, journey planning, optimisation, ticketing, payment and communication. The MaaS platform provider is the company responsible for providing the MaaS platform. This could be the MaaS operator or a third party responsible for just the technological elements. See Maria Kamargianni and others, ‘The MaaS Dictionary’ (MaaSLab, University College London 2018) <https://28716f27-42ea-4260-ac26-48e00a153449.filesusr.com/ugd/a2135d_d6ffa2fee2834782b4ec9a75c1957f55.pdf> accessed 31 March 2020.

  13. 13.

    See Kiran Desal, ‘Sharing Data: the 4D Competition Law Model to Determining Data Value Available’ (EY Law, June 2019) <www.eylaw.be/2019/06/04/sharing-data-the-4d-competition-law-model-to-determining-data-value/#_ftn2> accessed 18 March 2020.

  14. 14.

    In addition, data protection rules may be violated when large sets of data are combined, which in turn may cause antitrust rules to be triggered. See further on the Facebook investigation being conducted by the German Competition Authority, ‘Bundeskartellamt Initiates Proceeding Against Facebook on Suspicion of Having Abused its Market Power by Infringing Data Protection Rules’ (Bundeskartellamt, 2 March 2016) <www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_03_2016_Facebook.html> accessed 13 July 2018.

  15. 15.

    See Martens and Mueller-Langer (n 3).

  16. 16.

    See Laura Bliss, ‘A Controversial Scooter Data Tracking Program Gains Traction’ (CITYLAB, 23 August 2019) <www.citylab.com/transportation/2019/08/scooter-ride-mobility-data-privacy-laws-ecpa-los-angeles/596446/> accessed 17 March 2020.

  17. 17.

    Laura Bliss, ‘Uber’s Beef With L.A. Is Bigger Than Data’ (CITYLAB, 29 October 2019) <www.citylab.com/transportation/2019/10/uber-lawsuit-data-privacy-scooter-tracking-los-angeles/600985/> accessed 17 March 2020.

  18. 18.

    Laura Bliss, ‘This City Was Sick of Tech Disruptors: So It Decided to Become One’ (CITYLAB, 21 February 2020) <www.citylab.com/transportation/2020/02/los-angeles-transportation-data-mobility-scooter-mds-uber/606178/> accessed 17 March 2020.

  19. 19.

    See Erion Murati and Manjola Hënkoja, ‘Location Data Data Privacy on MaaS under GDPR’ (2019) 2 European Journal of Privacy Law & Technologies 115.

  20. 20.

    This enables users to access and compare specific travel information in real time from different transport providers and therefore pick the solution that best fits their mobility needs.

  21. 21.

    This enables users to access various transportation solutions with a single means of ticketing, which could be a card (smart card) or a dedicated app.

  22. 22.

    Matthias Finger and Maxime Audouin (eds), The Governance of Smart Transportation Systems (Springer 2019) 5.

  23. 23.

    For a discussion of interoperability, see Mariateresa Maggiolino and Laura Zoboli ‘Smart Mobility and Technological Compatibility from an Antitrust Perspective’ in this volume.

  24. 24.

    Ministry of Transport and Communications of Finland, ‘Could Mobility Be Viewed As Service?’ (YouTube, 17 June 2014) <www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZQieTU7_5xo> accessed 31 March 2020.

  25. 25.

    Jana Sochor and others, ‘The Added Value of a New, Innovative Travel Service: Insights from the UbiGo Field Operational Test in Gothenburg Sweden’ (International Conference on Mobility and Smart Cities, Rome, 27-28 October 2014) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19743-2_26> accessed 31 March 2020.

  26. 26.

    See MaaS Global, ‘Whim, the World’s First All-Inclusive Mobility Service, Promises to Change Urban Travel Forever’ (Whim, 13 June 2016) <https://whimapp.com/whim-the-worlds-first-all-inclusive-mobility-service-promises-to-change-urban-travel-forever/> accessed 12 March 2020.

  27. 27.

    For more information about the programme, see KOMPIS, ‘Det Här Är KOMPIS’ <https://kompis.me/> accessed 31 March 2020.

  28. 28.

    POLIS, ‘Mobility as a Service: Implications for Urban and Regional Transport’ (POLIS, September 2017) <www.polisnetwork.eu/document/mobility-as-a-service-implications-for-urban-and-regional-transport/> accessed 11 March 2020; MaaS Alliance, ‘White Paper: Guidelines & Recommendations to Create the Foundations for a Thriving MaaS Ecosystem’ (MaaS Alliance, 4 September 2017) <https://maas-alliance.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/09/MaaS-WhitePaper_final_040917-2.pdf> accessed 12 March 2020.

  29. 29.

    See Göran Smith, Jana Sochor and MariAnne Karlsson, ‘Mobility as a Service: Development Scenarios and Implications for Public Transport’ (2018) 69 Research in Transportation Economics 592. More specifically, experts believe that at first urban and suburban families will get rid of their secondary cars; only at a later stage will they bid farewell to their primary car as well.

  30. 30.

    Paul Hammond, Kate Mackay and Glen Lyons, ‘The Importance of User Perspective in the Evolution of MaaS’ (2019) 121 Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 22.

  31. 31.

    A potentially decisive reason for using MaaS is cost savings. For example, MaaS may be cheaper than owning one’s own car or holding an annual public transport pass.

  32. 32.

    MaaS offers freedom of choice, which does not just involve different modes of transport (e.g. a bus or an e-bicycle) but a range of vehicles on offer (e.g. an electric city car or a family car).

  33. 33.

    Andrea Melis and others, ‘Integrating Personalized and Accessible Itineraries in MaaS Ecosystems Through Microservices’ (2018) 23 Mobile Networks and Applications 167.

  34. 34.

    Sampo Hietanen, ‘Mobility as a Service: The New Transport Model?’ (2014) 12 (2) Eurotransport 27.

  35. 35.

    It was asserted that MaaS can provide potential health benefits, for example, less stress associated with multi-modal travel, more physical activity through increased demand for active modes, less pollution through a reduction in congestion and private car use and more social interactions through increased accessibility. See Jane Krantz, ‘Mobility-as-a-Service from a Health Perspective: Exploratory Research Into the Potential Health Impact of MaaS’ (Master thesis, Delft University of Technology 2018) 9 <https://repository.tudelft.nl/islandora/object/uuid%3A6f2faefb-9f80-49db-b226-9accf97f0105> accessed 31 March 2020.

  36. 36.

    See Commission, ‘The European Green Deal’ (Communication) COM (2019) 640 final.

  37. 37.

    UK Transport Committee, ‘Mobility as a Service Inquiry’ (UK Parliament, 19 December 2018), <www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/transport-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/mobility-as-a-service-17-19/> accessed 11 March 2020.

  38. 38.

    Besides transport operators, the data providers include the MaaS provider and user as well as potential external actors, e.g. the weather forecasting or traffic management authorities.

  39. 39.

    In this case, the authors referred especially to the MaaS Whim app, but the same logic is valid for other MaaS providers. See Maxime Audoin and Matthias Finger, ‘The development of Mobility-as-a-Service in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area: A Multi-level Governance Analysis’ (2018) 27 Research in Transportation Business & Management 24.

  40. 40.

    David König and others, ‘Technology for MaaS’ (2017) Conference of European Directors of Roads: Mobility As A Service for Linking Europe (MAASiFiE Project) 21 <www.researchgate.net/publication/317416475_Deliverable_5_Technology_for_MaaS_MAASiFiE_project_funded_by_CEDR> accessed 31 March 2020.

  41. 41.

    See MaaS Alliance, ‘White Paper: Guidelines & Recommendations to Create the Foundations for a Thriving MaaS Ecosystem’ (MaaS Alliance, 4 September 2017) <https://maas-alliance.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/09/MaaS-WhitePaper_final_040917-2.pdf> accessed 20 March 2020.

  42. 42.

    See Finnish Act on Transport Services (n 1).

  43. 43.

    See Audoin and Finger (n 39) 6.

  44. 44.

    The second part of the Finnish Act on Transport Services (n 1) was approved (amendment n 301/2018) in 2018. The concept of acting on someone else’s behalf, forcing public transport operators to also open up seasonal ticket APIs, was introduced in Sect. 2.

  45. 45.

    See the French Mobility Orientation law, LOI n° 2019-1428 du 24 décembre 2019 d’orientation des mobilités; see also Urban Mobility, ‘Your Guide to the French Mobility Orientation Law’ (UrbanMobility Company, 27 March 2020) <https://urbanmobilitycompany.com/content/daily/your-guide-to-the-french-mobility-orientation-law> accessed 2 April 2020.

  46. 46.

    See European Data Portal, ‘Open Data in a Nutshell’ (European Union 2018) <www.europeandataportal.eu/en/providing-data/goldbook/open-data-nutshell> accessed 4 March 2020.

  47. 47.

    See Murati and Hënkoja (n 19) 120.

  48. 48.

    MaaS Alliance, ‘Data Makes MaaS Happen’ (MaaS Alliance, November 2018) <https://maas-alliance.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2018/11/Data-MaaS-FINAL-after-plenary-1.pdf> accessed 4 March 2020.

  49. 49.

    See Fitzgerald and others (n 4) 167.

  50. 50.

    See Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1926 of 31 May 2017 supplementing Directive 2010/40/EU with regard to the provision of EU-wide multimodal travel information services [2017] OJ L 272/1.

  51. 51.

    See Valdani Vicari & Associati Economics and Policy, ‘Study on Market Access and Competition Issues Related to MaaS’ (MaaS Alliance, June 2019) <https://maas-alliance.eu/maas-alliance-commissioned-study-to-clarify-the-legal-framework-and-roles-of-public-and-private-parties/> accessed 5 March 2020.

  52. 52.

    The notion has also been taken into account by Regulation 1926/2017 (n 50) on providing multimodal travel information, which considers that only information data can be requested to be published by the National Access Points (NAPs).

  53. 53.

    Recently, a decision of the Paris Commercial Court prevented the online travel agent Lastminute.com from selling Ryanair tickets without the consent of the airline and using information on its website for commercial purposes (screen scraping); see AFP, ‘French Court Condemns lastminute.com for ‘Parasitism’ of Ryanair Website’ The Local (Paris, 6 April 2018) <www.thelocal.fr/20180406/french-court-condemns-lastminutecom-for-parasitism-of-ryanair-website> accessed 5 March 2020.

  54. 54.

    See Finnish Act on Transport Services (n 1).

  55. 55.

    Göran Smith and others, ‘Governing Mobility-as-a-Service: Insights from Sweden and Finland’ in Matthias Finger, Maxime Audouin (eds), The Governance of Smart Transportation Systems (Springer 2019) 169-188.

  56. 56.

    See e.g. Case C-74/14 ‘Eturas’ UAB and Others v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba EU:C:2016:42.

  57. 57.

    If such data pools are open access on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, they may very well fall outside Paper 101 TFEU altogether, similarly to the open access standard-setting agreements that fall inside the standard-setting safe harbour.

  58. 58.

    Nudging implies using data-driven, sophisticated personal persuasion. Nudging often refers to one of three strategies: (i) if the deferral is mainly the result of simple procrastination or inertia, using scarcity appeals such as limited time offers; (ii) if it is about fear of making the wrong choice (regret aversion), offering a guarantee; and (iii) if the deferral is due to confusion or choice overload, helping customers by simplifying their decision making. Alain Samson, ‘Big Data Is Nudging You’ (Behavioral Economics, 30 August 2016) <www.behavioraleconomics.com/big-data-is-nudging-you/> accessed 13 July 2018.

  59. 59.

    Perfect price discrimination occurs when a firm charges the maximum price for every unit sold (consumed). A firm that is able to charge the maximum possible price for each unit captures all available consumer surplus for itself. See Economics Online: for students of Economics, ‘Price Discrimination’ (Economics Online) <https://economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Price_discrimination.html> accessed 15 July 2018.

  60. 60.

    See OECD, ‘Hub-and-spoke Arrangements: Note by the European Union’ (OECD 2019) <https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2019)89/en/pdf> accessed 31 March 2020.

  61. 61.

    See Commission, ‘Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements Text with EEA relevance’ [2011] OJ C 11/1, para 55.

  62. 62.

    See Commission, ‘Guidelines on Vertical Restraints’ [2010] OJ C 130/1.

  63. 63.

    See OECD (n 60) 4-5.

  64. 64.

    Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E Stucke, ‘Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition’ [2017] University of Illinois Law Review 1775. See also Manon van Roozendaal, ‘Algorithms: Teenage Troublemakers of EU Competition Law: A Closer Look at Algorithms as the New Price-Fixing Tool in EU Competition Law’ (European Law Institute 2018) <www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/YLA_Award/Submission_ELI_Young_Lawyers_Award_Manon_van_Roozendaal_2018.pdf> accessed 31 March 2020.

  65. 65.

    The implementing algorithm was found to infringe in the United States in United States v David Topkins, No 15 CR 201 (NDC April 6, 2015) and the administrator pricing model in the European Union in Eturas (n 56).

  66. 66.

    See Ezrachi and Stucke (n 64).

  67. 67.

    See OECD (n 60) 4-5.

  68. 68.

    Case C-542/14 SIA ‘VM Remonts’ (formerly SIA ‘DIV un KO’) and Others v Konkurences padome EU:C:2016:578.

  69. 69.

    Case C-7/95 P John Deere v Commission EU:C:1998:256 [1998] ECR I-03111; preceding case law: Case T-35/92 Deere v Commission EU:T:1994:259 [1994] ECR II-00957; Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission EU:C:1993:120 [1993] ECR I-01307; Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit EU:C:2009:343 [2009] ECR I-04529.

  70. 70.

    Case C-441/97 P Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl and Others v Commission EU:C:2000:643 [2000] ECR I-10293.

  71. 71.

    The question of whether such a solution complies with the data protection framework remains beyond the scope of this paper.

  72. 72.

    Eturas (n 56).

  73. 73.

    See Katri Havu and Neža Zupančic, ‘Case Comment: Collusion and Online Platforms in Eturas’ (2016) 11 Competition Law Review 255.

  74. 74.

    See Alfonso Lamadrid, ‘Eturas on the Scope of “Concerted Practices” and on Technological Collusion’ (Chillin’Competition Blog, 22 January 2016) <https://chillingcompetition.com/2016/01/22/ecjs-judgment-in-case-c-7414-eturas-on-the-scope-of-concerted-practices-and-on-technological-collusion/> accessed 5 March 2020.

  75. 75.

    See Havu and Zupančic (n 73) 258.

  76. 76.

    See Eturas (n 56) Opinion of AG Szpunar EU:C:2015:493, paras 55-57. The AG emphasised that the evaluation of evidence is a matter of national law.

  77. 77.

    ibid paras 71 and 10.

  78. 78.

    ibid para 92.

  79. 79.

    Eturas (n 56) paras 27-28.

  80. 80.

    ibid paras 33-34.

  81. 81.

    ibid paras 35-37.

  82. 82.

    ibid paras 38-39.

  83. 83.

    ibid paras 40-41.

  84. 84.

    ibid para 46.

  85. 85.

    ibid paras 47-48.

  86. 86.

    ibid paras 49.

  87. 87.

    ibid paras 28.

  88. 88.

    See Sophie Lawrance and Marc Linsner, ‘Eturas: Any Conclusions on Platform Collusion?’ (Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 19 January 2017) <http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2017/01/19/eturas-conclusions-platform-collusion/?print=print> accessed 5 March 2020.

  89. 89.

    See Lamadrid (n 74).

  90. 90.

    Cf OECD, ‘Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age’ (OECD 2017) <www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Algorithms-and-colllusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age.pdf> accessed 6 March 2020.

  91. 91.

    The damaging influence that tacit collusion can have on a market is that it becomes less attractive for competitors to lower their prices and engage in price wars. In order for such decisions to attract customers, time is needed. Algorithms, by making decisions in less than a second, essentially take away this element, leading to prices being kept artificially high and resulting in distorted market conditions.

  92. 92.

    See OECD (n 60) 7.

  93. 93.

    Cf Case C-48/69 ICI v Commission EU:C:1972:70, 655 para 66.

  94. 94.

    Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union - Part Three: Union Policies and Internal Actions - Title VII: Common Rules on Competition, Taxation and Approximation Of Laws - Chapter 1: Rules on competition - Section 1: Rules Applying to Undertakings - Article 101 (ex Article 81 TEC) [2008] OJ C115/88, failing art 101, attempts were made to categorise this under art 102 TFEU. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union - Part Three: Union Policies and Internal Actions - Title VII: Common Rules on Competition, Taxation And Approximation Of Laws - Chapter 1: Rules on competition - Section 1: Rules Applying to Undertakings - Article 102 (ex Article 82 TEC) [2008] OJ C115/89, approaching this group behaviour from art 102 TFEU would not be novel. The Commission has shown an interest in this in the past. At one point, the Court even ruled that it was possible for independent companies in the relevant market to have a collective dominant position which they could abuse. This conclusion also required some economic link, interdependence or ensured parallelism between the participants in the collective dominant position. However, the Commission has since lost its interest in such an approach, meaning that there is, as of yet, no conclusion for such an approach. It is not unthinkable, however, for the Commission to take up the baton once again when algorithms become more and more influential. See Nicolas Petit, ‘The Oligopoly Problem in EU Competition Law’ in Ioannis Liannos and Damien Geradin (eds), Research Handbook in EU Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 259-349.

  95. 95.

    For a discussion of why smart mobility needs semantic compatibility, see Mariateresa Maggiolino and Laura Zoboli, ‘Smart Mobility and Technological Compatibility from an Antitrust Perspective’ in this volume.

  96. 96.

    Commission, ‘Final report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry’ COM (2017) 229 final.

  97. 97.

    More often, however, this exclusion proceeds through a subtle combination of commission rates imposed on the supplier and the ranking of results presented to the consumer. See Friso Bostoen, ‘Neutrality, Fairness or Freedom?: Principles for Platform Regulation’ (2018) 7(1) Internet Policy Review 4.

  98. 98.

    See Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, ‘Discriminatory Conduct in the ICT Sector: A Legal Framework’ in Gintarė Surblytė (ed), Competition on the Internet (Springer 2015) 66-67.

  99. 99.

    See Google Search (Shopping) (Case AT.39740) Summary of the Commission Decision 2017/4444 [2018] OJ C9/11.

  100. 100.

    See Matthias Finger, ‘Algorithms as Public Policy: How to Regulate Them?’ (2019) 21 (4) Network Industries 10, 12.

  101. 101.

    See Pinar Akman, ‘Online Platforms, Agency, and Competition Law: Mind the Gap’ (2019) 43 Fordham International Law Journal 209, 288.

  102. 102.

    The determining factor in defining an agency agreement for the application of art 101(1) is the financial or commercial risk borne by the agent in relation to the activities for which it has been appointed as an agent by the principal. See judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-325/01 Daimler Chrysler v Commission EU:T:2005:322, [2005] ECR II-3319; judgments of the Court of Justice in Case C-217/05 Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v CEPSA EU:C:2006:784, [2006] ECR I-11987; and Case C-279/06 CEPSA Estaciones de Servicio SA v LV Tobar e Hijos SL EU:C:2008:163, [2008] ECR I-6681.

  103. 103.

    Article 102 TFEU is still applicable, see Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v Zentrale zur Bekampfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs EU:C:1989:140, para 35 and the Interbrew case in Commission, ‘XXVIth Report on Competition Policy’ (European Union 1996) para 53 <https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/1996/en.pdf> accessed 1 April 2020.

  104. 104.

    See Pinar Akman (n 101). See also Pinar Akman, ‘A Competition Law Assessment of Platform Most-Favored-Customer Clauses’ (2016) 12 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 781, 806, where Akman argued that proceedings and decisions against Booking.com, for example, should have been pursued on the basis of TFEU art 102 prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position (assuming that the conditions of that article would have been fulfilled) rather than on the basis of art 101 because Booking.com is the agent of the hotels and their agreements fall outside the scope of art 101.

  105. 105.

    Under competition law the designation of the intermediary as an ‘agent’, ‘commission agent’, ‘licensee’ or ‘independent dealer’ is less material than an economic analysis of the relationship between the agent and the principle.

  106. 106.

    Case 40/73 Suiker Unie v Commission EU:C:1975:78 [1975] ECR 1663, paras 544-547.

  107. 107.

    Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (n 61) para 20.

  108. 108.

    See Caroline Cauffman, ‘The Commission’s European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy: (Too) Platform and Service Provider Friendly?’ (2016) Maastricht European Private Law Institute (M-EPLI) Working Paper 07/2016, 9 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883845> accessed 1 April 2020.

  109. 109.

    Margrethe Vestager, ‘Big Data and Competition’ (Speech at the EDPS-BEUC Conference on Big Data, Brussels, 29 September 2016) <https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20191129222113/https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/big-data-and-competition_en> accessed 13 July 2018.

  110. 110.

    Guidelines on Horizontal Co-operation Agreements (n 61) 1-72, para 55.

  111. 111.

    Vestager (n 109).

  112. 112.

    ibid.

  113. 113.

    ibid.

  114. 114.

    Bundeskartellamt, ‘Big Data und Wettbewerb Schriftenreihe “Wettbewerb und Verbraucherschutz in der Digitalen Wirtschaft”’ (Bundeskartellamt, October 2017) <www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Schriftenreihe_Digitales/Schriftenreihe_Digitales_1.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3> accessed 13 July 2018.

  115. 115.

    Guidelines on Horizontal Co-operation Agreements (n 61) 1-72, para 55, paras 65 ff.

  116. 116.

    ibid paras 262 ff.

  117. 117.

    Article 3(2); Commission Regulation (EU) 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of research and development agreements OJ L 335/36, 36 ff (defined as the R&D block exemption or 2010 R&D block exemption).

  118. 118.

    Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements (n 61) para 280. See also the certification case, Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96 SCK and FNK v Commission EU:T:1997:157.

  119. 119.

    Guidelines horizontal co-operation agreements (n 61) 1-72, paras 13-14.

  120. 120.

    ibid paras 245 ff.

  121. 121.

    Commission Regulation (EU) 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] OJ L 102/1.

  122. 122.

    Pools are set up by complex contracts that explicitly or implicitly imply four agreements. First, there is a clear pool agreement whereby the contributors of patents agree on (i) the definition of the technology (often identical to how the technology is defined under a technology standardisation agreement) and (ii) the terms (e.g. royalty rates) on which downstream product manufacturers should get access to the essential intellectual properties. Second, patent pools include standard licensing agreements from the pool to third-party licensees. Third, implicitly or explicitly, there is also an agreement to exchange licences between the patent providers (pool builders) that are also active in the downstream product markets. Thus, there is a horizontal aspect between firms that both contribute patents and take out licences from the pools, compared to the otherwise vertical set-up of patent pools. Fourth, implicitly, pooling may include an agreement on the further development of technology through grant-back clauses or cross-licensing covenants for future innovations and patents. See e.g. Björn Lundqvist, Standardization under EU Competition Rules & US Antitrust Laws: The Rise and Limits of Self-Regulation (Edward Elgar 2014) 229 ff.

  123. 123.

    For a similar list, see Björn Lundqvist, ‘Competition and Data Pools’ (2018) 7 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 146-155.

  124. 124.

    See Mariateresa Maggiolino and Laura Zoboli, ‘Smart Mobility and Technological Compatibility from an Antitrust Perspective’ in this volume book.

  125. 125.

    Claudia Tapia, Industrial Property Rights, Technical Standards and Licesing Practices (FRAND) in the Telecommunications Industry (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2010) 7 with references.

  126. 126.

    Josef Drexl, ‘Anti-competitive Stumbling Stones on the Way to a Cleaner World: Protecting Competition in Innovation without a Market’ (2012) 8 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 534.

  127. 127.

    It has been claimed that the old war between VHS and Betamax standards led to an outcome where the lesser quality standard (VHS) still won and became the global standard. However, others claim that VHS on the whole represented a better product and technology. See e.g. Julian Christ and André Slowak, ‘Why Blue-Ray v HD-DVD is not VHS v BETAMAX: The Co-evolution of Standard Setting Consortia’ (2009) Forschungszentrum Innovation und Dienstleistung (FZID) Discussion Papers Universität Hohenheim 5/2009, 4 ff with references <http://opus.uni-hohenheim.de/volltexte/2009/366/pdf/fzid_dp_2009_05_Slowak_Christ.pdf> accessed 1 April 2020.

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  1. Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

    Björn Lundqvist

  2. Hamburg University, Hamburg, Germany

    Erion Murati

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    Michèle Finck , Matthias Lamping , Valentina Moscon  & Heiko Richter , ,  & 

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Lundqvist, B., Murati, E. (2020). Collaborative Platforms and Data Pools for Smart Urban Societies and Mobility as a Service (MaaS) from a Competition Law Perspective. In: Finck, M., Lamping, M., Moscon, V., Richter, H. (eds) Smart Urban Mobility. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol 29. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-61920-9_10

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