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Pricing Anonymity

Conference paper
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Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10957)

Abstract

In electronic anonymity markets a taker seeks a specified number of market makers in order to anonymize a transaction or activity. This process requires both coalition formation, in order to create an anonymity set among the taker and makers, and the derivation of the fee that the taker pays each maker. The process has a novel property in that the taker pays for anonymity but anonymity is created for both the taker and the makers. Using the Shapley value for nontransferable utility cooperative games, we characterize the formation of the anonymity set and the fee for any arbitrary number of makers selected by the taker.

Keywords

Anonymity Markets Privacy Game theory Cryptocurrencies 

Notes

Acknowledgement

We thank the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. The second author is funded in part by Archimedes Privatstiftung, Innsbruck, and the German Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) under grant agreement 16KIS0382.

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Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Texas at DallasRichardsonUSA
  2. 2.University of InnsbruckInnsbruckAustria
  3. 3.Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität MünsterMünsterGermany

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