Abstract
Currently there is no holistic concept linking the various areas of private law that are concerned with the regulation of personal data. However, there is a strong need for one. This study elaborates on such an approach by focusing on the private power paradigm. Private power is of utmost relevance for personal data and pervades various areas of private law. This study applies recent findings of research conducted by private law scholars, who have conceptualized private power in private law, to the regulation of personal data in private law, namely in the areas of the law of contract, consumer protection, competition, (intellectual) property, data protection and anti-discrimination. It draws descriptive as well as normative conclusions which can help to better understand the regulatory implications and serve as a methodology for identifying and shaping coherent and prudent regulation of personal data in the future.
Heiko Richter is Junior Research Fellow and Doctoral Student at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition.
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Notes
- 1.
Here defined according to Art. 4(1) GDPR: “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”.
- 2.
Van Loenen / Kulk / Ploeger (2016), 16; see for distinguishing personal from non-personal data the case AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona, CJEU, Breyer v. Federal Republic of Germany, C-582/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:339, para. 52 et seq.
- 3.
Mayer-Schönberger / Padova (2016), 334.
- 4.
The most prominent—yet deliberately not chosen—paradigm in the field of private law is efficiency. There is a flourishing body of literature on the economics of privacy (see for the starting point Posner (1981) and a most recent elaboration on the streams of theoretical and empirical research on the economics of privacy Acquisti / Taylor / Wagman (2016); in particular on personal data markets (see for a good overview Spieckermann / Acquisti / Böhme / Hui (2015)).
- 5.
Explicitly calling for holistic approach see European Data Protection Supervisor (2014a); based on that also calling for a more holistic approach to tackle the (personal) data issues, Monopolkommission (2015); first advanced academic step towards a holistic approach (and also going on a more abstract, though not holistic level, referring to court decisions, but still legalistic, in a sense that trying to connect on the horizontal level) Ferretti (2014), in particular Ch. 5: Competition, the Consumer Interest and Data Protection; for a holistic deconstruction of data protection, v. Lewinski (2014), but also taking a conventional public law approach, by identifying actors and objects of protection, not going a step further and proceeding to the power question and only briefly discussed as “limitations of data power”, 56; for an ambitious holistic, interdisciplinary project see “EUDECO – Modelling the European Data Economy”, but this goes far beyond personal data and has a more industry-focused/economic approach, see EUDECO D1.1 Detailed research framework, Public Report – Version 1.0 – of 17 April 2015.
- 6.
E.g. technical phenomena related to “big data”, multi-layer regulation in the Member States, the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation – GDPR) on the EU level as well as various court decisions, e.g. CJEU, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Espanola de Protectión de Datos, Mario Costeja Gonzàles, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:217; CJEU, Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
- 7.
Amongst many seminal works, those ones which specifically refer to (private) power imbalances: Solove (2001), who pleads for reframing the perception of privacy in the digital age; on the pluralistic conception of the broader phenomenon of privacy Solove (2007); calling for a structural approach to privacy regulation Cohen (2013), also Cohen (2012); Richards / King (2014), for setting out general principles for big data.
- 8.
For one of the influential, recent works see Rössler (2001); for more polemic approaches, based rather on opinion than on evidence, on the one hand Sofsky (2007); on the other hand Heller (2011), which can be seen as representative for the extreme opinions at the respective ends of the political spectrum.
- 9.
Sketching the legal framework, but without drawing links (beyond what can be drawn from the constitution): Roßnagel / Richter / Nebel (2012); drawing on single aspects, which might be improved, Masing (2012), but already recognizing the gaining significance of data protection between private actors; focusing on the status quo and interfaces Spindler (2014); as a prototype for a public/constitutional law approach to elaborate on personal data between private actors see Bäcker (2012), which starts with the state-citizen perspective and then discusses duties to protect citizen against citizen, referring to outer limits, as pre-determined by the constitution; seminal in this respect Hoffmann-Riem (1998).
- 10.
This is an extended understanding of private law, as it also accommodates data protection rules, which regulate the relation between private actors. At the same time, it does not deal with questions of public power, which is a much more explicit paradigm in public law (e.g. theory of subordination), however in a rather formalistic way.
- 11.
- 12.
Müller / Flender / Peters (2012), 144.
- 13.
World Economic Forum (2014).
- 14.
European Data Protection Supervisor (2016), 8.
- 15.
Möslein (2016).
- 16.
Admittedly, data protection law is traditionally understood as public law in Germany. However, it heavily regulates the processing of personal data between private subjects and is based on consent. This conception moves it close to a contractual and private law understanding.
- 17.
Böhm (1960), 44.
- 18.
Renner (2016), 511, 519.
- 19.
Ibid., 507.
- 20.
- 21.
For an overview see Renner (2016), 505-528.
- 22.
Even though the taxonomy is debatable, the main goal of the study is the application to personal data and not the questioning of the taxonomy as such. However, in the wake of application, some insights can already be gained, which also bear some implications for a further refinement and development the taxonomy.
- 23.
- 24.
Renner (2016), 513.
- 25.
Rölli (2016), 88.
- 26.
Eucken (1965), 202.
- 27.
Renner (2016), 513.
- 28.
Ibid., 515.
- 29.
- 30.
Rölli (2016), 89.
- 31.
- 32.
Rölli (2016), 89.
- 33.
Luhmann (2012), 20.
- 34.
Rölli (2016), 89.
- 35.
Renner (2016), 517.
- 36.
Foucault (1976), 122.
- 37.
Foucault (2015), 239.
- 38.
Han (2005), 54.
- 39.
Kainer / Schweitzer (2016), 631.
- 40.
Berger (2016), 55.
- 41.
Ackermann / Franck (2014), 169: Provisions of invalidity refer to judicial acts in general and not specifically to contracts, as the presumption and protection of private autonomy is at the center-stage of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB).
- 42.
Herresthal (2016), 160.
- 43.
Renner (2016), 519.
- 44.
E.g. §§ 116-124 BGB.
- 45.
Ackermann / Franck (2014), 211 et seq., who understand § 138 BGB as an expression of “boni mores” and “undue influence”.
- 46.
Böhm (1960), 31.
- 47.
- 48.
- 49.
Ackermann / Franck (2014), 233: In 1977, the Act on General Conditions of Business (AGBG) entered into force and turned common case law into statutory law.
- 50.
Earlier, § 138 BGB was used as a standard to scrutinize standard terms if one party had a dominant position.
- 51.
Renner (2016), 519.
- 52.
Ackermann / Franck (2014), 237 et seq., speaking of information asymmetries, but also of systematic procedural deficiencies in the formation of contracts, due to rational ignorance of a party towards them.
- 53.
- 54.
Renner (2016), 520 et seq.
- 55.
For determining, if that is the case, the German model follows a 3-step approach (see §§ 305 et seq. BGB): First, it contains black clauses (§ 309 BGB), which precisely define such situations without any discretion. Second, grey clauses (§ 308 BGB) are presumed to constitute such a disadvantage, though the single circumstances can be taken into account. Third, a general clause (§ 307 BGB) sets the standard for all clauses, which must not cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract.
- 56.
Canaris (2000), 273 et seq. on the development of stronger material control of standard terms and materialization.
- 57.
Riesenhuber (2016), 206.
- 58.
Ibid., 199 et seq., therefore e.g. elaborated construction of termination rights.
- 59.
E.g. in Germany § 4a BDSG, §§ 12 et seq. TMG.
- 60.
Bräutigam / Sonnleithner (2015), para. 44; Faust (2016), 36 et seq., considers given rules as largely sufficient.
- 61.
§ 138 BGB is subordinate to AGB-Kontrolle, for the relationship see Armbrüster (2015), para. 5.
- 62.
See Fn. 6.
- 63.
BGH Urteil vom 18. Oktober 1989 – VIII ZR 325/88 = ZIP 1990, 1138.
- 64.
- 65.
- 66.
European Commission, COM(2015) 634 final, “Proposal for a Directive on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content”.
- 67.
Langhanke / Schmidt-Kessel (2015), 218.
- 68.
See for respective remedies (Art. 12), especially termination rights (Art. 13, 16) and the legal consequences, also Recital 16 Draft Directive.
- 69.
See Art. 3 No. 8 Draft Directive.
- 70.
Langhanke / Schmidt-Kessel (2015), 218: Therefore, it introduces contract rules as a parallel layer to data protection rules.
- 71.
Langhanke / Schmidt-Kessel (2015), 220.
- 72.
Reflected in Art. 3 No. 4 and Recital 14 Draft Directive.
- 73.
Even more rigid § 28 Abs. 3b BDSG, see also Faust, F. (2016), 7 et seq.
- 74.
Langhanke / Schmidt-Kessel (2015), 221; this is rooted in Art. 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU); see also Buchner (2006), 272 et seq., for the opposite opinion. A point can be made that there are similarities to intellectual property for that reason; see Hanau (2016), 129, for the discussion of (absolute) paternalism as a reason not to dispose of the object.
- 75.
Recital 13 Draft Directive.
- 76.
- 77.
On the European level, the Council Resolution of 14 April 1975 on a preliminary program for the EEC for a consumer protection and information policy can be seen as a starting point, OJ 1975 C92/1.
- 78.
Ibid., 222; Weatherill (2013), 92.
- 79.
While the respective regimes are highly national, there is an ongoing debate about the core of laws on unfair trade practices and what justifies their existence, see Henning-Bodewig / Spengler (2016). On the EU-level, unfair trade practices are rather treated as consumer protection law (see Köhler (2015), para. 15, about Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), while German law traditionally rather treats it as competition related law (see § 2(1) Nr. 3 AAUC, see also the discussion about § 3a AAUC (formerly § 4 Nr. 11 AAUC)). Accordingly, there must be some market relevant behavior, as the German AAUC protects competitors, consumers and other market participants and interests of the public in undistorted competition, see regarding breaches of data protection laws von Walter (2014). But due to this specific construction, it would be difficult to draw universal power implications and a more carful observation would not significantly add to the debate in this study.
- 80.
Calliess (2016), 221.
- 81.
Ibid., 214 about the seminal judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court on sureties (“Bürgschaftsentscheidung”), see BVerfG, Urteil v. 19.10.1993 – 1 BvR 567/89, 1044/89; for a more economic explanation see Kerber (2016), 643 et seq., elaborating on remedying market failures through information and rationality failures of consumers.
- 82.
Weatherill (2013), 144.
- 83.
Calliess (2016), 218.
- 84.
Ibid., 227 et seq. It is, however, difficult to determine a ranking. In regulatory practice, a combination of several measures is common, 233.
- 85.
Renner (2016), 522.
- 86.
- 87.
Renner (2016), 521.
- 88.
Ibid., 511.
- 89.
Ibid., 522.
- 90.
Calliess (2016), 217.
- 91.
The word “consumer” is neither used in the GDPR nor in the Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (ePrivacy Directive), which apply to all data subjects (see also German exception for credit contracts in § 29 BDSG).
- 92.
Harbour / Koslov, (2010) 773.
- 93.
Langhanke / Schmidt-Kessel (2015), 219, on whether data protection law is to be seen as consumer protection law.
- 94.
BT-Drs. 18/4631, 11 et seq.
- 95.
Ibid., 2, on the problem of § 3a AAUC (formerly § 4 No. 11 AAUC): There was considerable debate and many cases before the regional courts, where it had been tried to enforce data protection laws by means of unfair trade laws. There is, however, no ruling by the highest courts.
- 96.
Consent according to § 2(2) S. 2 UKlaG becomes only relevant if it concerns personal data, which go beyond what is allowed for by data protection law. This is in line with the ratio of the Digital Content Draft Directive.
- 97.
Buchner (2006), 103, remarks that power imbalances related to personal data are not new, but the solution is an effective right of self-determination.
- 98.
BT-Drs. 18/4631, 2.
- 99.
Art. 80(2) GDPR explicitly allows for that, see also BT-Drs. 18/4631, 14.
- 100.
Schweitzer (2016), 452 et seq.
- 101.
- 102.
See Vanberg (2011), 44 et seq., on consumer welfare, total welfare and economic freedom.
- 103.
- 104.
On Art. 101 TFEU (ex-Art. 81 EC) Roth (2006); Zimmer (2011) on the moral quality of competition law, 76 et seq.; Ferretti (2014), 94, argues, that especially after the Lisbon Treaty, the neo-liberal stream and the Commission’s policy, which focuses merely on economic interests, has changed by focusing on the social market economy, which enables for considering other public interest considerations and human rights.
- 105.
Hanau (2016), 131.
- 106.
Schweitzer (2016), 461.
- 107.
Ibid., 464; Buchner (2008), 725: Only the effects of certain measures on competition are relevant; Ferretti (2014), 96, argues that competition law concentrates on certain market processes, whereas consumer law focuses on specific transaction between consumer and undertaking, so consumer take different roles in both regimes.
- 108.
Eucken (1965), 202.
- 109.
Schweitzer (2016), 464 et seq., who is rather critical in this respect.
- 110.
On the predominant view that dominant position per se is not harmful, as an extension to Eucken’s view, see Behrens (2015), 8.
- 111.
This can also be based on a non-rebuttable presumption, as the regulation of hardcore restrictions under Art. 101 TFEU illustrates, see Schweitzer (2016), 468. However, this does not change the fact, that infringement requires causality, as it refers to concrete conduct and not to mere modalities; see also Körber (2016b), 351 et seq., distinguishing between strict causality and normative causality.
- 112.
- 113.
- 114.
Eucken (1965), 202: manipulation of the equilibrium between supply and demand.
- 115.
- 116.
Renner (2016), 515.
- 117.
Good overview in Behrens (2015), 11: At least from an ordoliberal view, competition is protected as a system within individuals are free to make their choices on the market.
- 118.
Schweitzer (2016), 471.
- 119.
Ibid., 472.
- 120.
Monopolkommission (2015), Ch. 1, para. 10 and BT-Drs. 18/4721, 3, show that the role of data protection for competition policies has been recognized, though so far, the Commission did not rule in any case that the collection or use of personal data was a violation of competition laws, see Almunia (2012), 4.
- 121.
In the U.S. F.T.C. Statement of December 2007, File No. 071-0170; in the EU European Commission, Case No. COMP/M.4721, 11 March 2008.
- 122.
The trigger was the Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour in the matter of Google/DoubleClick (2007), F.T.C. File No. 071-0170. For the first notable academic approach on the competition and privacy interface see Picker (2008). An early exception in German literature, which recognized knowledge as power, however, very briefly and only from a competition and consumer protection view, not generalizing it for private law as such, Buchner (2008), in reaction to FTC merger decision on Google / DoubleClick. The discussion of data power as market power had then been further elaborated on by Harbour / Koslov (2010). For a rather policy and economics oriented approach on the interfaces see Pasquale (2013). Cooper (2013) connected the debate to the constitutional discourse. Regarding EU-law, the relevant issues were first systematically spotted by Geradin / Kuschewsky (2013) and combined in Kuschewsky / Geradin (2014). Finally, Kerber (2016) discusses the links between the fields from the law & economics perspective takes.
- 123.
Monopolkommission (2015), Ch. 1, para. 65, according to which current competition law is not sufficiently suitable for solving problems of abuse of a dominant position in case of excessive access to personal data.
- 124.
See for a comprehensive discussion Bundeskartellamt (2016); also European Data Protection Supervisor (2014a), para. 57; Geradin / Kuschewsky (2013), 14; Monopolkommission (2015), Ch. 1 para. 29 et seq.; Ferretti (2014), 114; Evans (2011), 25 et seq.; Harbour / Koslov (2010), 773, addressing “free” markets for e.g. social networking, mapping, email, photo sharing, calendaring and document management.
- 125.
See European Commission, Case No. COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014; Bundeskartellamt, Online-Immobielienplattformen, 25 June 2015, B6-39/15, and Online-Datingplattformen, 22 October 2015, B6-57/15; opposite opinion Franz / Podszun (2015), OLG Düsseldorf, Beschluss v. 9.1.2015 – VI Kart 1/14 (V), para. 43; for a good overview of the recent debate Bundeskartellamt (2016), 36 et seq.
- 126.
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, Referentenentwurf eines Neunten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen of 1 July 2016 (RefE 9. GWB-ÄndG), 10: introduction of a new § 18(2a).
- 127.
Buchner (2008), 726.
- 128.
Network effects, though the European Commission argues in Microsoft/Skype (European Commission, Case No. COMP/M.6281 – Microsoft/Skype, 7 October 2011, para. 108 et seq.) that the position based on network effects in the particular case is contestable. See also Monopolkommission (2015), Ch. 1 para. 32 et seq. on the general relationship between dynamic markets, portfolio effects, economies of scale, two-sided-markets, lock-in and para. 5 on the business models in the data-driven economy.
- 129.
RefE 9. GWB-ÄndG, 51; Buchner (2008), 727.
- 130.
RefE 9. GWB-ÄndG, 51.
- 131.
- 132.
RefE 9. GWB-ÄndG, 10: new § 18(3a) No. 4.
- 133.
Ibid., 48.
- 134.
RefE 9. GWB-ÄndG, 73, referring to the Facebook/WhatsApp acquisition.
- 135.
Körber (2016a), 306 et seq.
- 136.
But see also CJEU, Allianz Hungária, C-32/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:160. A breach of laws in other areas can also be a factor to be considered when evaluating infringement of competition law. Therefore, a violation of data protection laws might also indicate an infringement of competition laws, see European Data Protection Supervisor (2014b), 3.
- 137.
Körber (2016b), 349.
- 138.
- 139.
Körber (2016b), 352 et seq.
- 140.
See Bundeskartellamt, Press Release, 2 March 2016, available at: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_03_2016_Facebook.htm; Ferretti (2014), 110, arguing that as long as data protection standard is not violated, it cannot be an issue of competition law.
- 141.
- 142.
See recently Drexl et al. (2016), para. 32 et seq.
- 143.
As the strictest form of market intervention (and in this case a diffusion of structural power), also divestiture is discussed, see Frenz (2014), 194, who argues that the data protection principle of “data separation” shares similarities with “informational divestiture”.
- 144.
See for concepts Swire (2007), 2; Ferretti (2014), 111 et seq., wants consumer aspects to be included under the Art. 101(3) TFEU test and justifies his position with Art. 169 TFEU (competence on consumer protection); Cooper (2013), 1134 et seq., rejects a “privacy-as-quality analogy”; European Data Protection Supervisor (2014a), para. 40, 71, understands data protection as a factor of consumer welfare, and proposes privacy-promoting remedies in competition decisions as a consequence.
- 145.
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour in the matter of Google/DoubleClick (2007), F.T.C. File No. 071-0170, 10, footnote 25; Cooper (2013), 1131; European Data Protection Supervisor (2014a), para. 79, referring to Coates (2011), Competition Law and Regulation of Technology Markets.
- 146.
Evans (2011), 13.
- 147.
- 148.
Körber (2016a), 305.
- 149.
Körber (2016b), 355.
- 150.
Ferretti (2014), 117; rather opposite opinion Frenz (2014), 195, 200; an analogy can be drawn to the diversity of the media, which lies in the general interest of democratic societies. While this special concern is reflected in special rules for media competition law, one could think about extending that ratio to privacy concerns, see European Data Protection Supervisor (2014b), 3.
- 151.
See § 41a GWB of the proposal of the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie of 5 May 2010, according to Schweitzer / Fetzer / Peitz (2016), 57, but not in the personal data context.
- 152.
See The Guardian, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/27/european-parliament-votes-yes-google-breakup-motion.
- 153.
Monopolkommission (2015), Ch. 1 para. 22.
- 154.
Renner (2016), 524.
- 155.
Ibid., 528.
- 156.
European Data Protection Supervisor (2014b), 4.
- 157.
See intensive debate in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on Google and Axel Springer, available at: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/mathias-doepfner-s-open-letter-to-eric-schmidt-12900860.html.
- 158.
On the train of thought of Franz Böhm, see Hellwig (2006), 241 et seq.
- 159.
Hellwig (2006), 244.
- 160.
Also in the regulatory context of the utilities, it was the price, which had been of concern and raised calls for divestiture regardless of abusive practices in the German energy market.
- 161.
Bäcker (2012), 106, 108.
- 162.
- 163.
This claims Körber (2016a), 306 et seq., but very generally refusing the data-is-power-analogy as merely political claim.
- 164.
Cashin Ritaine (2012), 13.
- 165.
- 166.
Purtova (2011), 80 et seq., comparing common and civil law property regimes and concluding the erga omnes effect as their lowest common denominator.
- 167.
Lehmann (2016), 284 et seq.
- 168.
Hellwig (2006), 236.
- 169.
Lehmann (2016), 292 et seq.
- 170.
Ibid., 289.
- 171.
Ibid., 284.
- 172.
Ibid., 289 with reference to the Marxian perception of property.
- 173.
Ibid., 286.
- 174.
Ibid., 291. Many jurisdictions, such as Germany, legally define and limit the scope and content of property (numerus clausus), when it comes for granting rights or transferring rights, see 299 et seq. However, the transfer of personal data seems different, because the intangible good is not rivalrous in consumption. Therefore, limits to property are not as strong as in the tangible world, Buchner (2006), 287.
- 175.
Lehmann (2016), 296 et seq.
- 176.
Purtova (2015), 2: An increasing commodification of personal data in the US triggered a debate as to whether or not treating personal data as property already in the early 1970s, while Europe joined the debate in the 2000s. For the roots of the debate see Schwartz (2004), 2057, footnotes 4 and 5; see also Rees (2013), 220.
- 177.
Purtova (2015), 3 et seq.
- 178.
Ibid., 8 et seq.
- 179.
Ibid., 11 et seq.
- 180.
Purtova (2010), 197, who also argues for a need of de jure allocation, because if there was no assignment de jure, de facto assignment is taking place anyway and property concentrates on the side of the more powerful actor (here: undertakings), see Purtova (2015); see also Marauhn / Thorn, (2013), para. 23 et seq.
- 181.
Purtova (2015), 2.
- 182.
- 183.
Schwartz (2004), 2058; see e.g. portability of personal data, which can basically be seen as an ownership right.
- 184.
Kerber (2016), 646.
- 185.
Ibid., 647.
- 186.
Purtova (2010), 199 et seq.
- 187.
Ibid., 203; Spieckermann / Acquisti / Böhme / Hui (2015), 162.
- 188.
BVerfG, Urteil v. 15.12.1983 – 1 BvR 209/83 (Volkszählungsurteil).
- 189.
Schwenke (2005), 71 et seq.
- 190.
Schwartmann / Hentsch, (2015), 226 et seq.
- 191.
The so-called “Leistungsschutzrecht für Presseverleger” was introduced in 2013 in §§ 87f-g of the German Copyright Act; currently, its introduction on the EU level is under discussion, see Art. 11 of the European Commission, COM(2016) 593 final, “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market” of 14 September 2016.
- 192.
By systematic use, which reached beyond merely setting links.
- 193.
Jani (2014), para. 6.
- 194.
Dreier (2009), 44: “A certain convergence of private and public law can be observed in the area[…] of data protection – for the simple reason that the State no longer holds the monopoly in owning powerful data processing equipment which is capable of performing both mass data mining and individual profiling [...].”
- 195.
Recital 4 GDPR.
- 196.
Marauhn / Thorn (2013), para. 28.
- 197.
Recital 2 GDPR.
- 198.
Schantz (2016), 1841.
- 199.
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (ePrivacy-Directive); see Commission Proposal for a Regulation concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications COM(2017) 10 final.
- 200.
See Art. 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, 11.
- 201.
Recital 75 GDPR.
- 202.
Mayer-Schönberger / Padova, (2016), 329: “pseudonymization as means to divest power”; also as a means to reduce risk, see Rec. 28 GDPR.
- 203.
- 204.
Not if clear imbalance (see Recital 43), but it is not entirely clear, when this shall be the case. Art 7(4) GDPR, extends to payment with data, see also Schantz (2016), 1845.
- 205.
Schantz (2016), 1844: Clearness of others (Art. 7(2) GDPR) comes close to the judicial control of standard terms as in consumer law.
- 206.
Recital 32 GDPR.
- 207.
But there must be explicit consent regarding profiling and safeguards might have to be established, see Art. 22, Art. 4 No. 4 GPDR, Recital 71 et seq.; see also Schantz (2016), 1844.
- 208.
Ex-Recital 34 named employment relationships as an example. However, this did not prevail in the final version of the GDPR.
- 209.
Art. 5(1) lit. a, Art. 12 GDPR: Rights to information and to access data in an intelligible form, see also Recital 39 GDPR on the prerequisites for the execution of rights.
- 210.
- 211.
Mayer-Schönberger / Padova (2016), 322 et seq.
- 212.
Kühling / Martini (2016), 450.
- 213.
Recital 65 et seq.
- 214.
Frenz (2014), 194.
- 215.
European Data Protection Supervisor (2014a), para. 24 et seq.
- 216.
In general Swire / Lagos (2013).
- 217.
- 218.
Picker (2008), 6 et seq.
- 219.
- 220.
- 221.
Kühling / Martini (2016), 450.
- 222.
- 223.
- 224.
Swire / Lagos (2013), 338 et seq.
- 225.
Ibid., 339.
- 226.
- 227.
Specifically, the legislative proposal and implementation of data portability has triggered some overarching work: Rather holistic on different justifications for the right of data portability under Art. 20 (ex-Art. 18), Swire / Lagos (2013); with a competition focus Graef / Verschakelen / Valcke (2013); from a public law side see Fialová (2014), arguing with “more and less privacy”.
- 228.
See Spindler (2016), 807, with further references for the proposed interpretations.
- 229.
Recital 51 GDPR.
- 230.
See also Recital 10 GDPR, employee data (Art. 88 GDPR); exemptions for health data have been crossed out; see Kühling / Martini (2016), 450, however, see also Recital 35 GDPR.
- 231.
- 232.
Mayer-Schönberger / Padova (2016), 333, footnote 67 with further references, which say that this has not been implemented in the GDPR.
- 233.
Ibid., (2016), 332; see also the concept of contextualisiation by Nissenbaum (2010).
- 234.
Mayer-Schönberger / Padova (2016), 332.
- 235.
Kerber (2016), 643 et seq.
- 236.
Ibid.
- 237.
Cf. § 20 Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (AGG).
- 238.
Directive of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; Council Directive of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation; Council Directive of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.
- 239.
See §§ 19 et seq. AGG.
- 240.
See especially § 19(2) AGG.
- 241.
“Awareness of a culture of anti-discrimination”, BT-Drs. 16/1780, 52; Renner (2016), 526.
- 242.
Hull (2015), 96.
- 243.
Hoffmann-Riem (2017).
- 244.
Tan (2007).
- 245.
See e.g. Executive Office of the President, May 2016, Big Data: A Report on Algorithmic Systems, Opportunity, and Civil Rights. Also in Germany, the question of what a legitimate reason for justification of discrimination is, is very debated in the case of big data measures, especially scoring (§ 28b BDSG). The problem is that special rules in data protection laws exist, but they are bound to decisions related to contracts (therefore, not on behavioral targeting), see Schaar (2016), 33, with reference to § 28b BDSG. Also, it is not entirely clear if the GDPR accounts for that, see Goodman / Flaxman (2016), doing maximal and minimal interpretations and recognize a “right to explanation”; also the German Minister of Justice called for making search algorithms more transparent, see Dörr / Natt (2014), 838, footnote 68.
- 246.
- 247.
- 248.
Even if users contribute to the algorithm to learn.
- 249.
Bucher (2012), 1167.
- 250.
Ibid., 1171 et seq., thus following a non-relational power-perception.
- 251.
Ibid.
- 252.
Hull (2015), 96.
- 253.
Bucher (2012), 1176.
- 254.
Hull (2015), 96.
- 255.
Weichert (2014), 170.
- 256.
Hull (2015), 98.
- 257.
Bauman / Lyon (2013), 52 et seq., on social exclusion through “surveillance techniques” like profiling.
- 258.
Lazer (2015), 1090.
- 259.
Schweitzer / Fetzer / Peitz (2016), 29.
- 260.
Dörr / Natt (2014), 832.
- 261.
Ibid., 835.
- 262.
§§ 25, 26 RStV, see Dörr / Natt (2014), 840, elaborating on the constitutional reasons (BVerfGE 57, 295, 320; 119, 181, 214).
- 263.
- 264.
Renner (2016), 507.
- 265.
Also shows that it shifts conventional power conceptions of the legal fields, so it triggers a debate about the extremes of the legal fields and therefore also develops the fields as such (see e.g. Faust (2016)).
- 266.
This reminds of Galbraith, who coined the theory of counter-power, as one sort of solution to the problem, see Schweitzer (2016), 472. One has to analyze, if such a constellation is given in case of personal data power.
- 267.
Kainer / Schweitzer (2016), 639 et seq.
- 268.
See Bachmann (2016) for a comprehensive treatment of the legitimation of private power, taking a broader perspective on approaches under which private power can be justified and discussing source, sort and consequences of power as determinants for justification in particular, 616 et seq.
- 269.
Ibid., 630.
- 270.
Ibid.
- 271.
Ibid., 636 et seq.; Bäcker (2012), 106, 108.
- 272.
Kainer / Schweitzer (2016), 630.
- 273.
Ibid., 630.
- 274.
Ibid., 632.
- 275.
See Kerber (2016), 646 et seq., who admits that even with rather holistic approaches, things are so complex that a lot of regulatory errors are to be expected, both in regard to under- and overregulation. For a comprehensive elaboration on the relationship between power, private law and economics, see Käseberg (2016), who concludes that economics cannot (yet) explain issues which are seminal for private law in general and for power issues in particular and can therefore only deliver solutions with limited reach (at 600). When reconciling his conclusion with the findings of this study, it becomes obvious that the ubiquitous relevance of power for personal data also implies the limited usefulness of economic analysis as a paradigm for regulation.
- 276.
See Calliess (2006), para. 6, stating that the density of control is not entirely clear when it comes to matters of private power.
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Richter, H. (2018). The Power Paradigm in Private Law. In: Bakhoum, M., Conde Gallego, B., Mackenrodt, MO., Surblytė-Namavičienė, G. (eds) Personal Data in Competition, Consumer Protection and Intellectual Property Law. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol 28. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-57646-5_19
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