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Combining Symbolic and Numerical Domains for Information Leakage Analysis

  • Agostino CortesiEmail author
  • Pietro Ferrara
  • Raju Halder
  • Matteo Zanioli
Chapter
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10730)

Abstract

We introduce an abstract domain for information-flow analysis of software. The proposal combines variable dependency analysis with numerical abstractions, yielding to accuracy and efficiency improvements. We apply the full power of the proposal to the case of database query languages as well. Finally, we present an implementation of the analysis, called \(\mathsf {Sails}\), as an instance of a generic static analyzer. Keeping the modular construction of the analysis, the tool allows one to tune the granularity of heap analysis and to choose the numerical domain involved in the reduced product. This way the user can tune the information leakage analysis at different levels of precision and efficiency.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work has been partially supported by CINI Cybersecurity National Laboratory within the project “FilieraSicura: Securing the Supply Chain of Domestic Critical Infrastructures from Cyber Attacks” funded by CISCO Systems Inc. and Leonardo SpA, and by MIUR-MAE within the Project “Formal Specification for Secured Software System”, under the Indo-Italian Executive Programme of Cooperation in Scientific and Technological Cooperation Project number IN17MO07.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ca’ Foscari UniversityVeniceItaly
  2. 2.Julia srlVeronaItaly
  3. 3.Indian Institute of Technology PatnaPatnaIndia
  4. 4.Alpenite srlVeniceItaly

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