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Beating the Gatecrasher Paradox with Judiciary Narratives

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Book cover Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2017)

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Abstract

A probabilistic model for the narrative approach to reasoning in legal fact-finding is developed and applied to the gatecrasher paradox.

The research has been supported by Research Foundation Flanders.

The research was funded by National Centre for Science grant number 2016/22/E/HS1/00304.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The paradox is mathematically the same as the prisoners in a yard scenario [13], where a group of prisoners commits a group killing, and it’s impossible to identify the single innocent prisoner.

  2. 2.

    The content of the guilt statement is \(\mathtt {G}\) which has the form of \(G\equiv g_1\wedge \cdots \wedge g_l\) for appropriate \(g_1, \dots , g _l\in \mathcal {L}\).

  3. 3.

    In contexts in which it is irrelevant whether a narration is an accusing one or not, I will suppress the superscripts.

  4. 4.

    A set of sentences is relevant for the case if it is consistent with the background knowledge and there is a narration such that its posterior probability given all background knowledge together with that set is different from its posterior probability given all background knowledge only. A set of sentences is a minimal relevant set if no proper subset thereof is a relevant set. A sentence is relevant if it or its negation is a member of a minimal relevant subset.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium

    Rafal Urbaniak

  2. Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism, University of Gdansk, Gdańsk, Poland

    Rafal Urbaniak

Authors
  1. Rafal Urbaniak
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Correspondence to Rafal Urbaniak .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam , Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, The Netherlands

    Alexandru Baltag

  2. Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland, Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

    Jeremy Seligman

  3. Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University , Sapporo, Japan

    Tomoyuki Yamada

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Urbaniak, R. (2017). Beating the Gatecrasher Paradox with Judiciary Narratives. In: Baltag, A., Seligman, J., Yamada, T. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10455. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_44

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_44

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-55664-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-55665-8

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