Non-triviality Done Proof-Theoretically

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10455)


It is well known that naive theories of truth based on the three-valued schemes K3 and LP are non-trivial.



We would like to thank the members of audiences at the Otago Logic Seminar and the Australasian Association for Logic Conference 2016 for feedback on this material. Shawn Standefer’s research was supported by the Australian Research Council, Discovery Grant DP150103801.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Monash UnversityMelbourneAustralia
  2. 2.University of MelbourneMelbourneAustralia

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