Advertisement

Neoliberalism and Law: The Case of the Constitutional Balanced-Budget Amendment

  • Thomas Biebricher
Chapter
Part of the Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht book series (BEITRÄGE, volume 273)

Abstract

This chapter discusses the significance of law in neoliberal theory and practice. Prefaced by a brief look at the role that law plays in the theories of the ordo- and neoliberal thinkers Franz Böhm and Friedrich August von Hayek, the subsequent sections focus on the work of James Buchanan and his brand of neoliberalism, which combines constitutional economics public choice theory. Buchanan’s core demand is a balanced-budget amendment to the constitution. The following sections examine this measure in its various aspects before the final section switches to the world of “actually existing neoliberalism” with a discussion of the various reforms of the economic governance structure of the European Union in recent years, particularly the “Fiscal Compact”, which amounts to the real world equivalent of a balanced-budget amendment.

References

  1. Bauer M, Becker S (2014) From the front line to the back stage: how the financial crisis has quietly strengthened the European commission. Pub Money Mgmt 34:161–163CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Biebricher T (2014) Sovereignty, norms, and exception in neoliberalism. Qui Parle 23:77CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Blyth M (2013) Austerity: the history of a dangerous idea. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  4. Böhm F (1989) Rule of law in a market economy. In: Peacock A, Willgerodt J (eds) Germany’s social market economy: origins and evolution, pp 15–16. Palgrave Macmillan, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Böhm F (2008) Das Problem der privaten Macht: Ein Beitrag zur Monopolfrage. In: Goldschmidt N, Wohlgemuth M (eds) Grundtexte zur Freiburger Tradition der Ordnungsökonomik, pp 49–67. Mohr Siebeck, TübigenGoogle Scholar
  6. Böhm F, Eucken W, Grossmann-Doerth H (1989) The ordo manifesto of 1936. In: Peacock A, Willgerodt J (eds) Germany’s social market economy: origins and evolution, pp. 15–16. Palgrave Macmillan, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Brennan G, Buchanan J (1985) The reason of rules: constitutional political economy. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  8. Brown W (2006) American nightmare: neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and de-democratization. Pol Theory 34:690CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Brown W (2015) Undoing the demos: neoliberalism’s stealth revolution. Zone Books, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  10. Buchanan JM (1975) The limits of liberty: between anarchy and leviathan. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, ILGoogle Scholar
  11. Buchanan JM (1979) The potential of taxpayer revolt in american democracy. Soc Sci Q 59:691Google Scholar
  12. Buchanan JM (1986) Liberty, market and state: political economy in the 1980s. Harvester Press, BrightonGoogle Scholar
  13. Buchanan JM (1987) The constitution of economic policy. Am Econ Rev 77:243Google Scholar
  14. Buchanan JM, Musgrave RA (1999) Public finance and public choice: two contrasting visions of the state. MIT Press, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
  15. Buchanan JM, Wagner R (1978) The political biases of keynesian economics. In: Buchanan J, Wagner R (eds) Fiscal responsibility in constitutional democracy, pp 79–100. Springer, BerlinCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Buchanan JM, Tollison R, Tullock G (1980) Towards a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M Press, College Station, TXGoogle Scholar
  17. European Council (2017) European Semester: a guide to the main rules and documents. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-semester/european-semester-key-rules-and-documents/. Accessed 15 Jan 2018
  18. Follesdal A, Hix S (2006) Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: a response to Majone and Moravcsik. J Common Mkt Stud 44:533CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Gill S (1998) European governance and new constitutionalism economic and monetary union and alternatives to disciplinary neoliberalism in Europe. New Pol Econ 3:5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Hodson D, Puetter U (2013) The European Union and the economic crisis. In: Cini M, Pérez-Solórzano Borragán N (eds) European Union politics, 4th edn. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  21. Jackson B (2010) At the origins of neo-liberalism: the free economy and the strong state. Hist J 53:129CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Joerges C (2014) Law and politics in Europe’s crisis: on the history of the impact of an unfortunate configuration. Constellations 21:249CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Juncker J-C (2016) State of the union 2016: towards a better Europe: a Europe that protects, empowers and defends. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm. Accessed 15 Jan 2018
  24. Krasner SD (1999) Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJGoogle Scholar
  25. Majone G (1994) The rise of the regulatory state in Europe. West Eur Pol 17:77CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Majone G (2014) From regulatory state to a democratic default. J Common Mkt Stud 52:1216CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Monti M (2012) Charlemagne: the other moral hazard. The Economist, 29 Sept. http://www.economist.com/node/21563741. Accessed 15 Jan 2018
  28. Peck J (2008) Remaking Laissez-Faire. Prog Hum Geog 32:3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Peck J (2010) Constructions of neoliberal reason. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  30. Scharpf FW (1999) Governing in Europe: effective and democratic? Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  31. Von Hayek FA (1944) The road to serfdom. Routledge, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  32. Von Hayek FA (1960) The constitution of liberty. Routledge, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  33. Von Hayek FA (1973) Law, legislation, liberty: rules and order. Routledge, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  34. Von Hayek FA (2002) Liberalismus. In: Vanberg V (ed) Grundsätze einer liberalen Gesellschaftsordnung: Aufsätze zur Politischen Philosophie und Theorie, pp 88–119. Mohr Siebeck, TübingenGoogle Scholar
  35. Wilkinson M (2013) The specter of authoritarian liberalism: reflections on the constitutional crisis of the European Union. German LJ 14:527Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V., to be exercised by Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Heidelberg 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Goethe University FrankfurtFrankfurt a.M.Germany

Personalised recommendations