Constitutional and Administrative Pluralism in the EU System of Banking Supervision

  • Matej Avbelj
Part of the Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht book series (BEITRÄGE, volume 273)


This chapter examines the relationship between the developing European Union (EU) system of banking supervision and the theories of constitutional pluralism. It questions the remaining epistemic, explanatory, and normative value of these theories with regard to the EU system of banking supervision. The argument is broken down into three sections. First, the chapter briefly describes the system of banking supervision in the European Union and the pluralist challenges that it spurs. Second, it schematically maps out the leading theories of constitutional pluralism to test, by way of their application to the field of EU banking supervision, their epistemic, explanatory, and normative value. Finally, to the extent that this value has diminished, the chapter offers another pluralist theory, not a constitutional one, which could supplement the identified epistemic, explanatory, and normative gaps. This is a theory of administrative pluralism.


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Copyright information

© Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V., to be exercised by Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Heidelberg 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Government and European StudiesKranjSlovenia

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