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The Self-blindable U-Prove Scheme from FC’14 Is Forgeable (Short Paper)

Conference paper
First Online:
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9603)

Abstract

Recently an unlinkable version of the U-Prove attribute-based credential scheme was proposed at Financial Crypto’14 [9]. Unfortunately, the new scheme is forgeable: if sufficiently many users work together then they can construct new credentials, containing any set of attributes of their choice, without any involvement of the issuer. In this note we show how they can achieve this and we point out the error in the unforgeability proof.

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Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Radboud UniversityNijmegenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Johann Bernoulli Institute for Mathematics and Computer ScienceUniversity of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands

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