Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Impact of European Developments on German Codetermination and German Corporate Law

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
German Corporate Governance in International and European Context

Abstract

For more than a decade, developments originating from the European Union (EU) have considerably impacted on German corporate governance and, with it, on German codetermination laws.

Otto Sandrock sadly passed away shortly after the completion of this chapter.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See Sect. 6.2.

  2. 2.

    See Sect. 6.3.

  3. 3.

    See Sect. 6.4.

  4. 4.

    See Sect. 6.4.1.

  5. 5.

    See Sect. 6.4.2.

  6. 6.

    See Sect. 6.5.

  7. 7.

    See Sect. 6.6.

  8. 8.

    See Sect. 6.6.1.

  9. 9.

    See Sect. 6.6.2.

  10. 10.

    See Sect. 6.6.3.

  11. 11.

    See Sect. 6.7.

  12. 12.

    See Sect. 6.8.

  13. 13.

    See Sect. 6.8.

  14. 14.

    See Sect. 6.9.

  15. 15.

    See Sect. 6.6.1.7.

  16. 16.

    For some of the earlier developments, see Sandrock and du Plessis (2005), pp. 88–95.

  17. 17.

    As to the basic policies behind that theory and as to its origins see Ebke (2011), p. 175 at 182.

  18. 18.

    That theory is followed, e.g. in France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Austria, Portugal, Spain and Greece. Cf Großfeld (1998) paras 153 et seq; Behrens (1997), p. 4 et seq.

  19. 19.

    The German courts have applied that theory since the beginning of the twentieth century, and the majority of the German legal scholars applauded it. See Kindler (2006) paras 433 et seq, 493 et seq. See also Rose (2001), p. 126.

  20. 20.

    The historic origins and the policies behind that theory are elucidated by Ebke (2011), p. 181.

  21. 21.

    A plethora of German legal writings on that theory itself and on its shortcomings has emerged in recent years. A description of its basic rules may be found in some handbooks like Kegel and Schurig (2004), p. 575 et seq; von Bar (1991), p. 449 et seq; Firsching et al. (2007), p. 288 et seq; Kropholler (2006), p. 571 et seq; Siehr (2001), p. 304 et seq. For a more detailed description, see Großfeld (1998) paras 141 et seq; Behrens (1997); Kindler (2006) paras 312 et seq.

  22. 22.

    See in particular Knobbe-Keuk (1990), p. 325.

  23. 23.

    The Treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community already had been entered into in 1951. It was joined, in 1957, by the Treaty on the European Economic Community and the Treaty on the European Atomic Energy Community. The two latter Treaties are summarised under the term ‘Treaties of Rome’.

  24. 24.

    They are the free movement of goods (Art 28 et seq TFEU), the free movement of workers (Art 45 et seq TFEU), the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State including that freedom of establishment for companies and firms (Art 49 et seq TFEU), the freedom to provide services within the Union (Art 56 et seq TFEU), and the freedom of movements of capital and payments between Member States and third countries (Art 63 et seq TFEU).

  25. 25.

    See its Arts 52, 58.

  26. 26.

    Some of them will be cited below in this chapter.

  27. 27.

    See du Plessis and Sandrock (2005), pp. 67–79.

  28. 28.

    The so-called Lisbon Treaty which entered into effect on 1 December 2009. It has completely remodeled the former Amsterdam (1997) and Nizza (2001) ‘Treaty Establishing the European Community’ (EC-Treaty).

  29. 29.

    See Sect. 6.4.2.

  30. 30.

    ECJ 9 Mar 1999 (Case C-212/97) Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 ECR 1-1459, (1999) 54 BB 809.

  31. 31.

    ECJ 5 Nov 2002 (Case C-208/00) Üeberseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), (2002) 57 BB 2402.

  32. 32.

    ECJ 30 Sept 2003 (Case C-167/01) Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, (2003) 58 BB 2195.

  33. 33.

    ECJ 11 Mar 2004 (Case C-9/02) Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v Ministére de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, [2004] RIW 392.

  34. 34.

    See Sect. 6.2.2.5.

  35. 35.

    Among the great number of commentaries on this decision see Kindler (2000), p. 1993; Hirte (2000), p. 3321; Eidenmüller (2002), p. 2233; Kersting (2002), pp. 1, 13 et seq; Weller (2003), p. 207; Kindler (2003), p. 1073; Sandrock (2003), pp. 447, 452 et seq.

  36. 36.

    As to the different national regimes established in the member states of the EU with regard to codetermination or employee participation at supervisory board level, see the collection of articles in Baums and Ulmer (2004).

  37. 37.

    The Centros decision was open to several interpretations. See Rose (2001), p. 121.

  38. 38.

    Dammann (2003), p. 607, para 617 summarises the Centros judgment as follows: ‘It is contrary to Articles [43 (ex-Article 52)] and [46 (ex-Article 58)] of the EC Treaty for a Member State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed in accordance with the law of another Member State in which it has its registered office but in which it conducts no business where the branch is intended to enable the company in question to carry on its entire business in the State in which that branch is to be created, while avoiding the need to form a company there, thus evading application of the rules governing the formation of companies which, in that State, are more restrictive as regards paying of a minimum share capital.’

  39. 39.

    ECJ 9 Mar 1999 (Case C-212/97) Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 ECR 1-1459 no 27, (1999) 54 BB 809.

  40. 40.

    See, among others, Kindler (2000), p. 1993; Kindler (2003), p. 1073.

  41. 41.

    ECJ 5 Nov 2002 (Case C-208/00) Üeberseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), (2002) 57 BB 2402.

  42. 42.

    Published in (2000) 20 IPRax 423 and (2000) 46 RIW 555.

  43. 43.

    See the commentaries by Ebke (2003), p. 927; Zimmer (2003b), p. 1; Schanze and Jüttner (2003a), p. 30; Leible and Hoffmann (2002), p. 925; Meilicke (2003), p. 793; Paefgen (2003), p. 487.

  44. 44.

    ECJ 5 Nov 2002 (Case C-208/00) Üeberseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), no 92, (2002) 57 BB 2402.

  45. 45.

    Ibid.

  46. 46.

    ECJ 30 Sep 2003 (Case C-167/01) Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, (2003) 58 BB 2195.

  47. 47.

    See the commentaries on that decision by Kersting and Schindler (2003), p. 1277; Behrens (2003), p. 193; Zimmer (2003a), p. 3585; Spindler and Berner (2003), p. 949; Leible and Hoffmann (2003), p. 677; Schanze and Jüttner (2003b), p. 661; Maul and Schmidt (2003), p. 2297.

  48. 48.

    ECJ 30 Sep 2003 (Case C-167/01) Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, no 142, (2003) 58 BB 2195.

  49. 49.

    Para 1 of that Article provided: “The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.”

  50. 50.

    ECJ 11 Mar 2004 (Case C-9/02) Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v Ministére de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, (2004) 50 RIW 392.

  51. 51.

    See the commentaries by Kraft and Müller (2004), p. 366; Eicker (2004), p. 186. In Germany, the taxation of persons transferring their residence abroad is framed similarly. As a consequence of the ECJ decision, the EC has demanded the German Government to change its laws accordingly (FAZ 20 April 2004, 12).

  52. 52.

    Case C-411/03, [2005] ECR I-10805.

  53. 53.

    See Sect. 6.7 and, in particular Sect. 6.7.1.

  54. 54.

    In this context see also the decision of the ECJ in the matter of Cadbury Schweppes v Commissioners of Inland Revenue dealing with a problem of taxation; Case C-196/04 [2006 I-07995].

  55. 55.

    Case C-81/87, [1988] ECR 05483.

  56. 56.

    See no. 19 of the decision.

  57. 57.

    See no. 23 of the decision.

  58. 58.

    See nos. 24 and 25 of the decision.

  59. 59.

    See, for example, the recent publication by Weng (2008), pp. 261–272. As to earlier publications see Sandrock and Austmann (1989), pp. 249–253; Knobbe-Keuk (1990), p. 325; Behrens (1989), p. 354 at 357–359.

  60. 60.

    Decision of 16 December 2008, Case C-210/05, [2008] ECR I-09641. See the rather exhausting analysis of that decision by Barthel (2010), pp. 316–330.

  61. 61.

    See no. 21 of the decision.

  62. 62.

    See nos. 100, 119 of the decision.

  63. 63.

    See no. 24 of the decision.

  64. 64.

    See nos. 16, 17 of the decision.

  65. 65.

    See no. 20 of the decision.

  66. 66.

    Of 22 May 2008; available in the internet.

  67. 67.

    See no. 36 of the opinion sub (4).

  68. 68.

    See no. 27 of the opinion.

  69. 69.

    See no. 34 of the opinion sub (4).

  70. 70.

    See, for example, Behme and Nohlen (2009), pp. 13, 14; Kußmaul and Richter (2008), pp. 1–10; Leible and Hoffmann (2009), pp. 58–63; Weng (2008), pp. 264–272; Behme and Nohlen (2008), pp. 496–498.

  71. 71.

    Sub no. 4 of its rulings (para 125) the Court decreed:

    As Community law now stands, Articles 43 EC and 48 EC are to be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State under which a company incorporated under the law of that Member State may not transfer its seat to another Member State whilst retaining its status as a company governed by the law of the Member State of incorporation.

  72. 72.

    See no. 109 of the opinion.

  73. 73.

    See, for example, Zimmer and Naendrup (2009), p. 545; Leible and Hoffmann (2009), p. 58; Bayer and Schmidt (2009), p. 735 at 742–744; Bollacher (2009), p. 150; Kindler (2009), p. 189 at 190.

  74. 74.

    Among German commentators see, above all, the detailed study of Weller (2013a), pp. 530–536 with further references.

  75. 75.

    Case C-378/10.

  76. 76.

    See no. 112 of the decision.

  77. 77.

    See, however, the cautious commentary on that ruling by Kindler (2009), p. 189 at 191 warning that the protection of the creditors’ rights should not be forgotten.

  78. 78.

    See marginal nos. 9–11 of the decision.

  79. 79.

    See marginal nos. 12–14 of the decision.

  80. 80.

    See supra sub 6.2.2.5.

  81. 81.

    See marginal nos. 27, 28 of the decision.

  82. 82.

    See marginal nos. 29 of the decision.

  83. 83.

    See marginal no. 33 of the decision.

  84. 84.

    See marginal nos. 34–41 of the decision.

  85. 85.

    See marginal no. 41 of the decision.

  86. 86.

    As to both principles, see, inter alia, the decision of the ECJ of 28th November in the matter of Roquette Frères SA, Case C-88/99, at no. 21 and Koen Lenaerts, ‘Effective judicial protection in the EU’, http://ec.eurpa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/files /interventions/koenlenaerts.pdf.

  87. 87.

    See marginal no. 62 of the decision.

  88. 88.

    Both national laws, the English as well as the German, allow such conversion of companies.

  89. 89.

    That “theory of combination” (Kombinatiuonslehre) was first advocated on the level of EU law by the early study of Beitzke (1966), p. 14 et seq. Beitzke drew a parallel to the international merger of companies.

  90. 90.

    For all further details of such transfer of the registered seat see the detailed, in-depth study by Weller (2013b), p. 509 et seq. See also Weller (2013a), pp. 530–536.

  91. 91.

    See <http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/company/seat-transfer/2004-concult_en.htm>.

  92. 92.

    See Impact Assessment by the EC of December 2007, <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/seat-transfer/index_en.htm>.

  93. 93.

    See the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European private company (COM (200) 396/3). That Proposal is in detail dealt with below sub 6.5.

  94. 94.

    See Chapter VII of the Commission’s Proposal for such Regulation of 2008 (COM (2008) 396/3). The German Study Group for Stock Corporation and Capital Markets Law (see Sect. 6.4.8) pleads, however, for the continuation of the Commission’s work on a Directive on the Transfer of Registered Seats quoting persuasive reasons for such an initiative, (2011) 14 NZG 98.

  95. 95.

    See infra sub 6.6.3.

  96. 96.

    See Art. 9 para. 1.

  97. 97.

    See Art. 9 para. 2.

  98. 98.

    See Art. 9 para. 3.

  99. 99.

    The German rules on codetermination are however not regarded as part of the German ordre public (in the meaning of Art 9 para 2 of Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Official Journal L 177/6 of 4 July 2008) reading: “Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum”). For further details see Sandrock (2004), pp. 57, 65; Veit and Wichert (2004), pp. 14–15, 17.

  100. 100.

    See (2005) 60 BB 1016 et seq; (2005) 58 NJW 1648 et seq; [2005] 51 RIW 542. The BGH was followed by the Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht) Hamm, (2006) 61 BB 24 which had extended the purview of the theory of incorporation even to companies from non-EU-States.

  101. 101.

    See Sandrock (2005), p. 529.

  102. 102.

    The European Economic Area (EEA) is organised under an Agreement of 1993. It comprises the 27 Member States of the EU and the three EEA/EFTA States Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway. Switzerland, however, is not a member of the EEA.

  103. 103.

    Sub II 2 b of the reasons of the judgment.

  104. 104.

    Ibid.

  105. 105.

    Of 2nd December 2015 in the matter of Kornhaas (II ZR 119/14).

  106. 106.

    That provision was later amended by the Statute on the Modernization of that statute (BGBl. 2008 I 2026, 2031. The substance of it was, however, not changed by that amendment.

  107. 107.

    ECJ Rs. C-594/14 (in the matter of Kornhaas). That decision has been commented upon by Wansleben (2016), p. 72.

  108. 108.

    (2002) 57 BB 2031.

  109. 109.

    II ZR 158/06 (Trabrennbahn), (2009) 64 BB 14.

  110. 110.

    Art 31 para 1 of that Treaty provides that there shall be no restrictions on the freedom of establishment of an EC Member State or an EFTA State in the territory of any other of these States.

  111. 111.

    European Free Trade Agreement of 1960 to which Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland are members.

  112. 112.

    The judgment has been thoroughly analysed by Ebke (2011), p. 175 at 196. For a thorough review of the German position vis-à-vis “third state” companies see the recent study by Ebke (2010), pp. 117–141.

  113. 113.

    (2002) 57 BB 3031.

  114. 114.

    As to the rather devastating effects on Swiss companies with their centers of administration in Germany see Ebke (2011), p. 175 at 197.

  115. 115.

    But see the arguments in favour of the two sub-rules brought forward by Ebke (2010).

  116. 116.

    Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany 1956 Part II 488.

  117. 117.

    Judgment of 29 January 2003 (BGHZ 153, 353 = (2003) 49 RIW 473); judgment of 5 July 2004, (2004) 59 BB 1868 = (2004) 50 RIW 787; Judgment of 13 October 2004, (2004) 59 BB 2595.

  118. 118.

    Official Journal of the former “Reich” 1927 Part II 1088.

  119. 119.

    Translation by Otto Sandrock, one of the co-authors of this Chap. 6.

  120. 120.

    See Sandrock (2006a), p. 85.

  121. 121.

    Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany 1972 Part II 1042.

  122. 122.

    Translation by Otto Sandrock, one of the co-authors of this Chap. 6.

  123. 123.

    See Sandrock (2006b), p. 658.

  124. 124.

    Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBl. 1892, 477) (Official Journal of the former Reich, 1892 at 477).

  125. 125.

    Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl. 1965 I 1089) (Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1965, Part I at 1089).

  126. 126.

    Sec. 4a was inserted into the GmbHG by a statute of 22 June 1998 (Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Kaufmanns- und Firmenrechts und zur Änderung anderer handels- und gesellschaftsrechtlicher Vorschriften, Handelsrechtsreformgesetz – HRefG, BGBl. 1998 I 1471). In Germany, there is no central register of companies since such registers are administered by the local courts in each judicial district. Companies had sought to be registered in judicial districts far away from their creditors and, if possible, with lax registration practices. The new section sought to forestall such abuses by prescribing the registration in districts to which the companies were factually connected.

  127. 127.

    Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl. 2008 I 2026; Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2008, Part I at 2026).

  128. 128.

    S 25 MoMiG.

  129. 129.

    That provision was already contained in the version in which the AktG had been amended in 1937.

  130. 130.

    Elke Bohl, ‘Die Mitbestimmung irritiert die ausländischen Investoren’ FAZ 20 Sept 2003, 14. See also Veit and Wichert (2004), p. 17 (fn 39); Ulmer (2002), pp. 271, 273–274; Hirte (2002b), pp. 349, 355.

  131. 131.

    See Triebel and Horton (2006), p. 35; FAZ 18 Aug 2006, 14; FAZ 13 Sept 2006, 22.

  132. 132.

    Ibid.

  133. 133.

    See Sect. 6.4.

  134. 134.

    Dammann (2003), p. 607 paras 685–86 argues that there are possibilities by which the German legislature could circumvent the negative consequences of the Centros decision on codetermination.

  135. 135.

    See the in-depth study by Ringe (2013), p. 230 (sub II, 2); published also as Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 34/2013. See also Sandrock (2011), pp. 1–12, in particular ibid. under I, 2 in footnotes 2, 3 and 4. Under the provisions of German company law relating to the registrations of foreign firms, these Ltds. are obliged to file for registration with the German registers maintained with the different German local courts. This obligation is even sanctioned by a fine. But despite of such sanction, only one third of these Ltds. are estimated to be registered in the German registers of companies.

  136. 136.

    See Sandrock (2011), pp. 1–12.

  137. 137.

    The minimum capital is € 25,000 (see S 5 para 1 of the GmbHG). But when the officers of the company file for registration, only one fourth of that sum must have been paid in (see S 7 para 2 GmbHG).

  138. 138.

    There is a vast literature on this topic in Germany. Among many others see Müller (2006b), p. 837; Dierksmeyer (2006), pp. 1516, 1518; Wegen and Schlichte (2006), p. 801.

  139. 139.

    Different rates of depreciation, for example.

  140. 140.

    See Dierksmeyer (2011), pp. 205–216 with further references.

  141. 141.

    The German co-author of this Chapter, Otto Sandrock, has been a member of that Committee.

  142. 142.

    Both Proposals with the reasons attached to them by the Commission are published in (2006) 52 RIW, Beilage 1 to issue 4, April 2006.

  143. 143.

    It provides that, inter alia, the following shall be determined by the law in effect at the place of incorporation: a company’s legal nature and legal capacity; its formation, reorganisation, and dissolution; its name or company name; its organisational and financial constitution; the power of representation of its bodies.

  144. 144.

    ‘Referentenentwurf Gesetz zum Internationalen Privatrecht der Gesellschaften, Vereine und juristischen Personen’—see Wagner and Timm (2008), pp. 81–90.

  145. 145.

    Other forms of European legal organisations are the EEIG (European Economic Interest Grouping) (for a survey see Grundmann (2011), p. 657 et seq.), and the SCE (European Cooperative Society).

  146. 146.

    du Plessis and Dine (1997), p. 23 et seq.

  147. 147.

    See Marychurch (2002), pp. 80, 82–83 and 94.

  148. 148.

    Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE), 8 Oct 2001 OJ L 294/1.

  149. 149.

    See Habersack and Verse (2011), p. 424v et seq. With abundant references: Thoma and Leuering (2002), p. 1449; Gruber and Weller (2003), p. 297.

  150. 150.

    Official Journal of the European Union no. 294 of 10 Nov 2001, 22–33.

  151. 151.

    See SE Employees’ Dir Art 17.

  152. 152.

    See SE Employees’ Dir Art 16.

  153. 153.

    For a survey see Grundmann (2011), p. 614 et seq.

  154. 154.

    (BGBl. 2004 I 3675) which contains two Articles. In its Art 1 the SEEG is promulgated. Its Art 2 contains the SEBG.

  155. 155.

    See Art s 9 of the SEBG (see fn. 126).

  156. 156.

    See Sect. 6.6.1.5.

  157. 157.

    As to a general survey on the SE Directive see Kellerhals and Trüten (2002), p. 71; Hommelhoff (2001), p. 279; Schwarz (2001), p. 1847; Bungert and Beier (2002), p. 1; Hirte (2002a), p. 1; Teichmann (2002), p. 383; Thoma and Leuering (2002), p. 1449.

  158. 158.

    Art 8 para 2.

  159. 159.

    Art 8 para 3.

  160. 160.

    Art 8 para 4.

  161. 161.

    Art 8 para 5.

  162. 162.

    Art 8 para 6 as well as Art 59 of the SE Regulation.

  163. 163.

    Art 8 para 8.

  164. 164.

    Art 8 para 9.

  165. 165.

    Art 8 para 13.

  166. 166.

    See further Sect. 6.4.4.

  167. 167.

    See <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/sebg/gesamt.pdf>.

  168. 168.

    See also Jürgen Oechsler in Kropff et al. (2006), EWG VO 2157/2001, Art 8 at marginal note 12 who even thinks it “worth of discussion” whether the principles on a frustration of the contract would be applicable here.

  169. 169.

    Official Journal of the European Union no. 294 of 10 Nov 2001, 22–33.

  170. 170.

    The agreement could apparently be to exclude any form of codetermination, which will probably be the case with most non-German SEs, but it will hardly be possible for a dominant German company to escape a German-type of codetermination as it is unlikely that the Trade Unions will agree that codetermination be excluded completely. Hopt (2002), p. 42 argues that this may once again give dominant German SEs a disadvantage in comparison with other SEs in the European Union.

  171. 171.

    For further information on codetermination in the SE see Wissmann (2009) 3. Buch: Kollektives Arbeitsrecht, Achter Abschnitt: Vertretung der Arbeitnehmer in Unternehmensorganen, 5. Kapitel: Mitbestimmung nach europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht; Heinze (2002), p. 66; Pluskat (2001), p. 524; Herfs-Röttgen (2001), p. 424; Weiß (2003), p. 177.

  172. 172.

    Kübler (2001), p. 224 characterises these provisions as ‘mit einer die Grenzen der Skurrilität streifenden Akribie festgelegt’.

  173. 173.

    For further details see SE Employees’ Directive Art 7 para 1 sub-para 2.

  174. 174.

    See generally Veit and Wichert (2004), p. 19.

  175. 175.

    See Wagner (2005), p. 548 et seq. See also FAZ 2 Feb 2005, 23; and 5 Aug 2005, 11.

  176. 176.

    Including the Austrian Province of Tirol.

  177. 177.

    In the first edition of this book (2007), the following companies were mentioned: (i) from Germany: Zoll Pool Hafen Hamburg (the customs authority at the seaport of Hamburg); Go-East- Invest Co: the large Allianz AG as the holding of its many insurance subsidiaries; the Fresenius AG (a worldwide provider of medical services); (ii) from Austria: the STRABAG AG (a holding of construction companies); the Neumann Partners AG (a management consulting company); (iii) from Scandinavia: the Nordea (a finance company) and the Alfred Berg (ABN Amro) (a bank); from (iv) France: The Mazars company (an accounting company); (v) from Great Britain: the Schering Plough Clinical Trials (a pharmaceutical company); (vi) from the Netherlands: the MPIT Structure Financial Services; and (vi) from Finland: the Elocteq Network Corporation (an electrical equipment company). See FAZ 5 Aug 2005, 11.

  178. 178.

    Since SEs do not have to—and cannot register—on a European level, but in the national registers of the Member States only, the EC is not able to publish reliable numbers on all incorporations in SEs. But see the website of the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI): <http://worker-participation.eu/european_company>. See ibid. sub Facts & Figures.

  179. 179.

    ‘Empty SEs’ are SEs that have organs like shareholders meeting and a board of directors, but no employees. That may be the case, for example, in the counselling business where a few shareholders who at the same time are board members advise their clients without employing anybody else. See also <http://www.worker-participation.eu/European-Company/SE-COMPANIES-News/SE-Factsheets/News-on-European-Companies-March-2011 and <http://www.seeurope-network.org/homepages/seeurope/file_uploads/sefactsheetsglance0506.pdf>.

  180. 180.

    See <http://worker-participation.eu/european_company>. See ibid. sub Facts & Figures.

  181. 181.

    It was impossible to find out the exact number of German SEs which have opted for a monistic board. See the website of the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI): <http://worker-participation.eu/european_company>.

  182. 182.

    See Art 4 para 2 of the SE Regulation. Para 3 of that provision adds that the laws of a Member State requiring a greater subscribed capital for companies carrying on certain types of activity shall apply to SEs with registered offices in that Member State.

  183. 183.

    The SE has been recommended to be a good organizational form of company in particular for small and medium-sized companies (Mittelstand). See Giangreco and Polte (2014), p. 2917. See also Albert Schröder in Manz et al. (2010), Teil A Vorbemerkungen at IX.

  184. 184.

    Albert Schröder in Manz et al. (2010) Teil A Vorbemerkungen at VIII, with further references.

  185. 185.

    See SE-Ausführungsgesetz-SEAG—see <http://www.bmas.de/portal/15432/seag.html>.

  186. 186.

    The affinity of that regulation to the respective regulation of the German supervisory board is evident.

  187. 187.

    See Raabe (2010), pp. 315–325. As Raabe (ibid 205, 206) reports the majority of the SEs registered in Germany seems however not to have reduced the size in members of their supervisory boards.

  188. 188.

    See its S. 16 sentence 2 and its S.17 para 2.

  189. 189.

    See again Sect. 5.2.3.

  190. 190.

    SE-Ausführungsgesetz-SEAG see <http://www.bmas.de/portal/15432/seag.html>.

  191. 191.

    See the ‘Gesetz über die Beteiligung der Arbeitnehmer in einer Europäischen Gesellschaft—SE-Beteiligungsgesetz (SEBG)’—see <http://www.bmas.de/portal/15432/seag.html>.

  192. 192.

    See S 23 para 2 and S 24 para 2 of the German statute.

  193. 193.

    See supra sub 6.6.1.5.

  194. 194.

    See no. 20 of the introductory remarks to the SE Regulation as well as its Art 3 para 1.

  195. 195.

    The origins of these frictions are well indicated in the “Study on the Operation and the Impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE) of 9 December 2009 – 2008/S 144-192482” submitted by Ernst & Young at p. 26 et seq. That study explains, for example, at 26: “Even though the SE Regulation includes many uniform and directly applicable provisions, it also refers to national legislation which is sometimes not harmonised (especially in the field of corporate governance). Furthermore it contains a certain number (32) of options, which are left to the discretion of the Member States (with regard to the appropriateness and methods of implementation). The options given by the SE Regulation refer to (i) the formation of the SE, (ii) the transfer of the registered office, (iii) the organisation and management of the SE and (iv) miscellaneous items.”

  196. 196.

    Report drawn up by Ernst & Young following call for tender from the European Commission—2008/S 144-192482) at 2.1.

  197. 197.

    See in particular Sects. 5.2.3.2–5.2.3.4.

  198. 198.

    Study on the Operation and the Impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE) of 9 December 2009—2008/S 144-192482.

  199. 199.

    As to the meaning of these terms see Sect. 6.4.5.

  200. 200.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The application of Council Regulation 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE), COM (2010) 1391. The Commission also published a “Commission Staff Working Document” accompanying its Report, COM (2010) 676.

  201. 201.

    Ibid at 3.

  202. 202.

    Ibid at 6.

  203. 203.

    Ibid at 9.

  204. 204.

    At 4.

  205. 205.

    See Casper (2009), pp. 181–221; Kiem (2009), pp. 156–180; Henssler (2009), pp. 222–249. These publications represented papers which had been submitted to a conference with an ensuing discussion. As to the results of the discussion see Beuchert (2009), pp. 250–254.

  206. 206.

    One of its members was Matthias Casper, who is one of the co-authors of this book.

  207. 207.

    See its proposals: Study Group for German Stock Corporation and Capital Markets Law (2000), pp. 285–289; Arbeitskreis Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht (AAK) (2009), pp. 698, 699 together with the reasons supporting them in: Arbeitskreis Aktien- und Kapitalmarktecht (AAK) (2009), pp. 2221–2228.

  208. 208.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The application of Council Regulation 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE), COM(2010) 1391.

  209. 209.

    Ibid at p. 4, 5.

  210. 210.

    That assessment was prepared by Jan Cremers, Norbert Kluge and Michael Stollt under the title ‘Worker Participation: a “burden” on the European Company (SE)’.

  211. 211.

    See Sect. 6.4.8.

  212. 212.

    See also Ziegler and Gey (2009), pp. 1750–1758.

  213. 213.

    Kiem (2009), p. 156.

  214. 214.

    See in particular Henssler (2009), p. 222.

  215. 215.

    Beuchert (2009), pp. 250–252.

  216. 216.

    See Volker Rieble in Bork and Schäfer (2012), S 52 marginal note 76–81, with further references.

  217. 217.

    See, for example, ‘“Europa GmbH” soll Kosten sparen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) (a nation-wide German daily newspaper) of 4 March 2009 at p. 21: Christian Steinberger, ‘Europäische Privatgesellschaft/Weniger Kosten, mehr Rechtssicherheit und gut für den Mittelstand’, (2008) 63 BB issue 30 of 1 July 2008, Die Erste Seite; (without author) ‘Europäische Rechtsform für den Mittelstand’ in FAZ of 1 July 2008 at p. 17.

  218. 218.

    European Parliament, Report with recommendation to the Commission of the European private company statute of 29 November 2006, 2006/2013 (INI).

  219. 219.

    COM (2008) 396/3.

  220. 220.

    Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2008, COM (2007) 640.

  221. 221.

    Similar to the struggle on the implementation of the codetermination of employees within the SE, the implementation of such codetermination within the SPE was one of the most debated obstacles to the presentation of the Proposal for an SPE. See (without author) ‘Mitbestim- mungsstreit behindert Europa GmbH’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (nation-wide German daily newspaper) of 4 November 2008 at 21.

  222. 222.

    For a general survey, see Maul and Röhricht (2008), pp. 1574–1579; Peters (2008), pp. 807–812; Anzinger (2009), pp. 2606–2612.

  223. 223.

    In contrast to the SE which can be organised only under some restrictive criteria (see Art 2 of the SE Regulation: merger between two companies from different EU Member States; formation of a holding by companies from different EU Member States; formation of a subsidiary SE by parent companies from different EU Member States; transformation into an SE of a company which has a subsidiary in another Member State), Art 5 of the Proposal does not restrict the manner in which an SPE can be created. It can even be set up ex nihilo.

  224. 224.

    See Art 4 of the Proposal.

  225. 225.

    It is with good reason that the “Memorandum” preceding the text of the Proposal points out (in its Chapter IV) that creditors nowadays look rather at aspects other than capital, such a cash flow, which are more relevant to solvency; that director-shareholders of small companies often offer personal guarantees to their creditors (e. g. to banks); and that suppliers also use other methods to secure their claims, e. g. providing that ownerships of goods only passes upon payment.

  226. 226.

    See Sect. 6.4.2.

  227. 227.

    See Art 26 para 2 of the Proposal.

  228. 228.

    See Annex I Chapter V (Organisation of the SPE).

  229. 229.

    See Art 26 par. 1 sentence 2.

  230. 230.

    See Annex I Chapter V (Organisation of the SPE).

  231. 231.

    See Annex I Chapter V (Organisation of the SPE).

  232. 232.

    See Hommelhoff (2011), pp. 7–40.

  233. 233.

    See Sect. 6.4.2.2.

  234. 234.

    The next para of Chapter VII mentions that the transfer procedure would be inspired by the provisions on the transfer of the registered office of the SE Regulation. See Sect. 6.4.3.

  235. 235.

    See Press release, reference no. 20090309IPR51336.

  236. 236.

    See Sects. 6.4.8 and 6.4.9.

  237. 237.

    With good reasons, the Group approves of the absence of a cross-border element for the formation of an SPE; see no. 20 of the Study.

  238. 238.

    No. 21 of the Study.

  239. 239.

    See nos. 39, 40.

  240. 240.

    For further critique see Bormann and König (2010), pp. 111–119.

  241. 241.

    See para. 1 of the bulky Art. 352 TFEU reading: If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies of the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, voting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. Where the measures in question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.”

  242. 242.

    See Art. 294 para. 13 TFEU.

  243. 243.

    COM(2014) 212 final or 2014/0120 (COD).

  244. 244.

    For details see the extensive description by Kindler (2015), pp. 330–384, who illustrates also how a proposal by the Italian Government tries to even out some weaknesses of the Proposal.

  245. 245.

    See Art. 7 para. 3 of the Proposal.

  246. 246.

    See Art. 9 of the Proposal.

  247. 247.

    See Art. 10 of the Proposal.

  248. 248.

    See Art. 15 para. 1 of the Proposal.

  249. 249.

    See Art. 16 para. 1 of the Proposal.

  250. 250.

    See Sect. 6.4.1.1.5.

  251. 251.

    See Sect. 6.7.2.

  252. 252.

    See Sect. 6.7.2.

  253. 253.

    Case C-411/03 [2005] ECR I-10805. The decision is also reprinted in (2006) 26 IPRax 596 and in (2006) 17 EWS 27.

  254. 254.

    See no 26 of the judgment: ‘It should be noted in that respect that, whilst Community harmonisation rules are useful for facilitating cross-border mergers, the existence of such harmonisation rules cannot be made a precondition for the implementation of the freedom of establishment laid down by Articles 43 EC and 48 EC …’.

  255. 255.

    See Bungert (2006), p. 54 et seq.

  256. 256.

    See Ott (2004), p. 212; Triebel and von Hase (2003), p. 2416.

  257. 257.

    See Peter Behrens in a comment on this case in (2006) 43 Common Market L Rev 1686.

  258. 258.

    Official Journal of the European Union 25 Nov 2005 L 310/1.

  259. 259.

    COM(2003) 703 [2003/0277(COD)].

  260. 260.

    For details see Wenglorz (2004), p. 1061 and further references.

  261. 261.

    See Drinhausen and Keinath (2006), pp. 81–87; Neye (2005), p. 1894.

  262. 262.

    See Müller (2006a), p. 286; Louven and Dettmeier (2006), p. 1.

  263. 263.

    COM(2003) 703 [2003/0277(COD)] sub no. 3.3.

  264. 264.

    For details see Müller (2006a), p. 286 at 289 et seq; Louven and Dettmeier (n 226) 15 et seq.

  265. 265.

    Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des Umwandlungsgesetzes, BGBl. I 542–548. The legislative reasons supporting that Act are stated in the bill by which that Act was introduced into the federal Parliament by the government (see Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung, Drucksache des Bundesrates 548/06 of 11 August 2006).

  266. 266.

    For details see Frenzel (2008), pp. 12–20; Kollmorgen and Feldhaus (2007), pp. 2189–2193.

  267. 267.

    Sec. 1 para 1 of the Umwandlungsgesetz lists four kinds of transformations: those by merger, by spin-offs, by transfer of property, and by change of legal form.

  268. 268.

    See its s 122a et seq.

  269. 269.

    See Sect. 6.2.3.2.

  270. 270.

    See Sect. 6.5.3.2.

  271. 271.

    In the following, we will however not deal with the transfer of seats of companies between those States with which Germany has entered into bilateral treaties—treaties in which the two Contracting States agreed on the mutual application of the theory of incorporation like the USA, Japan and Spain (see Sect. 6.3.1.2).

  272. 272.

    European Economic Area, see “Exceptions” in Sect. 6.5.3.2.

  273. 273.

    For further references see Daniel Zimmer in Schmidt and Lutter (2010) at S 45 marginal note 20.

  274. 274.

    It is repeated again that in this context those States will not be mentioned separately with which Germany has entered into bilateral treaties providing, inter alia, for the mutual application of the theory of incorporation (USA, Japan, Spain) (see “A Few Exceptions” in Sect. 6.3.1.2).

  275. 275.

    For further references see Daniel Zimmer in Schmidt and Lutter (2010) at S 45 marginal note 27.

  276. 276.

    As to such view see ibid Daniel Zimmer in Schmidt and Lutter (2010) at S 45 marginal note 27. See also Teichmann (2009), p. 401 at 401.

  277. 277.

    See Bernhard Großfeld in: Staudinger (1998) marginal note 629.

  278. 278.

    For the convenience of the reader, those States will not be mentioned in this context separately with which Germany has entered into bilateral treaties providing, inter alia, for the mutual application of the theory of incorporation (USA, Japan, Spain) (see “Exceptions” in Sect. 6.5.3.2).

  279. 279.

    For further references Daniel Zimmer in Schmidt and Lutter (2010) at S 45 marginal note 31.

  280. 280.

    Again it has to be noted the seat theory has been abandoned by a judgment of the German Supreme Court in Civil Matters in March 2005, German courts now follow the theory of incorporation (see Sect. 6.5.3.1).

  281. 281.

    See Sect. 6.5.3.1.

  282. 282.

    It is repeated again that those States will not be mentioned separately in this context with which Germany has entered into bilateral treaties providing, inter alia, for the mutual application of the theory of incorporation (USA, Japan, Spain) (see “A Few Exceptions” in Sect. 6.3.1.2).

  283. 283.

    For further references see Daniel Zimmer in Schmidt and Lutter (2010) at S 45 marginal note 33.

  284. 284.

    See Sect. 6.5.3.1.

  285. 285.

    See S 262 paragraph 1 No. 2 of the AktG.

  286. 286.

    In the case of a dissolution, codetermination could take place however only during the liquidation proceedings.

  287. 287.

    For further details see Daniel Zimmer in Schmidt and Lutter (2010) at S 45 marginal notes 33–36.

  288. 288.

    See Sect. 6.6.1.3.

  289. 289.

    See Sect. 6.6.2.3.

  290. 290.

    Sentence 2 of Art 7 the continues: “A Member State may in addition impose on SEs registered in its territory the obligation of locating their head office and their registered office in the same place”. That provision authorizes the Member States to provide that registered seat and real seat of an SE must be situated even in the same local community.

  291. 291.

    See the ‘Gesetz zur Ausführung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2157/2001 des Rates vom 8. Oktober 2001 über das Statut der Europäischen Gesellschaft (SE)’ (SE-Ausführungsgesetz-SEAG)“, BGBl. 2004 I 3675.

  292. 292.

    It is disputed whether this mandatory linkage between registered and real seat is compatible with the freedom of establishment as guaranteed by Arts. 49, 54 of the TFEU. In this respect see de Diego (2005), pp. 446–454.

  293. 293.

    I.e. the USA, Japan and Spain (see “Exceptions” in Sect. 6.5.3.1).

  294. 294.

    For further details and references see Daniel Zimmer in Schmidt and Lutter (2010) at S 45 marginal note 22.

  295. 295.

    For further details and references see ibid at S 45 marginal note 23/24.

  296. 296.

    See the Decision of 16 December 2008, Case C-210/05, [2008] ECR I-09641 at marginal note 111.

  297. 297.

    See ibid, marginal note 109.

  298. 298.

    See ibid, marginal note 112.

  299. 299.

    For further details and references see Daniel Zimmer in Schmidt and Lutter (2010) at S 45 marginal note 28 as well as Teichmann (2009), pp. 401 and 402.

  300. 300.

    See Decision of 16 December 2008, Case C-210/05, [2008] ECR I-09641 at marginal note 111.

  301. 301.

    See ibid at marginal note 109.

  302. 302.

    With respect to this group of cases, see Daniel Zimmer in Schmidt and Lutter (2010) at S 45 marginal note 32 referring to notes 21–23.

  303. 303.

    Again it has to be noted that the seat theory has been abandoned by a judgment of the German Supreme Court in Civil Matters in March 2005, German courts now follow the theory of incorporation (see section “The General Rule”).

  304. 304.

    See section “The General Rule” under Sect. 6.5.3.1.

  305. 305.

    For further details and references see Daniel Zimmer in Schmidt and Lutter (2010) at S 45 marginal note 35.

  306. 306.

    See section “The General Rule” under Sect. 6.5.3.1.

  307. 307.

    See Sect. 6.6.1.3.

  308. 308.

    See section “Transfer of the Real Seat of an SE or an SPE from Germany to a State Either Inside or Outside of EU and EEA (Emigration from Germany)”.

  309. 309.

    It is true that some substantive rules on the national commercial registers have been harmonised (see, for example, the very early “First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968 (!) on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community” (Official Journal L 065 of 14 March 1968, pp. 00008-0012), amended by Directive 2003/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2003 amending Council Directive 68/151/EEC, as regards disclosure requirements in respect of certain types of companies” (Official Journal of 4 September 2003 L 221/13). But insofar as the problems here under examination are concerned, no such harmonisation has taken place.

  310. 310.

    See section “The General Rule”.

  311. 311.

    See du Plessis et al. (2007) at 163.

  312. 312.

    Ibid 163.

  313. 313.

    Ibid.

  314. 314.

    Since SEs do not have to—and cannot register—on a European level, but in the national registers of the Member States only, the EC is not able to publish reliable numbers on all incorporations in SEs. But see the website of the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI): <http://worker-participation.eu/european_company>. See ibid. sub Facts & Figures.

  315. 315.

    As to all these numbers, see supra sub 6.6.1.5.

  316. 316.

    See SE-Ausführungsgesetz-SEAG—see <http://www.bmas.de/portal/15432/seag.html>.

  317. 317.

    See Sect. 6.6.1.4.

  318. 318.

    See <http://worker-participation.eu/layout/set/print/European-Company/SE-COMPANIES-News/Facts-and-Figures>.

  319. 319.

    See Roland Köstler and Frank Werner, ‘SE zwischen Eiszeit und Europa’ (Magazin Mitbestimmung, 2007 issue 12, Hans Böckler-Stiftung, available in the Internet). See also Sect. 6.4.6.

  320. 320.

    See supra sub 6.6.1.5.

  321. 321.

    See www.worker-participation.eu/layout/set/print/European-Company-SE/Facts-Figures sub ‘Worker Involvement in the ‘normal SES”.

  322. 322.

    See www.worker-participation.eu/layout/set/print/European-Company-SE/Facts-Figures sub ‘Board Structure of ‘normal SES”.

  323. 323.

    See Roland Roland Köstler and Frank Werner, ‘SE zwischen Eiszeit und Europa’ (Magazin Mitbestimmung, 2007 issue 12, Hans Böckler-Stiftung, available in the Internet).

  324. 324.

    Pursuant to Art 4 para 2 lit. g of the SE Employees’ Directive, the arrangement between the competent organs of the participating companies and the special negotiating body shall cover the number of members in the SEs administrative or supervisory body which the employees will be entitled to elect, appoint, recommend or oppose, the procedures as to how these members may be elected, appointed, recommended or opposed by the employees, and their rights …” (emphasis added).

  325. 325.

    See Sect. 6.8.1.5.

  326. 326.

    Commission of the European Communities (Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament), ‘Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union—A Plan to Move Forward’ COM (2003) 284 Final <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/index.htm>.

  327. 327.

    The members of the Commission were Jaap Winter (Chair); Jan Schans Christensen; José Maria Garriddo Garcia; Klaus J Hopt; Jonathan Rickford; Guido Rossis; and Joëlle Simon.

  328. 328.

    Winter Report, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Jan 2002 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/ news/hlg01–2002.pdf>. See Hopt (2009), pp. 57–59 for a to-the-point discussion of these developments.

  329. 329.

    Winter Report, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Jan 2002 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/ news/hlg01–2002.pdf> 6.

  330. 330.

    Ibid 33.

  331. 331.

    Ibid 74 (Annex 4).

  332. 332.

    See the article ‘Deutsche Bank sichtet Fusionskandidaten’ FAZ 5 June 2004, 14.

  333. 333.

    See Berliner Morgenpost of 26 October 2009 (available in the Internet).

  334. 334.

    See Wagner (2005), p. 548. See also FAZ 2 Feb 2005, 23; and 5 Aug 2005, 11.

  335. 335.

    See supra sub 6.6.1.5.

  336. 336.

    See supra sub 6.6.1.8.

  337. 337.

    See www.worker-participation.eu/layout/set/print/European-Company-SE/Facts-Figures sub ‘Geographical Distribution of European Companies’.

  338. 338.

    See Hendrik Kafsack, ‘Studie: Europa AG hebelt die Mitbestimmung aus’, F.A.Z (German nation-wide daily) of 9 April 2009 at p. 12.

  339. 339.

    See Sect. 6.6.1.8.

  340. 340.

    As to the following see the detailed study by Joachim Möller, ‘The German labor market response in the world recession – demystifying a miracle’, published online in “Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung” on 22 January 2010.

  341. 341.

    Under the headline of “Europe’s engine” of March 13th–19th, 2010 at p. 13.

  342. 342.

    See “Boards behaving badly”, Economist of August 8th–14th, 2010 at p. 55.

  343. 343.

    See “The lives of others”, Economist of March 8th–14th, 2010 at p. 62.

  344. 344.

    See “Inside the miracle”, Economist of March 13th–19th, 2010 at p. 5 (6).

  345. 345.

    See “The lives of others”, Economist of August 8th–14th, 2009 at p. 61.

  346. 346.

    See “Unbalanced Germany”, The Economist of August 8th–14th, 2009 at p. 7 and “The lives of others”, Economist of August 8th–14th, 2009 at p. 61.

  347. 347.

    See “Unbalanced Germany”, Economist of August 8th–14th, 2009 at p. 7. See also Luca di Leo, ‘No German Jobs Miracle, but there may be a lesson for the US’, The Wall Street Journal, European Edition, online, 17 March 2011; Michael C. Burda (Berlin) and Jennifer Hunt (McGill University), What Explains the German Labor Market Miracle in the Great Recession, 6 March 2010 (online). http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2011_spring_bpea_papers/2011_spring_bpea_conference_burda.pdf.

  348. 348.

    See the report in the German weekly “Focus” of 16 November 2010.

  349. 349.

    Mr. Studzinski was quoted by the Financial Times Deutschland, a German daily newspaper. See its issue of 27 January 2011 (available in the Internet).

  350. 350.

    See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (nation-wide German daily newspaper) of 29 January 2011 at p. 13.

  351. 351.

    See also the assessment of German codetermination by Harold Meyerson, ‘Business is Booming’, (2011 March issue) The American Prospect, Washington DC 20036 USA, <http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=business_is booming>) as well as Jordan Meijias, ‘Feuert die Reichen! Warum … Deutschland plötzlich als ökonomischer Musterknabe gilt’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (nation-wide German daily newspaper) of 2 April 2011 at p. 35.

References

  • Anzinger H (2009) Die Europäische Privatgesellschaft – vom Vollstatut zum tragfähigen Kompromiss. BB 64:2606–2612

    Google Scholar 

  • Arbeitskreis Aktien- und Kapitalmarktecht (AAK) (2009) Vorschläge zur Reform der Mitbestimmung in der Societas Europea. ZIP 31:2221–2228

    Google Scholar 

  • Arbeitskreis Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht (AAK) (ed) (2009) Die 8 wichtigsten Änderungsvorschläge zur SE-VO. ZIP 31:698, 699

    Google Scholar 

  • Barthel D (2010) Die Niederlassungsfreiheit der Gesellschaften nach EuGH “Cartesio”. EWS 20:316–330

    Google Scholar 

  • Baums T, Ulmer P (eds) (2004) Unternehmensmitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer im Recht der EU-Mitgliedstaaten/Employees’ Co-Determination in the Member States of the European Union. Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft GmbH, Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Bayer W, Schmidt J (2009) Grenzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung und grenzüberschreitende Restrukturierungen nach MoMiG, Cartesio und Trabrennbahn. ZHR 173:735

    Google Scholar 

  • Behme C, Nohlen N (2008) Zur Wegzugsfreiheit von Gesellschaften. Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NGZ) 11:496–498

    Google Scholar 

  • Behme C, Nohlen N (2009) Entscheidung Überraschend für die Praxis. BB 64:13, 14

    Google Scholar 

  • Behrens P (1989) Die grenzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung von Gesellschaften in der EWG. IPrax 9:354

    Google Scholar 

  • Behrens P (1997) Die Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung im internationalen und europäischen Recht, 2nd edn. de Gruyter Verlag, Berlin, p 4 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Behrens P (2003) Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem Überseering-Urteil des EuGH und den Schlußanträgen zu Inspire Art. IPRax 23:193

    Google Scholar 

  • Beitzke G (1966) Internationalrechtliches zur Gesellschaftsfusion. In: v. Caemmerer E et al (ed) Probleme des Europäischen Rechts, Festschrift für Walter Hallstein, 1966. Vittorio Klosternmann, Frankfurt am Main, p 14 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Beuchert T (2009) Diskussionsbericht. ZHR 173

    Google Scholar 

  • Bollacher P (2009) Keine Verletzung der Niederlassungsfreiheit durch nationale Beschränkungen des Wegzugs von Gesellschaften. RIW 55:150

    Google Scholar 

  • Bork R, Schäfer C (eds) (2012) GmbHG – Kommentar, 2nd edn. RWS Verlag, Köln

    Google Scholar 

  • Bormann J, König D (2010) Der Weg zur Europäischen Privatgesellschaft. RIW 56:111–119

    Google Scholar 

  • Bungert H (2006) Grenzüberschreitende Verschmelzungsmobilität—Anmerkung zur Sevic-Entscheidung des EuGH. BB 61:54 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Bungert H, Beier CH (2002) Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft. EWS 1

    Google Scholar 

  • Casper M (2009) Erfahrungen und Reformbedarf bei der SE – Gesellschaftsrechtliche Reformvorschläge. 173, 181–221

    Google Scholar 

  • Dammann JC (2003) The future of codetermination after CENTROS: will German corporate law move closer to the US model? Fordham J Corp Financ Law 8:607

    Google Scholar 

  • de Diego A (2005) Die Mobilität der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft (SE) im EG-Binnenmarkt. EWS 16:446–454

    Google Scholar 

  • Dierksmeyer J (2006) Die englische Ltd in Deutschland—Haftungsrisiko für Berater. BB 61:1516, 1518

    Google Scholar 

  • Dierksmeyer J (2011) Kapitalgesellschaften aller Länder willkommen! Die deutsche GmbH im internationalen Wettbewerb der Rechtsformen 2010. In: Ebke, Elsing, Großfeld, Kühne (eds) Das deutsche Wirtschaftsrecht unter dem Einfluß des US-amerikanischen Rechts. Frankfurt a. M., pp 205–216

    Google Scholar 

  • Drinhausen F, Keinath A (2006) Die grenzüberschreitende Verschmelzung inländischer Gesellschaften nach Erlaß der Richtlinie zur grenzüberschreitenden Verschmelzung von Kapitalgesellschaften in Europa. RIW 52:81–87

    Google Scholar 

  • du Plessis JJ, Dine J (1997) The fate of the draft fifth directive on company law: accommodation instead of harmonisation. JBL 23 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • du Plessis JJ, Großfeld B, Luttermann C, Saenger I, Sandrock O (2007) German corporate governance in international and European context. Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, p 163

    Google Scholar 

  • du Plessis JJ, Sandrock O (2005) The rise and the fall of supervisory codetermination in Germany. Int Company Commer Law J 16:67–79

    Google Scholar 

  • Ebke W (2003) Überseering: Die wahre Liberalität ist Anerkennung. JZ 58:927

    Google Scholar 

  • Ebke W (2010) Gesellschaften aus nicht privilegierten Drittstaaten im Internationalen Privatrecht. In: Hoffmann-Becking M, Hommelhoff P, von Westphalen FG (eds) Festschrift für Hans-Jürgen Hellwig. Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln, pp 117–141

    Google Scholar 

  • Ebke W (2011) Der Einfluß des US-amerikanischen Rechts auf das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht in Deutschland: Rezeption oder Abwehr? In: Ebke W, Elsing S et al (eds) Das deutsche Wirtschaftsrecht unter dem Einfluß des US-amerikanischen Rechts. Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Frankfurt a.M.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eicker K (2004) Commentary. EWS 15:186

    Google Scholar 

  • Eidenmüller H (2002) Wettbewerb der Gesellschaftsrechte in Europa. ZIP 23:2233

    Google Scholar 

  • Firsching K, von Hoffmann B, Thorn K (2007) Internationales Privatrecht, 9th edn. CH Beck Verlag, München, p 288 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Frenzel R (2008) Grenzüberschreitende Verschmelzung von Kapitalgesellschaften – nach dem Ablauf der Umsetzungsfrist. RIW 54:12–20

    Google Scholar 

  • Giangreco BH, Polte M (2014) Die SE als Rechtsform für den Mittelstand. BB 2917

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B (1998) Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht. In: Kropholler J (ed) Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch. de Gruyter Verlag, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Gruber J, Weller M-P (2003) Societas Europaea: Mitbestimmung ohne Aufsichtsrat? NZG 6:297

    Google Scholar 

  • Grundmann S (2011) Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, 2nd edn. Heidelberg. C. F. Müller Verlag

    Google Scholar 

  • Habersack M, Verse D (2011) Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, 4th edn. Verlag C. H. Beck, Munich, p 424v et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Heinze M (2002) Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft. ZGR 31:66

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Henssler M (2009) Erfahrungen und Reformbedarf bei der SE – Mitbestimmungsrechtliche Reformvorschläge. ZHR 173

    Google Scholar 

  • Herfs-Röttgen E (2001) Arbeitnehmerbeteiligung in der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft. NZA, p 424

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirte H (2000) Die Entwicklung des Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrechts in Deutschland in den Jahren 1998 und 1999. NJW 53:3321

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirte H (2002a) Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft. NZG 5:1

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirte H-C (2002b) Germany: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co-determination and Corporate Governance Reforms. Company Lawyer 23:349, 355

    Google Scholar 

  • Hommelhoff P (2001) Einige Bemerkungen zur Organisationsverfassung der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft. AG 46:279

    Google Scholar 

  • Hommelhoff P (2011) SPE-Mitbestimmung: Strukturen, Wertungen und rechtspolitische Kompromisslinien. Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (ZEuP) 19:7–40

    Google Scholar 

  • Hopt KJ (2002) Unternehmensführung, Unternehmenskontrolle, Modernisierung des Aktienrechts—Zum Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance. In: Hommelhoff P, Lutter M, Schmidt K, Schön W, Ulmer P (eds) Corporate Governance: Gemeinschaftssymposion der Zeitschriften ZHR/ZGR. Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft GmbH, Heidelberg, p 42

    Google Scholar 

  • Hopt KJ (2009) Die internationalen und europarechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der Corporate Governance. In: Hommelhoff P, Hopt KJ, von Werder A (eds) Handbuch Corporate Governance: Leitung und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts- und Wirtschaftspraxis, 2nd edn. Otto Schmidt Verlag, Köln, pp 57–59

    Google Scholar 

  • Kegel G, Schurig K (2004) Internationales Privatrecht, 9th edn. CH Beck Verlag, München, p 575 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Kellerhals A, Trüten D (2002) The Creation of the European Company. Tulane Eur Civil Law Forum 17:71

    Google Scholar 

  • Kersting C (2002) Corporate choice of law—a comparison of the United States and European systems and a proposal for a European Directive. Brooklyn J Int Law 28:1, 13 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Kersting C, Schindler CP (2003) The ECJ’s Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its effects on practice. German L J 4:1277

    Google Scholar 

  • Kiem R (2009) Erfahrungen und Reformbedarf bei der SE – Entwicklungsstand. ZHR 173

    Google Scholar 

  • Kindler P (2000) Niederlassungsfreiheit für Scheinauslandsgesellschaften? NJW 53:1993

    Google Scholar 

  • Kindler P (2003) Auf dem Weg zur Europäischen Briefkastengesellschaft? NJW 56:1073

    Google Scholar 

  • Kindler P (2006) Internationales Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht. In: Sonnenberger H-J (ed) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch: Internationales Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht, vol 11. CH Beck Verlag, München

    Google Scholar 

  • Kindler P (2009) Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht 2009: MoMiG, Trabrennbahn, Cartesio und die Folgen. IPrax 29:189

    Google Scholar 

  • Kindler P (2015) Die Einpersonen-Kapitalgesellschaft als Konzernbaustein – Bemerkungen zum Kompromißvorschlag der italienischen Ratspräsidentschaft für eine neue Societas Unius Personae (SUP). ZHR 179:330–384

    Google Scholar 

  • Knobbe-Keuk B (1990) Umzug von Gesellschaften in Europa. ZHR 154:325

    Google Scholar 

  • Kollmorgen A, Feldhaus H (2007) Probleme der Übertragung von Vermögen mit Auslandsbezug. BB 62:2189–2193

    Google Scholar 

  • Kraft G, Müller M (2004) Schlußfolgerungen aus der EuGH-Entscheidung zur französischen Wegzugsbesteuerung (Saillant) für die internationale Steuerberatungspraxis aus deutscher Sicht. RIW 50:366

    Google Scholar 

  • Kropff B, Semler J et al (eds) (2006) Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, vol. 9b, 2nd edn. München

    Google Scholar 

  • Kropholler J (2006) Internationales Privatrecht, 6th edn. Mohr and Siebeck Verlag, Tuebingen, p 571 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Kübler F (2001) Leitungsstrukturen der Aktiengesellschaft und die Umsetzung des SE-Statuts. ZHR 165:224

    Google Scholar 

  • Kußmaul H, Richter L (2008) Grenzenlose Mobilität?! – Zum Zuzug und Wegzug von Gesellschaften in Europa. EWS 20:1–10

    Google Scholar 

  • Leible S, Hoffmann J (2002) Überseering und das (vermeintliche) Ende der Sitztheorie. RIW 925

    Google Scholar 

  • Leible S, Hoffmann J (2003) Wie inspiriert ist ‘Inspire Art’? EuZW 677

    Google Scholar 

  • Leible S, Hoffmann J (2009) Cartesio – fortgeltende Sitztheorie, grenzüberschreitender Formwechsel und Verbot materiellrechtlicher Wegzugsbeschränkungen. BB 64

    Google Scholar 

  • Louven C, Dettmeier M (2006) Optionen grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzungen innerhalb der EU—Gesellschafts- und steuerrechtliche Grundlagen. BB Spezial 13 March 2006, 3:1

    Google Scholar 

  • Manz G, Mayer B, Schröder A (2010) Europäische Aktiengesellschaft SE. 2nd edn. Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden

    Google Scholar 

  • Marychurch J (2002) Harmonisation or Proliferation of Corporations Law in the European Union? Aust Int Law J 80, 82–83 and 94

    Google Scholar 

  • Maul S, Röhricht V (2008) Die Europäische Privatgesellschaft – Überblick über eine neue supranationale Rechtsform. BB 63:1574–1579

    Google Scholar 

  • Maul S, Schmidt C (2003) Inspire Art—Quo vadis Sitztheorie? BB 58:2297

    Google Scholar 

  • Meilicke W (2003) Die Niederlassungsfreiheit nach ‘Überseering’. GmbHR 94:793

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller H-F (2006a) Die grenzüberschreitende Verschmelzung nach dem Referentenentwurf des Bundesjustizministeriums. NZG 8

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller KJ (2006b) Die englische Limited in Deutschland—für welche Unternehmen ist sie tatsächlich geeignet? BB 61:837

    Google Scholar 

  • Neye HW (2005) Die neue Richtlinie zur grenzüberschreitenden Verschmelzung von Kapitalgesellschaften. ZIP 26:1894

    Google Scholar 

  • Ott K-P (2004) Die rechtsüberschreitende Verschmelzung nach Centros, Überseering und Inspire Art. In: Sandrock O, Wetzler C (eds) Deutsches Gesellschaftsrecht im Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen. Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Heidelberg, p 212

    Google Scholar 

  • Paefgen WG (2003) Auslandsgesellschaften und Durchsetzung deutscher Schutzinteressen nach ‘Überseering’. DB 56:487

    Google Scholar 

  • Peters W (2008) Grenzenlose gesellschaftsrechtliche Flexibilität – die Societas Privata Europea. Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 11:807–812

    Google Scholar 

  • Pluskat S (2001) Die neuen Vorschläge für die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft. EuZW 524

    Google Scholar 

  • Raabe N (2010) Die Mitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat. Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlin, pp 315–325

    Google Scholar 

  • Ringe W-G (2013) Corporate mobility in the European Union – a flash in the pan? An empirical study on the success of lawmaking and regulatory competition. Eur Company Financ Law Rev 230

    Google Scholar 

  • Rose P (2001) EU company law convergence possibilities after CENTROS. Transnat’l Law Contemp Prob 11

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandrock O (2003) Die Schrumpfung der Überlagerungstheorie. ZVglRWiss 102:447, 452 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandrock O (2004) Gehören die deutschen Regelungen über die Mitbestimmung auf Unternehmensebene wirklich zum deutschen ordre public? AG 49:57, 65

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandrock O (2005) Niederlassungsfreiheit und Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht. EWS 16:529

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandrock O (2006a) Japanische Gesellschaften mit Verwaltungssitz in Deutschland. In: Großfeld B et al (eds) Probleme des deutschen, europäischen und japanischen Rechts. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, p 85

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandrock O (2006b) Spanische Gesellschaften in Deutschland, deutsche Gesellschaften in Spanien: kollisionsrechtliche Probleme. RIW 52:658

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandrock O (2011) Gesellschafter- und Geschäftsführerlisten von englischen Limiteds im deutschen Rechtsverkehr. RIW 57:1–12

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandrock O, Austmann A (1989) Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach der Daily Mail-Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes: Quo vadis? RIW 35:249–253

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandrock O, du Plessis JJ (2005) The German corporate governance model in the wake of company law harmonisation in the European Union. Company Lawyer 26:88–95

    Google Scholar 

  • Schanze E, Jüttner A (2003a) Anerkennung und Kontrolle ausländischer Gesellschaften—Rechtslage und Perspektiven nach der Überseering-Entscheidung des EuGH. AG 48:30

    Google Scholar 

  • Schanze E, Jüttner A (2003b) Die Entscheidung für Pluralität: Kollisionsrecht und Gesellschaftsrecht nach der EuGH-Entscheidung ‘Inspire Art’. AG 48:661

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt K, Lutter M (eds) (2010) Aktiengesetz—Kommentar, vol I, 2nd edn. Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln

    Google Scholar 

  • Schwarz GC (2001) Zum Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft. ZIP 22:1847

    Google Scholar 

  • Siehr K (2001) Internationales Privatrecht. CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, p 304 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Spindler G, Berner O (2003) Inspire Art—Der europäische Wettbewerb um das Gesellschaftsrecht ist endgültig eröffnet. RIW 49:949

    Google Scholar 

  • Staudinger (ed) (1998) Kommentar zum BGB, special volume: Einführungsgesetz zum BGB, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht. Verlag Sellier – de Gruyter Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Study Group for German Stock Corporation and Capital Markets Law (2000) The Eight Most Important Recommendations for Modification of the SE Regulation. Eur Bus Law Org Law Rev 10:285–289

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Teichmann C (2002) Die Einführung der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft—Grundlagen der Ergänzung des Europäischen Statuts durch den deutschen Gesetzgeber. ZGR 31:383

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Teichmann C (2009) Cartesio: Die Freiheit zum formwechselnden Wegzug. Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht ZIP 30

    Google Scholar 

  • Thoma GF, Leuering D (2002) Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft—Societas Europaea. NJW 55:1449

    Google Scholar 

  • Triebel V, Horton C (2006) Will more English plcs take off in Germany? Int Financ Law Rev 35

    Google Scholar 

  • Triebel V, von Hase K (2003) Wegzug und grenzüberschreitende Umwandlungen deutscher Gesellschaften nach “Überseering” und “Inspire Art”. BB 58:2416

    Google Scholar 

  • Ulmer P (2002) Editorial: Paritätische Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat von Großunternehmen—noch zeitgemäß? ZHR 166:271, 273–274

    Google Scholar 

  • Veit M, Wichert J (2004) Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung bei europäischen Kapitalgesellschaften mit Verwaltungssitz in Deutschland nach “Überseering” und “Inspire Art”. AG 49

    Google Scholar 

  • von Bar C (1991) Internationales Privatrecht, vol 2. CH Beck Verlag, München, p 449 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagner J (2005) Praktische Erfahrungen mit der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft. EWS 16

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagner R, Timm B (2008) Der Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zum Internationalen Privatrecht der Gesellschaften, Vereine und juristischen Personen. IPrax 28:81–90

    Google Scholar 

  • Wansleben T (2016) Die feine Linie zwischen Gesellschafts- und Insolvenzstatut im Unionsrecht – EuGH-Urteil “Konrnhaas”. Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 27:72

    Google Scholar 

  • Wegen G, Schlichte J (2006) GmbH oder EU- inländische Gesellschaft—die Qual der Wahl für Unternehmer und Berater in der Praxis. RIW 52:801

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiß M (2003) Arbeitnehmermitwirkung in Europa. NZA 177

    Google Scholar 

  • Weller M-P (2003) Scheinauslandsgesellschaften nach Centros, Überseering und Inspire Art. IPRax 23:207

    Google Scholar 

  • Weller M-P (2013a) Die Kombinationslehre beim grenzüberschreitenden Rechtsformwechsel – Neue Impulse für das Europarecht. IPrax 33:530–536

    Google Scholar 

  • Weller M-P (2013b) Unternehmensmobilität im Binnenmarkt. In: Jung P et al (ed) Einheit und Vielfalt im Unternehmensrecht, Festschrift für Uwe Blaurock zum 70. Geburtstag, 2013. Verlag Mohr Siebeck, pp 487–526

    Google Scholar 

  • Weng A (2008) Die Rechtssache Cartesio – Das Ende Daily Mails? EWS 19

    Google Scholar 

  • Wenglorz G (2004) Die grenzüberschreitende “Heraus”-Verschmelzung einer deutschen Kapitalgesellschaft: Und es geht doch! BB 59:1061

    Google Scholar 

  • Wissmann H (2009) Mitbestimmung nach europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht, Europäische Gesellschaft. In: Richardi R, Wissmann H et al (eds) Münchener Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, vol 2, Kollektivar-beitsrecht/Sonderformen, 3rd edn. C. H. Beck Verlag, München

    Google Scholar 

  • Ziegler U, Gey A (2009) Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat der Europäischen Gesellschaft (SE) im Vergleich zum Mitbestimmungsgesetz. BB 64:1750–1758

    Google Scholar 

  • Zimmer D (2003a) Nach ‘Inspire Art’: Grenzenlose Gestaltungsfreiheit für deutsche Unternehmen? NJW 56:3585

    Google Scholar 

  • Zimmer D (2003b) Wie es Euch gefällt? Offene Fragen nach dem Überseering-Urteil des EuGH. BB 58:1

    Google Scholar 

  • Zimmer D, Naendrup C (2009) Das Cartesio-Urteil des EuGH: Rück- oder Fortschritt für das internationale Gesellschaftsrecht? NJW 545

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Muenser, Muenser, Germany

    Otto Sandrock

Authors
  1. Otto Sandrock
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Sandrock, O. (2017). The Impact of European Developments on German Codetermination and German Corporate Law. In: German Corporate Governance in International and European Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54198-2_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54198-2_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-54197-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-54198-2

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation