More Efficient Constant-Round Multi-party Computation from BMR and SHE

  • Yehuda Lindell
  • Nigel P. Smart
  • Eduardo Soria-Vazquez
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9985)

Abstract

We present a multi-party computation protocol in the case of dishonest majority which has very low round complexity. Our protocol sits philosophically between Gentry’s Fully Homomorphic Encryption based protocol and the SPDZ-BMR protocol of Lindell et al. (CRYPTO 2015). Our protocol avoids various inefficiencies of the previous two protocols. Compared to Gentry’s protocol we only require Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE). Whilst in comparison to the SPDZ-BMR protocol we require only a quadratic complexity in the number of players (as opposed to cubic), we have fewer rounds, and we require less proofs of correctness of ciphertexts. Additionally, we present a variant of our protocol which trades the depth of the garbling circuit (computed using SHE) for some more multiplications in the offline and online phases.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yehuda Lindell
    • 1
  • Nigel P. Smart
    • 2
  • Eduardo Soria-Vazquez
    • 2
  1. 1.Bar-Ilan UniversityRamat GanIsrael
  2. 2.University of BristolBristolUK

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