Analyzing Power in Weighted Voting Games with Super-Increasing Weights

  • Yoram Bachrach
  • Yuval Filmus
  • Joel Oren
  • Yair Zick
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9928)


Weighted voting games (WVGs) are a class of cooperative games that capture settings of group decision making in various domains, such as parliaments or committees. Earlier work has revealed that the effective decision making power, or influence of agents in WVGs is not necessarily proportional to their weight. This gave rise to measures of influence for WVGs. However, recent work in the algorithmic game theory community have shown that computing agent voting power is computationally intractable. In an effort to characterize WVG instances for which polynomial-time computation of voting power is possible, several classes of WVGs have been proposed and analyzed in the literature. One of the most prominent of these are super increasing weight sequences. Recent papers show that when agent weights are super-increasing, it is possible to compute the agents’ voting power (as measured by the Shapley value) in polynomial-time. We provide the first set of explicit closed-form formulas for the Shapley value for super-increasing sequences. We bound the effects of changes to the quota, and relate the behavior of voting power to a novel function. This set of results constitutes a complete characterization of the Shapley value in weighted voting games, and answers a number of open questions presented in previous work.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yoram Bachrach
    • 1
  • Yuval Filmus
    • 2
  • Joel Oren
    • 3
  • Yair Zick
    • 4
  1. 1.Microsoft ResearchCambridgeUK
  2. 2.Technion - Israel Institute of TechnologyHaifaIsrael
  3. 3.University of TorontoTorontoCanada
  4. 4.Carnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburghUSA

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