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Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII pp 149–161Cite as

Reflections on the Significance of Misrepresenting Preferences

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((TCCI,volume 9760))

Abstract

This paper deals with the concept of manipulation, understood as preference misrepresentation, in the light of the main theoretical results focusing on their practical significance. It also reviews some indices measuring the degree of manipulability of choice functions. Moreover, the results on complexity of manipulation as well as on safe manipulability are briefly touched upon.

H. Nurmi—The author has greatly benefited from conversations with Stefan Napel during his visit to Public Choice Research Centre of University of Turku and from email exchanges with Alexander Mayer. The suggestions of the three anonymous referees have substantially improved the paper. Despite all these contributions the author is still solely responsible for the remaining errors and weaknesses.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Contemporary History, Philosophy and Political Science, University of Turku, Turku, Finland

    Hannu Nurmi

Authors
  1. Hannu Nurmi
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Correspondence to Hannu Nurmi .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Wrocław University of Technology, Wrocław, Poland

    Ngoc Thanh Nguyen

  2. Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn, Australia

    Ryszard Kowalczyk

  3. WSB University in Wroclaw, Wroclaw, Poland

    Jacek Mercik

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Nurmi, H. (2016). Reflections on the Significance of Misrepresenting Preferences. In: Nguyen, N., Kowalczyk, R., Mercik, J. (eds) Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9760. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_10

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-52885-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-52886-0

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