Non-malleable Codes for Bounded Depth, Bounded Fan-In Circuits

  • Marshall BallEmail author
  • Dana Dachman-Soled
  • Mukul Kulkarni
  • Tal Malkin
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9666)


We show how to construct efficient, unconditionally secure non-malleable codes for bounded output locality. In particular, our scheme is resilient against functions such that any output bit is dependent on at most \(n^{\delta }\) bits, where n is the total number of bits in a codeword and \(0\le \delta < 1\) a constant. Notably, this tampering class includes \(\mathsf {NC}^0\).



We thank Seung Geol Choi and Hoeteck Wee for sharing with us an in-submission journal version of [15], as well as the manuscript [16]. We also thank Yevgeniy Dodis for helpful discussions and clarifications regarding [2] and other previous work. Finally, we thank Eran Tromer for enlightening discussions on practical tampering attacks, which inspired the class of attacks considered in this work.

This work was done in part while all authors were visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, supported by the Simons Foundation and by the DIMACS/Simons Collaboration in Cryptography through NSF grant #CNS-1523467. The first and fourth authors are supported in part by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and Army Research Office (ARO) under Contract #W911NF-15-C-0236, and NSF grants #CNS-1445424 and #CCF-1423306. The second and third authors are supported by an NSF CAREER award #CNS-1453045 and by a Ralph E. Powe Junior Faculty Enhancement Award. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Army Research Office, the National Science Foundation, or the U.S. Government.


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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marshall Ball
    • 1
    Email author
  • Dana Dachman-Soled
    • 2
  • Mukul Kulkarni
    • 2
  • Tal Malkin
    • 1
  1. 1.Columbia UniversityNew YorkUSA
  2. 2.University of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

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