A Bounded-Risk Mechanism for the Kidney Exchange Game

  • Hossein EsfandiariEmail author
  • Guy Kortsarz
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9644)


In this paper we consider the pairwise kidney exchange game. This game naturally appears in situations that some service providers benefit from pairwise allocations on a network, such as the kidney exchanges between hospitals.

Ashlagi et al. [1] present a 2-approximation randomized truthful mechanism for this problem. This is the best known result in this setting with multiple players. However, we note that the variance of the utility of an agent in this mechanism may be as large as \(\varOmega (n^2)\), which is not desirable in a real application. In this paper we resolve this issue by providing a 2-approximation randomized truthful mechanism in which the variance of the utility of each agent is at most \(2+\epsilon \).

As a side result, we apply our technique to design a deterministic mechanism such that, if an agent deviates from the mechanism, she does not gain more than \(2\lceil \log _2 m\rceil \).


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  2. 2.Rutgers UniversityCamdenUSA

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