Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9470)

Abstract

Bottleneck routing games are a well-studied model to investigate the impact of selfish behavior in communication networks. In this model, each user selects a path in a network for routing their fixed demand. The disutility of a used only depends on the most congested link visited. We extend this model by allowing users to continuously vary the demand rate at which data is sent along the chosen path. As our main result we establish tight conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Some of the proof techniques used in this paper appeared in the diploma thesis of the third author. We wish to thank three anonymous referees who found several (nontrivial) typos and suggested several improvements and new related references.

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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of MathematicsUniversity of AugsburgAugsburgGermany
  2. 2.Department of MathematicsTechnische Universität BerlinBerlinGermany

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