International Conference on Web and Internet Economics

Web and Internet Economics pp 201-215

Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

  • Branislav Bošanský
  • Simina Brânzei
  • Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
  • Peter Bro Miltersen
  • Troels Bjerre Sørensen
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9470)
Cite this paper as:
Bošanský B., Brânzei S., Hansen K.A., Miltersen P.B., Sørensen T.B. (2015) Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games. In: Markakis E., Schäfer G. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9470. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Branislav Bošanský
    • 1
    • 2
  • Simina Brânzei
    • 1
  • Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
    • 1
  • Peter Bro Miltersen
    • 1
  • Troels Bjerre Sørensen
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceAarhus UniversityAarhusDenmark
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Electrical EngineeringCzech Technical University in PraguePragueCzech Republic
  3. 3.IT-University of CopenhagenCopenhagenDenmark

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