Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

  • Branislav BošanskýEmail author
  • Simina Brânzei
  • Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
  • Peter Bro Miltersen
  • Troels Bjerre Sørensen
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9470)


The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.


Stackelberg Equilibrium Chance Nodes Stackelberg Solution Concept Correlation Scheme Letchford 
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We would like to thank the reviewers for useful feedback. This work was supported by the Danish National Research Foundation and The National Science Foundation of China (under the grant 61361136003) for the Sino-Danish Center for the Theory of Interactive Computation, by the Center for Research in Foundations of Electronic Markets (CFEM) supported by the Danish Strategic Research Council, and by the Czech Science Foundation (grant no. 15-23235S).


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Authors and Affiliations

  • Branislav Bošanský
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Simina Brânzei
    • 1
  • Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
    • 1
  • Peter Bro Miltersen
    • 1
  • Troels Bjerre Sørensen
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceAarhus UniversityAarhusDenmark
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Electrical EngineeringCzech Technical University in PraguePragueCzech Republic
  3. 3.IT-University of CopenhagenCopenhagenDenmark

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