Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games
- Cite this paper as:
- Bošanský B., Brânzei S., Hansen K.A., Miltersen P.B., Sørensen T.B. (2015) Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games. In: Markakis E., Schäfer G. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9470. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.