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Services of General Interest and Special Rights

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Handbook of EU Competition Law

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Abstract

Art. 106 TFEU is an interface between state intervention in economy for performance of nation-state public service tasks and the obligation, based on economic constitutional law, of the Member States to guarantee a system of undistorted competition. Even if services of general interest are not completely congruent with the services of general economic interest: both have the common core of covering special goods and services that serve existential basic human needs, and therefore must be rendered on a stable basis and not too expensively; a special responsibility of the state arises hereof. In the Dimosia case the ECJ accepted the principle of equal opportunities in favour of other undertakings; an abuse must not be proven if a situational basis is created which opens interventions of monopolists into the primary activities of upstream or downstream segments. This concept reaches too far.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Wernicke, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 106 AEUV para 3.

  2. 2.

    Weiß (2013), 670 in reference to the specific German terminology; also Krajewski (2008), 195; however also see Commission, Communications “Services of General Interests in Europe”, OJ 1996 C 281, p. 3 and COM (2000), 580 final; see Ronellenfitsch, In: Blümel (2003), p. 87, 90 et seq., but also Kämmerer (2002), 1041; Krajewski (2008), 179 et seq. as well as Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2003), 270 final; White Paper on Services of General Interest COM (2004), 374 final.

  3. 3.

    Weiß (2013), 670 in reference to Simon (2009), p. 29 et seq.

  4. 4.

    See above paras 4169 et seq.

  5. 5.

    Cf. Koenig and Vorbeck (2008), 214. Extensive discussion on the term Bull (2008), 1 et seq.

  6. 6.

    Wernicke, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 106 AEUV para 1.

  7. 7.

    Wernicke, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 106 AEUV para 1.

  8. 8.

    For Art. 106 (1) TFEU, which in this respect is equivalent to the obligations on which it is based, ECJ, Case 155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40 (para 18)—Sacchi as well as—according to the imperative wording—without reference to other rules ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (para 12)—Corbeau; Regarding Art. 106 (2) TFEU, see ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (paras 55 et seq.)—Ahmed Saeed air travel.

  9. 9.

    Similarly, Rose and Bailey (2013), 11.046.

  10. 10.

    See above paras 522 et seq., 1853 et seq.

  11. 11.

    See above paras 1896 et seq.

  12. 12.

    See above paras 1895 et seq.

  13. 13.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279 (para 74)—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen.

  14. 14.

    Generally for an equality of treatment Commission Communication of 20 September 2000, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (2000), 580 final, (para 21); Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 3; Stadler, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 106 AEUV para 14. For additional discussion, see paras 4378 et seq.

  15. 15.

    For additional discussion, see para 4380.

  16. 16.

    Starting here, AG Reischl, ECJ, Cases 188–190/80, ECLI:EU:C:1982:134 (para 3)—Transparency Directive, however in context of the need for stricter regulations. Accordingly, equality of treatment is not possible in this case as well seen from this perspective.

  17. 17.

    For additional discussion, see para 4378.

  18. 18.

    However, a converse arrangement is conceivable in which public undertakings have competitive disadvantages as a result of the degree to which they are integrated into national law in particular. See below, paras 4382 et seq.

  19. 19.

    Voet van Vormizeele, In: Schwarze (2012), Art. 106 AEUV para 4.

  20. 20.

    See ECJ, Case C-387/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:439 (para 51)—Banchero; Case C-203/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:316 (para 61)—Dusseldorp.

  21. 21.

    Firmly Klotz, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 106 AEUV para 40 in conjunction with footnote 111. According to the ECJ, Case C-260/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254 (para 37)—ERT the possibility is sufficient. For further discussion, see below paras 4229 et seq.

  22. 22.

    See ECJ, Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279 (para 66)—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen.

  23. 23.

    See above paras 4152 et seq.

  24. 24.

    Regarding the incompatibility with the fundamental freedoms except in cases where procurement from other sources is not possible in the context of obligatory services, see Frenz (2012), paras 244 et seq.; in general, see Scheps (2006).

  25. 25.

    On this requirement, see above paras 2334 et seq.

  26. 26.

    Further discussion of the entire topic, Burmeister and Staebe (2004), 814 et seq.

  27. 27.

    Not explicitly demanding this, ECJ, Cases 209–213/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:188 (para 71)—Asjes; Case 30/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225 (paras 33 et seq.)—Bodson; Bach (1992), p. 42 et seq.; Stadler, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 106 AEUV paras 32 et seq.; contra, still Mestmäcker (1988), 551 et seq.

  28. 28.

    See immediately following para 4210.

  29. 29.

    Triantafyllou (2014), 737.

  30. 30.

    ECJ, Case 13/77, ECLI:EU:C:1977:185 (para 40/42)—Inno/ATAB.

  31. 31.

    ECJ, Cases 188–190/80, ECLI:EU:C:1982:257 (para 26)—Transparency Directive.

  32. 32.

    AG Reischl, ECJ, Cases 188–190/80, ECLI:EU:C:1982:134 (para 3)—Transparency Directive.

  33. 33.

    Specifically referring to this provision, see ECJ, Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279 (para 74)—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen. For further discussion, see Frenz (2012), paras 1258 et seq.

  34. 34.

    In relation to Art. 106 (1) TFEU, suggesting this already, ECJ, Case 13/77, ECLI:EU:C:1977:185 (para 30/35)—Inno/ATAB as well as explicitly AG Reischl, ECJ, Cases 188–190/80, ECLI:EU:C:1982:134 (para 3)—Transparency Directive; Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 1 end.

  35. 35.

    Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 2; in the context of complete displacement of Art. 106 AEUV Mestmäcker (1988), 576 et seq.

  36. 36.

    Clear, see e.g. ECJ, Case C-157/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:499 (para 32)—Commission/Netherlands; detailed discussion with additional citations Frenz (2012), paras 1258, 1296 et seq.

  37. 37.

    ECJ, Case C-203/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:316 (paras 39 et seq., 53 et seq.)—Dusseldorp; Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279 (paras 31 et seq., 52 et seq.)—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen.

  38. 38.

    ECJ, Case C-202/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:120 (para 24)—Telecommunications devices.

  39. 39.

    Discussing the relationship of dependency in particular, Stadler, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 106 AEUV para 19; Müller-Graff, In: Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2012), Art. 106 AEUV para 9: decisive influence of the state.

  40. 40.

    See by contrast, Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 14 end: “similar dependence”.

  41. 41.

    See previously, Klotz, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 106 AEUV para 27.

  42. 42.

    Only emphasising the competition-related purpose, Ehricke (1993), 212.

  43. 43.

    Accordingly, not finding in favour of the ownership of “special” or even “exclusive” rights, ECJ, Case 13/77, ECLI:EU:C:1977:185 (para 40/42)—Inno/ATAB.

  44. 44.

    See previously, Klotz, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015) Art. 106 AEUV para 27; Stadler, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 106 AEUV para 24.

  45. 45.

    ECJ, Case C-163/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:54—Raso.

  46. 46.

    ECJ, Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279 (para 61)—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen.

  47. 47.

    For further discussion, see Frenz (2012), paras 1263 et seq.

  48. 48.

    ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (para 8)—Corbeau; Cases C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (para 37)—Deutsche Post.

  49. 49.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case C-260/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254 (para 37)—ERT as well as Case 155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40 (para 14)—Sacchi.

  50. 50.

    ECJ, Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161—Höfner and Elser.

  51. 51.

    ECJ, Case 30/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225 (para 33)—Bodson.

  52. 52.

    ECJ, Case C-462/99, ECLI:EU:C:2003:297—Connect Austria.

  53. 53.

    ECJ, Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 9)—Genova.

  54. 54.

    For additional discussion, see paras 4234 et seq.

  55. 55.

    ECJ, Case C-202/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:120 (paras 44 et seq.)—Telecommunications devices; Case C-271 inter alia/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:440 (para 34)—Telecommunications services; Recital 11 to Commission Directive 94/46/EC of 13 October 1994 amending Directive 88/301/EEC and Directive 90/388/EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications, OJ 1994 L 268, p. 15.

  56. 56.

    Limited to undertakings benefiting from grants, Mestmäcker (1993), p. 80.

  57. 57.

    Wernicke, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 106 AEUV para 33; Stadler, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 106, para 25.

  58. 58.

    See also ECJ, Case 13/77, ECLI:EU:C:1977:185 (para 40/42)—Inno/ATAB.

  59. 59.

    See Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 16 and ECJ, Case C-475/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:577 (paras 24 et seq.)—Ambulanz Glöckner.

  60. 60.

    The result may be different under domestic law if a preference for certain undertakings impairs the fundamental rights of others and thus represents an infringement. Legislation may even be necessary in cases material to the realisation of fundamental rights for this reason, see Frenz (2013a), paras 408 et seq.

  61. 61.

    However, see Wernicke, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 106 AEUV para 35.

  62. 62.

    For additional discussion of the development of the jurisprudence, see below paras 4280 et seq.

  63. 63.

    Regarding definition and nature, detailed discussion in Burgi (1997), 264 et seq.

  64. 64.

    Kämmerer (2001), p. 99; Weiß (2003), 168; Stadler, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Art. 106 AEUV para 19; Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV paras 12 et seq.

  65. 65.

    See below paras 4332 et seq.

  66. 66.

    Manthey (2001), p. 75 et seq.

  67. 67.

    For further discussion overall, see Frenz (2012), paras 320 et seq.

  68. 68.

    ECJ, Case 118/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:283 (para 7)—Commission/Italy; Case C-35/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:303 (para 36)—CNSD.

  69. 69.

    Kersting and Faust (2011), 8.

  70. 70.

    See above paras 595 et seq.

  71. 71.

    Uniform for Art. 101 et seq. TFEU and of fundamental importance, ECJ, Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (para 21)—Höfner and Elser on the issue of the previous employment agency monopoly held by the German Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit); see also Case C-55/96, ECLI:EU:C:1997:603—Job Centre. With additional citations. ECJ, Case C-180–184/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:428 (para 74)—Pavlov. For general discussion, see above paras 584 et seq.

  72. 72.

    See ECJ, Case C-364/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:7 (para 19)—SAT Fluggesellschaft; Case C-82/01 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:617 (para 75)—Aéroports de Paris.

  73. 73.

    For Eurocontrol, ECJ, Case C-364/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:7 (paras 28 et seq.)—SAT Fluggesellschaft.

  74. 74.

    See ECJ, Case 2/73, ECLI:EU:C:1973:89 (paras 8 et seq.)—Geddo; Case 94/74, ECLI:EU:C:1975:81 (para 33/35)—IGAV.

  75. 75.

    Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 11 end, citing ECJ, Cases 9 and 10/77, ECLI:EU:C:1977:132 (para 4)—Eurocontrol where the interpretation of an international treaty was at issue.

  76. 76.

    ECJ, Case C-82/01 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:617 (para 82)—Aéroports de Paris.

  77. 77.

    ECJ, Case C-159 and 160/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:63 (para 19)—Poucet and Pistre.

  78. 78.

    See ECJ, Case C-218/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:36 (paras 42 et seq.)—Cisal.

  79. 79.

    ECJ, Case C-264 inter alia/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:150 (paras 54 et seq.)—AOK; detailed discussion, Krajewski (2004), 256 et seq.; rejecting this approach, see e.g. Kersting and Faust (2011), 8 et seq.; with additional citations above paras 584 et seq.

  80. 80.

    See ECJ, Case C-67/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430 (paras 81 et seq.)—Albany. Cf. generally with a different approach in part, Herding (2005), p. 104 et seq.

  81. 81.

    See, e.g. Kersting and Faust (2011), 9, 11 et seq. For further discussion, see above paras 621 et seq.

  82. 82.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case C-157/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404—Smits and Peerbooms.

  83. 83.

    ECJ, Case C-244/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:392 (paras 17 et seq.)—Fédération française des sociétés d’assurance; summarising both scenarios, ECJ, Case C-180–184/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:428 (paras 109 et seq.)—Pavlov.

  84. 84.

    In general, only according this criterion very limited effect, Herding (2005), p. 86 et seq.

  85. 85.

    ECJ, Case C-180–184/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:428 (para 112)—Pavlov; see Case C-67/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430 (paras 81 et seq.)—Albany; Case C-115–117/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:434 (paras 81 et seq.)—Brentjens; Case C-219/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:437 (paras 71 et seq.)—Drijvende Bokken.

  86. 86.

    Further discussion Koenig and Engelmann (2004), 685 et seq.

  87. 87.

    Jaeger (2005), 52 et seq.

  88. 88.

    See ECJ, Case 172/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:69 (para 15)—Inter-Huiles, where the observation of the free movement of goods and a Directive are equated.

  89. 89.

    See above para 4152.

  90. 90.

    See previously paras 4204 et seq.

  91. 91.

    See previously, Klotz, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 106 AEUV para 47.

  92. 92.

    For a detailed discussion, see Frenz (2012), paras 313 et seq.

  93. 93.

    Cf. also from a different perspective, Thoma (2004).

  94. 94.

    Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 106 AEUV para 11.

  95. 95.

    See ECJ, Case 30/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225 (para 33)—Bodson.

  96. 96.

    Generally against inclusion, Vygen (1967), p. 73 et seq.

  97. 97.

    See above para 4217.

  98. 98.

    Klotz, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 106 AEUV para 40.

  99. 99.

    See above para 4206.

  100. 100.

    ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (para 10)—Corbeau. See above paras 658 et seq.

  101. 101.

    ECJ, Cases C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (para 48)—Deutsche Post.

  102. 102.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (paras 8 et seq.)—Genova; Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (paras 7 et seq.)—Corbeau; Case C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (paras 37 et seq.)—Deutsche Post.

  103. 103.

    ECJ, Case 311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394 (para 17)—CBEM; Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (para 29)—Höfner and Elser; Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 16)—Genova; Case C-271 inter alia/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:440 (para 35)—Telecommunications services.

  104. 104.

    ECJ, Case C-18/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:474 (para 20)—GB-Inno-BM; Case C-266/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:306 (para 41)—Corsica Ferries II; Case C-203/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:316 (para 61)—Dusseldorp; Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279 (para 67, para 82)—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen.

  105. 105.

    ECJ, Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 14)—Genova; Case C-18/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:474 (para 17)—GB-Inno-BM; Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (para 9)—Corbeau; Case C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (para 38)—Deutsche Post.

  106. 106.

    See above paras 1897, 1990 et seq.

  107. 107.

    See ECJ, Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (para 30)—Höfner and Elser; Case C-387/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:439 (para 53)—Banchero (rejected in this specific case); Case C-55/96, ECLI:EU:C:1997:603 (para 29, 32)—Job Centre.

  108. 108.

    Buendia Sierra, In: Faull and Nikpay (2014), para 6.57.

  109. 109.

    ECJ, Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 19)—Genova.

  110. 110.

    ECJ, Case C-18/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:195 (para 43)—Corsica Ferries.

  111. 111.

    Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law and Government Measures relating to Public and Privileged Enterprises: Article 90 EEC Treaty, 1984 Fordlam Corp. Law Institute (1985), 543 (559); ((543–581)).

  112. 112.

    E.g. Ehlermann (1993).

  113. 113.

    Buendia Sierra, In: Faull and Nikpay (2014), para 6.61.

  114. 114.

    See—however critical in part—above, paras 1832 et seq.

  115. 115.

    See ECJ, Case C-18/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:474 (paras 24 et seq.)—GB-Inno-BM; Case C-271 inter alia/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:440 (para 36)—Telecommunications services; most recently, Case C-553/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2083 (para 671)—Dimosia.

  116. 116.

    See above paras 30 et seq.

  117. 117.

    ECJ, Case C-202/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:120 (para 51)—Telecommunications devices.

  118. 118.

    ECJ, Case C-553/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2083, (paras 46 et seq.)—Dimosia.

  119. 119.

    General Court, Case T-169/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:448 (para 118)—Dimosia.

  120. 120.

    Further, see also paras 4242 et seq.

  121. 121.

    ECJ, Case C-553/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2083 (paras 46 et seq.)—Dimosia, contrary to the General Court, Case T-169/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:448 (para 105, 118)—Dimosia.

  122. 122.

    ECJ, Case C-163/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:54 (para 28, 30)—Raso.

  123. 123.

    ECJ, Case C-462/99, ECLI:EU:C:2003:297 (paras 43 et seq., 86 et seq.)—Connect Austria.

  124. 124.

    ECJ, Case C-18/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:474 (paras 25 et seq.)—GB-Inno-BM.

  125. 125.

    ECJ, Case C-49/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376 (para 51)—MOTOE.

  126. 126.

    ECJ, Case C-82/01 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:617 (para 106)—Aéroports de Paris.

  127. 127.

    ECJ, Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (para 41)—Enel; Case C-67/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430 (para 103)—Albany with additional citations.

  128. 128.

    ECJ, Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (para 42)—Enel; Case C-265/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:205 (para 33)—Federutility.

  129. 129.

    ECJ, Case C-475/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:577 (para 43)—Ambulanz Glöckner.

  130. 130.

    ECJ, Case C-55/96, ECLI:EU:C:1997:603 (para 32, 35)—Job Centre.

  131. 131.

    ECJ, Case C-82/01 P, ECLI:EU:C:2002:617 (paras 109 et seq.)—Aéroports de Paris.

  132. 132.

    ECJ, Case C-475/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:577 (paras 60 et seq.)—Ambulanz Glöckner; further paras 4302 et seq.

  133. 133.

    ECJ, Case C-260/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254 (paras 35 et seq.)—ERT; Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (paras 10 et seq.)—Corbeau; Case C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (paras 39 et seq.)—Deutsche Post.

  134. 134.

    ECJ, Case C-203/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:316 (paras 62 et seq.)—Dusseldorp.

  135. 135.

    To such an extent, viewing the permissibility of the monopoly as questionable from the outset, Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 106 AEUV para 18.

  136. 136.

    ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (paras 11, 14 et seq.)—Corbeau.

  137. 137.

    ECJ, Case C-260/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254 (para 37)—ERT; see also more recently General Court, Case T-169/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:448 (para 85)—Dimosia: actual or potential abuse.

  138. 138.

    In this direction as well, Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 106 AEUV para 14 end.

  139. 139.

    ECJ, Case C-323/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:368 (para 18)—La Crespelle; Case C-55/96, ECLI:EU:C:1997:603 (para 31)—Job Centre; similar, Case C-387/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:439 (para 51)—Banchero.

  140. 140.

    General Court, Case T-169/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:448 (para 85)—Dimosia.

  141. 141.

    ECJ, Case C-553/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2083 (para 47)—Dimosia, contrary to the General Court, Case T-169/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:448 (para 105, 118)—Dimosia.

  142. 142.

    See ECJ, Case C-387/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:439 (paras 52 et seq.)—Banchero.

  143. 143.

    ECJ, Case C-323/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:368 (para 18)—La Crespelle.

  144. 144.

    ECJ, Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (para 29)—Höfner and Elser.

  145. 145.

    ECJ, Case C-323/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:368 (para 18)—La Crespelle.

  146. 146.

    See above paras 177 et seq., 1002 et seq.

  147. 147.

    ECJ, Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (para 32)—Höfner and Elser in relation to the impairment of transnational trade; similarly, Case C-55/96, ECLI:EU:C:1997:603 (para 29, 36)—Job Centre.

  148. 148.

    See above para 4228.

  149. 149.

    Clear discussion of impairment and justification, ECJ, Case C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (paras 46 et seq.)—Deutsche Post.

  150. 150.

    See below paras 4302 et seq.

  151. 151.

    ECJ, Case C-553/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2083 (para 47)—Dimosia.

  152. 152.

    See General Court, Case T-169/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:448 (para 85)—Dimosia. In favour of the following, Frenz (2013b).

  153. 153.

    See General Court, Case T-169/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:448 (para 105, 118)—Dimosia.

  154. 154.

    Detailed discussion, above paras 235 et seq. in the context of obligations to protect fundamental rights.

  155. 155.

    See ECJ, Case C-188–190/80, ECLI:EU:C:1982:257 (para 21)—France inter alia/Commission.

  156. 156.

    For example, the supply of power, ECJ, Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171—Almelo and waste disposal, ECJ, Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279 (para 61)—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen.

  157. 157.

    Accordingly, finding against state aid, ECJ, Case C-280/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:415—Altmark.

  158. 158.

    Frenz (2009), para 3200.

  159. 159.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case C-271 inter alia/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:440 (para 35)—Telecommunications services.

  160. 160.

    Particularly clear, ECJ, Case C-462/99, ECLI:EU:C:2003:297 (paras 86 et seq.)—Connect Austria; see in this regard, General Court, Case T-169/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:448 (para 111)—Dimosia.

  161. 161.

    Clearly so, ECJ, Case C-203/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:316 (para 61)—Dusseldorp; see the corresponding citation in General Court, Case T-169/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:448 (para 117 end)—Dimosia. On this topic and the prior topic, Frenz (2013b).

  162. 162.

    See ECJ, Case C-553/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2083 (para 47)—Dimosia.

  163. 163.

    See, e.g. Triantafyllou (2014), 737.

  164. 164.

    See above para 4234 end; contra Buendia Sierra, In: Faull and Nikpay (2014), para 6.61.

  165. 165.

    ECJ, Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279 (paras 78 et seq.)—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen.

  166. 166.

    Cf. ECJ, Case C-2/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:310 (para 34)—Wallonische Abfälle; further discussion, Frenz (2012), para 252.

  167. 167.

    ECJ, Case C-260/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254 (para 38)—ERT.

  168. 168.

    See above paras 2354 et seq.

  169. 169.

    For additional discussion, see above paras 4219 et seq.

  170. 170.

    See ECJ, Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen.

  171. 171.

    Krajewski (2011), p. 81.

  172. 172.

    See, e.g. Pielow, In: Hrbek and Nettesheim (2002).

  173. 173.

    For a detailed discussion, see Linder (2004), p. 37 et seq.

  174. 174.

    Budäus and Schiller (2000), 96 et seq.

  175. 175.

    See above paras 4196 et seq.

  176. 176.

    For additional discussion, see below paras 4361 et seq. as well as Frenz (2011b), 16 et seq.

  177. 177.

    OJ 1997 C 340, p. 133.

  178. 178.

    See, e.g. Tettinger (1997), 344 with additional citations.

  179. 179.

    Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 37.

  180. 180.

    White Paper on Services of General Interest, dated 12 May 2004, COM (2004) 374 final (Annex 1). See, Commission Communication of 20 September 2000, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (2000), 580 final (Annex II) as well as Commission report to the Laeken European Council of 17 October 2001, Services of General Interests, COM (2001), 598 final (Annex), in which services of general economic interest are defined in each case. To such an extent, these services comprise a sub-set of services of general economic interest, as they likewise include non-market oriented activities related to the general welfare in addition to market-related activities.

  181. 181.

    Communication from the Commission—Implementing the Community Lisbon programme—Social services of general interest in the European Union, COM (2006), 177 final (No 1.1 sent. 4 et seq.).

  182. 182.

    Communication from the Commission—Implementing the Community Lisbon programme—Social services of general interest in the European Union, COM (2006), 177 final (No 1.1, 3.1, sent. 5, 10); further discussion on the accompanying document to this Communication, COM (2007), 725 final: Dietrich (2012), p. 154 et seq.

  183. 183.

    Regarding their classification, see Schorkopf (2008), 253 et seq.; Ruge (2008), 263 et seq.

  184. 184.

    Krajewski (2010), 89.

  185. 185.

    Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission “A Single Market for 21st Century Europe”, services of general interest including social services: Europe’s new commitment, COM (2007), 725 final (No 2.3 sent. 7 et seq.).

  186. 186.

    General Court, Case T-289/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:29 (para 202)—BUPA; Krajewski (2010), 90.

  187. 187.

    Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission “A Single Market for 21st Century Europe”, services of general interest including social services: Europe’s new commitment, COM (2007), 725 final (No 3 sent. 11).

  188. 188.

    Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission “A Single Market for 21st Century Europe”, services of general interest including social services: Europe’s new commitment, COM (2007), 725 final (No 3 sent. 11 et seq.).

  189. 189.

    Krajewski (2010), 90.

  190. 190.

    Dietrich (2012), p. 165; Krajewski (2011), p. 579.

  191. 191.

    Krajewski (2010), 87.

  192. 192.

    Frenz (2008), 78; Dietrich (2012), p. 164.

  193. 193.

    White Paper on Services of General Interest, dated 12 May 2004, COM (2004), 374 final (Annex 1). Citing Art. 345 TFEU Commission Communication of 20 September 2000, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (2000), 580 final, para 21) as well as Burgi (2002), 257.

  194. 194.

    ECJ, Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (para 50)—Enel; Case C-265/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:205 (para 29)—Federutility; Case C-67/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430 (para 104)—Albany.

  195. 195.

    Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, OJ L 94, p. 243.

  196. 196.

    See Nolte (2004).

  197. 197.

    Detailed discussion Commission Communication of 20 September 2000, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (2000), 580 final (Annex II, paras 14 et seq.).

  198. 198.

    White Paper on Services of General Interest, dated 12 May 2004, COM (2004), 374 final (Annex 1).

  199. 199.

    White Paper on Services of General Interest, dated 12 May 2004, COM (2004), 374 final (sub-section 2.2).

  200. 200.

    General Court, Case T-289/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:29 (para 166)—BUPA Commission Communication of 20 September 2000, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (2000), 580 final (para 22); Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 37; critical view in connection with the funding of public broadcasting institutions, Engel (1996), p. 54; contra in turn Bartosch (1999), 179.

  201. 201.

    For a detailed discussion, see Götz (2001), p. 921 et seq.

  202. 202.

    Krajewski (2010), 87.

  203. 203.

    General Court, Case T-289/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:29 (para 172)—BUPA.

  204. 204.

    For additional discussion, see paras 4322 et seq.

  205. 205.

    Representative of this point and the following, Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 38 with additional citations.

  206. 206.

    Kordel (2004), p. 119.

  207. 207.

    ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (para 14)—Corbeau; White Paper on Services of General Interest, dated 12 May 2004, COM (2004), 374 final (sub-section 3.3).

  208. 208.

    Rose and Bailey (2013), para 11.051.

  209. 209.

    ECJ, Case 7/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:52 (paras 31 et seq.)—GVL with regard to copyright collecting societies which may thus not rely on Art. 106 (2) TFEU.

  210. 210.

    ECJ, Case 127/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:25 (para 18/23)—BRT/SABAM likewise with regard to a copyright collecting society.

  211. 211.

    ECJ, Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171 (para 48)—Almelo; on this topic, see Rapp-Jung (1994a).

  212. 212.

    For a detailed discussion in the context of Germany power utilities, see Rinne (1998), p. 58 et seq.

  213. 213.

    See above para 1556; however, different result ECJ, Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (paras 68 et seq.)—Commission/France; Breuer (2013), p. 651 et seq.

  214. 214.

    See, White Paper on Services of General Interest, dated 12 May 2004, COM (2004), 374 final (sub-section 3.3); Commission report to the Laeken European Council of 17 October 2001, Services of General Interests, COM (2001), 598 final (Annex). A more detailed listing may be found in Commission Communication of 20 September 2000, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (2000), 580 final (Annex II).

  215. 215.

    Regarding telecommunications undertakings, ECJ, Case 41/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:120 (para 33)—Italy/Commission; subsequent Case C-18/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:474 (para 22)—GB-Inno-BM.

  216. 216.

    ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (para 55)—Ahmed Saeed air travel.

  217. 217.

    ECJ, Case C-266/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:306 (para 45)—Corsica Ferries II.

  218. 218.

    ECJ, Case C-242/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:376 (paras 52 et seq.)—GT Link as well as Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 27)—Genova.

  219. 219.

    See above para 1942.

  220. 220.

    Open on this point, ECJ, Case C-242/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:376 (para 54)—GT-Link.

  221. 221.

    See above paras 2225 et seq.

  222. 222.

    ECJ, Case 172/80, ECLI:EU:C:1981:178 (para 7)—Züchner, however based on the lack of entrusting official act.

  223. 223.

    For additional discussion, see Frenz (2002b), 307 et seq. with additional citations.

  224. 224.

    See e.g. Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 106 AEUV para 26.

  225. 225.

    ECJ, Case 258/78, ECLI:EU:C:1982:211 (para 9)—Nungesser.

  226. 226.

    See Protocol No 9 to the Treaty of Amsterdam.

  227. 227.

    Koenig and Paul, In: Streinz (2012), Art. 106 AEUV para 55.

  228. 228.

    ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (para 15)—Corbeau.

  229. 229.

    ECJ, Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 (para 24)—Höfner and Elser for the public-law Federal Labour Office.

  230. 230.

    ECJ, Case C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (para 44)—Deutsche Post.

  231. 231.

    ECJ, Case C-55/96, ECLI:EU:C:1997:603 (paras 26 et seq.)—Job Centre.

  232. 232.

    ECJ, Case C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (para 22)—Deutsche Post.

  233. 233.

    ECJ, Case C-360/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:525 (para 52)—BFI-Holding; on this topic, see Weidemann and Otting (1999), 41 et seq. as well as comments on this ruling Sura (1999), 19 et seq.

  234. 234.

    ECJ, Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279 (para 75)—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen; on this topic, see Frenz (2000b), 611 et seq.

  235. 235.

    Of 27 August 1998, Federal Gazette I 1998, p. 2379, last amended by Ordinance of 24 May 2005, Federal Gazette I 2005, p. 1407.

  236. 236.

    Further discussion in Frenz (2002a), 1028 et seq.

  237. 237.

    See above para 1558.

  238. 238.

    See Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 40 with additional citations. Further discussion Götz (2001), p. 925 et seq., 931 et seq.

  239. 239.

    General Court, Case T-289/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:29 (para 172)—BUPA.

  240. 240.

    See ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (para 55)—Ahmed Saeed air travel; Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171 (para 50)—Almelo; Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (para 65)—Commission/France.

  241. 241.

    See ECJ, Case C-49/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376 (para 46)—MOTOE.

  242. 242.

    ECJ, Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171 (para 47)—Almeo, affirmed in Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (para 66)—Commission/France.

  243. 243.

    Open question, ECJ, Case C-360/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:525 (para 24)—BFI Holding as well as Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279 (para 76)—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen. In that case, reference is only made to entrustment pursuant to national legal requirements without addressing the arrangement in detail.

  244. 244.

    ECJ, Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (para 66)—Commission/France.

  245. 245.

    Burgi (1997), 275 et seq.; Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 106 AEUV para 25; in relation to the energy sector, Baur (1995), p. 77; Rapp-Jung (1994b), 169; Bala (1997), p. 162 et seq.

  246. 246.

    Linder (2004), p. 99.

  247. 247.

    Cf. Ossenbühl (1983), 301 et seq.

  248. 248.

    Linder (2004), p. 99 et seq.

  249. 249.

    See previously, Rapp-Jung (1994a), 465 with fn. 17: Legal form of entrustment is irrelevant but rather the substance of the function is decisive.

  250. 250.

    AG Léger, ECJ, Case C-309/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:390 (para 160)—Wouters; to which Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 106 AEUV para 25 correctly refers. See also Gyselen (2000), 445.

  251. 251.

    Further ECJ, Case C-67/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430 (paras 104 et seq.)—Albany.

  252. 252.

    ECJ, Case C-67/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430 (para 103)—Albany citing earlier case law and without evidence of a specific act of entrustment.

  253. 253.

    See Burgi (1997), 276; Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 13 with additional citations. Also trending in this direction, Federal Administrative Court 134, 154 (161).

  254. 254.

    See e.g. Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 106 AEUV para 27.

  255. 255.

    Cf. ECJ, Cases C-46/90 and 93/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:852 (para 33)—Lagauche; Case C-17/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:422 (para 36)—Gervais; narrowing, Case 271/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:175 (paras 10 et seq.)—Mialocq; providing a summary, Frenz (2012), para 1266.

  256. 256.

    On commercial monopolies in general, see in detail Frenz (2012), paras 1263 et seq.

  257. 257.

    Khan, In: Geiger et al. (2010), Art. 106 AEUV para 18 citing Ueberschär (2008), p. 4.

  258. 258.

    Voet van Vormizeele, In: Schwarze (2012), Art. 106 AEUV para 68; Khan, In: Geiger et al. (2010), Art. 106 AEUV para 18.

  259. 259.

    Müller-Graff, In: Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2012), Art. 106 AEUV para 18.

  260. 260.

    See only ECJ, Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (para 44)—Commission/France.

  261. 261.

    ECJ, Cases 188–190/80, ECLI:EU:C:1982:257 (para 12)—Transparency Directive; Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (paras 46 et seq.)—Commission/France.

  262. 262.

    ECJ, Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (para 49)—Commission/France.

  263. 263.

    ECJ, Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (para 53)—Commission/France; Case C-340/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:281 (para 56)—TNT Traco; from the literature Mestmäcker (1998), p. 641; Burgi (1997), 276; Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 35 in conjunction with footnote 140 each with additional citations.

  264. 264.

    See, e.g. Tettinger (1997), 344.

  265. 265.

    ECJ, Case 155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40 (para 15)—Sacchi; Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 26 et seq.)—Genova and more precisely, General Court, Case T-260/94, ECLI:EU:T:1997:89 (para 138)—Air Inter as well as, e.g. Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 48.

  266. 266.

    Tettinger (1997), 344.

  267. 267.

    Koenig and Vorbeck (2008), 214.

  268. 268.

    Referring to this figure, Schwarze (2001), 339; applying a different approach Koenig (2001), 481. Regarding Art. 14 TFEU in this context, further discussion below, paras 4340 et seq. regarding practical concordance above, paras 1547 et seq.

  269. 269.

    But see Reese and Koch (2010), 1396; Krämer (2010), 41.

  270. 270.

    Explicitly ECJ, Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (para 57)—Commission/France.

  271. 271.

    ECJ, Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (para 59)—Commission/France.

  272. 272.

    See ECJ, Case C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (para 52)—Deutsche Post.

  273. 273.

    See ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (para 14, 16)—Corbeau; Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279 (para 77)—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen; similar, Case C-340/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:281 (para 54)—TNT Traco: economically reasonable.

  274. 274.

    Applying both formulations, ECJ, Case C-475/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:577 (paras 57 et seq.)—Ambulanz Glöckner. See also ECJ, Case C-162/06, ECLI:EU:C:2007:681 (para 34)—International Mail Spain.

  275. 275.

    Bartosch (1999), 180.

  276. 276.

    ECJ, Case C-297/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:115 (para 69)—Region Campania.

  277. 277.

    ECJ, Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (paras 48, 50 et seq.)—Enel.

  278. 278.

    Case C-360/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:525 (para 52)—BFI-Holding.

  279. 279.

    For a further discussion of § 17 KrWG, see Klement (2012), 235.

  280. 280.

    Along these lines, Commission Communication of 11 September 1996, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (1996), 443 final (sub-section 3.4).

  281. 281.

    Commission Communication of 20 September 2000, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (2000), 580 final (Annex II). Similarly, White Paper on Services of General Interest, dated 12 May 2004, COM (2004), 374 final (Annex 1).

  282. 282.

    ECJ, Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (para 68)—Commission/France.

  283. 283.

    ECJ, Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (para 68)—Commission/France.

  284. 284.

    German Federal Administrative Court, NVwZ 2006, 589 (591); fundamental discussion Frenz (1996), p. 73 et seq.

  285. 285.

    ECJ, Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (para 48)—Enel.

  286. 286.

    ECJ, Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (paras 89 et seq.)—Commission/France.

  287. 287.

    ECJ, Case C-297/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:115 (para 69)—Region Campania; see previously, above para 4294.

  288. 288.

    ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (para 16)—Corbeau; Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501 (para 96)—Commission/France; Case C-475/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:577 (para 57)—Ambulanz Glöckner.

  289. 289.

    Rose and Bailey (2013), 11.056.

  290. 290.

    For additional discussion, see paras 4355 et seq.

  291. 291.

    ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (paras 16 et seq.)—Corbeau; Case C-475/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:577 (para 57)—Ambulanz Glöckner.

  292. 292.

    Same approach, ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140 (para 55)—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen; clearer still, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (para 18)—Corbeau; most recently, Case C-437/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:112 (para 77)—AG2R/Prévoyance.

  293. 293.

    ECJ, Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171 (paras 48 et seq.)—Almelo.

  294. 294.

    ECJ, Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171 (para 49)—Almelo.

  295. 295.

    ECJ, Case C-266/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:306 (para 46)—Corsica Ferries II.

  296. 296.

    ECJ, Case C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (paras 54 et seq.)—Deutsche Post.

  297. 297.

    See immediately following para 4312 end.

  298. 298.

    Rejected for example for funding shortfalls in the package delivery segment by the Deutsche Post from Held (2005), p. 145.

  299. 299.

    ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (para 19)—Corbeau.

  300. 300.

    ECJ, Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (para 41)—Enel citing Case C-67/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430 (para 103)—Albany with additional citations.

  301. 301.

    Similar Schink (2005), 867: Netting profitable and unprofitable services in order to avoid cherry picking.

  302. 302.

    ECJ, Case C-437/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:112 (para 77)—AG2R/Prévoyance.

  303. 303.

    Whish and Bailey (2011), p. 236.

  304. 304.

    ECJ, Case C-475/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:577 (para 59)—Ambulanz Glöckner.

  305. 305.

    ECJ, Case C-437/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:112 (para 77)—AG2R/Prévoyance.

  306. 306.

    ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198 (para 19)—Corbeau.

  307. 307.

    Führmeyer (2004), p. 232 et seq., contra Bartosch (2000), 2252 et seq.

  308. 308.

    Commission report to the Laeken European Council of 17 October 2001, Services of General Interests, COM (2001), 598 final (paras 17 et seq.) with a reminder that security measures need to be taken to ensure that funds are used as intended.

  309. 309.

    ECJ, Case C-280/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:415 (paras 87 et seq.)—Altmark; following Case C-53/00, ECLI:EU:C:2001:627 (paras 27 et seq.)—Ferring; see also Case C-126/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:622 (paras 23 et seq.)—GEMO; Case C-34–38/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:640 (paras 44 et seq.)—Enirisorse; see on this topic, Frenz (2007), paras 428 et seq.

  310. 310.

    Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, OJ 2012 C 8, p. 4; Commission Decision 2012/21/EU of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest, OJ 2012 L 7, p. 3; Communication from the Commission—European Union framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation, OJ 2012 C 8, p. 15; Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic interest, OJ 2012 L 114, p. 8.

  311. 311.

    Knauff and Badenhausen (2014), 34 et seq.

  312. 312.

    Rose and Bailey (2013), 11.058.

  313. 313.

    ECJ, Case C-265/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:205 (para 33)—Federutility; Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (para 42)—Enel.

  314. 314.

    Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 106 AEUV paras 29 et seq.; further discussion, see Wernicke, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 106 AEUV paras 69 et seq.

  315. 315.

    In this context, Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 106 AEUV para 29.

  316. 316.

    In relation to electricity, ECJ, Case C-157/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:499 (para 67)—Commission/Netherlands.

  317. 317.

    ECJ, Case C-157/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:499 (para 69)—Commission/Netherlands.

  318. 318.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case C-157/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:499 (para 70)—Commission/Netherlands.

  319. 319.

    For additional discussion, see below paras 4355 et seq.

  320. 320.

    ECJ, Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (para 50)—Enel.

  321. 321.

    ECJ, Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (paras 56 et seq.)—Enel.

  322. 322.

    ECJ, Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (paras 68 et seq.)—Enel.

  323. 323.

    ECJ, Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (para 75)—Enel.

  324. 324.

    ECJ, Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (para 77)—Enel.

  325. 325.

    ECJ, Case C-242/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:861 (para 80)—Enel.

  326. 326.

    General Court, Case T-289/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:29 (para 172)—BUPA; previously implicit, ECJ, Case C-34–38/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:640 (paras 33 et seq., 37)—Enirisorse.

  327. 327.

    General Court, Case T-289/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:29 (para 172)—BUPA.

  328. 328.

    An economic activity is required, ECJ, Case C-49/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376 (para 46)—MOTOE.

  329. 329.

    General Court, Case T-289/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:29 (para 172)—BUPA citing ECJ, Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 27)—Genova; Case C-34–38/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:640 (paras 33 et seq.)—Enirisorse; see also ECJ, Case C-242/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:376 (para 52)—GT-Link; Rose and Bailey (2013), para 11.051.

  330. 330.

    ECJ, Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464 (para 27)—Genova.

  331. 331.

    The direct application of Art. 106 (2) TFEU has since been recognised by the ECJ, see only ECJ, Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171 (para 51 end)—Almelo. From the literature, Burgi (1997), 278.

  332. 332.

    ECJ, Case C-203/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:316 (para 66)—Dusseldorp.

  333. 333.

    Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 106 AEUV para 28, citing ECJ, Case C-340/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:281 (para 62)—TNT Traco.

  334. 334.

    Commission Decision 2001/892/EC, OJ 2001 L 331, p. 40 (para 84)—Deutsche Post.

  335. 335.

    ECJ, Case C-157/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:499 (para 58)—Commission/Netherlands.

  336. 336.

    ECJ, Case C-48 and 66/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:63 (paras 27 et seq.)—Kurierdienste Niederlande.

  337. 337.

    ECJ, Case C-157/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:499 (paras 59 et seq., 69, et seq.)—Commission/Netherlands.

  338. 338.

    Decisions to undertakings cannot be based thereon. They are made in the context of business-related rules on competition and the secondary law supplementing them.

  339. 339.

    See ECJ, Case C-48 and 66/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:63 (para 34)—Kurierdienste Niederlande.

  340. 340.

    ECJ, Case C-202/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:120 (para 17)—Telecommunications devices.

  341. 341.

    ECJ, Cases 188–190/80, ECLI:EU:C:1982:257 (para 18)—Transparency Directive.

  342. 342.

    Knauff (2010), 734, fn. 56 contra Hellermann (2000), p. 104.

  343. 343.

    Kühling, In: Streinz (2012), Art. 106 AEUV para 86.

  344. 344.

    Grill, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 106 AEUV para 31.

  345. 345.

    Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 4 end.

  346. 346.

    For further discussion, see Frenz (2011a), paras 2419 et seq. as well as below, paras 4372 et seq.

  347. 347.

    Commission Decision (2000), 580 final (p. 26).

  348. 348.

    See above para 4312.

  349. 349.

    Green Paper on Services of General Interest of 21 May 2003, COM (2003), 270 final (p. 5) since integrated into the White Paper on Services of General Interest of 12 May 2004, COM (2004), 374 final.

  350. 350.

    Scharpf (2005), 295.

  351. 351.

    See below paras 4346 et seq.

  352. 352.

    Dated 12 May 2004, COM (2004), 374 final.

  353. 353.

    Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings, OJ L 318, p. 17.

  354. 354.

    See above paras 4302 et seq.

  355. 355.

    See General Court, Case T-106/95, ECLI:EU:T:1997:23 (para 178)—FFSA as well as above, para 4312.

  356. 356.

    OJ 2002 L 249, p. 21.

  357. 357.

    Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, OJ 1990 L 192, p. 10.

  358. 358.

    OJ 2002 L 108, p. 7, last amended by OJ 2009 C 337, p. 37.

  359. 359.

    OJ 2002 L 108, p. 21, last amended by OJ 2009 C 337, p. 37.

  360. 360.

    OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33, last amended by OJ 2009 C 337, p. 37.

  361. 361.

    OJ 2002 L 108, p. 51, last amended by OJ 2009 C 337, p. 11.

  362. 362.

    See above paras 4257 et seq.

  363. 363.

    Commission Communication of 11 September 1996, COM (1996), 443 final, para 1). An additional update was provided in Commission Communication of 20 September 2000, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (2000), 580 final; see on this topic, Dohms, In: Schwarze (2001), p. 43 et seq. Further discussion and additional work on this topic were continued in the Green Book (COM (2003), 270 final) and the White Paper (COM (2004), 374 final) on Services of Public Interest.

  364. 364.

    Commission Communication of 11 September 1996, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (1996), 443 final (para 15). See also, White Paper on Services of General Interest, dated 12 May 2004, COM (2004), 374 final (sub-section 3.3).

  365. 365.

    Commission Communication of 11 September 1996, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (1996), 443 final (para 54). Critical view of this proposal, Tettinger (1997), 346.

  366. 366.

    CEEP (1995), 456 et seq.; critical view, Mestmäcker (1998), p. 649 et seq.

  367. 367.

    Additional discussion, see CEEP (1995), 457.

  368. 368.

    Cf. regarding a summary of these proposals, CEEP (1995), 455 et seq.

  369. 369.

    Budäus and Schiller (2000), 96.

  370. 370.

    Extension discussion of the origins, Rodrigues (1998), 40 et seq.; Linder (2004), p. 21 et seq. through the first beginnings in decision of the European Parliament in 1993.

  371. 371.

    Frenz (2011a), paras 2415 et seq.

  372. 372.

    Further discussion of the role of France with its tradition of service public as a driving factor, Linder, Daseinsvorsorge in der Verfassungsordnung der Europäischen Union, 2004, p. 57 et seq.

  373. 373.

    See above paras 4257 et seq.

  374. 374.

    OJ 1997 C 340, p. 133.

  375. 375.

    Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 44.

  376. 376.

    See also, Burgi (1997), 271, 289: Art. 106 (1) TFEU “as home of the principle of equality of treatment for public and private undertakings”.

  377. 377.

    For further discussion, see Frenz (2009), paras 4273 et seq.

  378. 378.

    See, e.g. van Miert (1997), 4 et seq.: “le nouvel article (i.e. Art. 16 EC) ne peut en aucun cas être interprété comme une modification de ces dispositions (i.e. Art. 73, 86, 87 EC)”; contra Rodrigues (1998), p. 42.

  379. 379.

    Cf. Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 52: “ambivalently phrased”.

  380. 380.

    See, previously Commission Communication of 11 September 1996, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (1996), 443 final (paras 15 et seq.). On the topic of numerous follow-on activities, see Linder (2004), p. 65 et seq.

  381. 381.

    Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 12: identical terms; Lenz, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 14 AEUV para 6.

  382. 382.

    Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 53.

  383. 383.

    Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 21. However, this does not apply in an exclusive sense, see, e.g. paras 4348 et seq.

  384. 384.

    On this point, see Frenz (2011a), paras 2149 et seq., 2377 et seq.

  385. 385.

    On this proposal, see above, para 4336.

  386. 386.

    Lenz, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 14 AEUV para 4.

  387. 387.

    General Court, Case T-53/01 R, ECLI:EU:T:2001:143 (para 132)—Poste Italiane.

  388. 388.

    General Court, Case T-309 inter alia 04, ECLI:EU:T:2008:457 (para 102)—TV2/Danmark.

  389. 389.

    Decker, In: Ludwig et al. (2013), Teil V, EG-Vertrag, Art. 16, p. 3.

  390. 390.

    Decker, In: Ludwig et al. (2013), Teil V, EG-Vertrag, Art. 16, p. 4.

  391. 391.

    See, e.g. Badura, In: Classen (2001), p. 578 et seq.; Tettinger, In: Hendler et al. (2003), p. 253; approving this reasoning, Schoo, In: Schwarze (2012), Art. 14 AEUV para 11.

  392. 392.

    See, e.g. van Miert (1997), 4 et seq.

  393. 393.

    General Court, Case T-53/01 R, ECLI:EU:T:2001:143 (para 132)—Poste Italiane.

  394. 394.

    General Court, Case T-53/01 R, ECLI:EU:T:2001:143 (para 133)—Poste Italiane. Also referring to this provision, Alber, In: Schwarze (2001), p. 84.

  395. 395.

    General Court, Case T-309 inter alia 04, ECLI:EU:T:2008:457 (para 102)—TV2/Danmark with additional citations regarding the opinions of the Advocates General.

  396. 396.

    AG Maduro, Case C-205/03 P, ECLI:EU:C:2005:666 (para 26 in conjunction with footnote 35)—FENIN.

  397. 397.

    See ECJ, Case C-205/03 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:453 (paras 25 et seq.)—FENIN, in which however the entrepreneurial aspect was already precluded.

  398. 398.

    See also Mestmäcker (1998), p. 651, who commented on Art. 16 EC and its supplementation by Declaration No 13 to the Final Act to the Treaty of Amsterdam: “If this is really intended to correspond to the will of the European Council, one could “do without the new Art. 16 EC”.

  399. 399.

    See above paras 4340 et seq.

  400. 400.

    Schneiderhan (2012), p. 74.

  401. 401.

    Schwarze (2001), 336; Ronellenfitsch, In: Blümel (2003), p. 90; Doerfert (2006), 318.

  402. 402.

    Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 52.

  403. 403.

    See above para 4346.

  404. 404.

    Streinz (1998), 144.

  405. 405.

    Cf. rejected this approached based on systemic considerations (Art. 106 (2) TFEU as an independent exception), Burgi (1997), 277 et seq.

  406. 406.

    See above paras 4291 et seq.

  407. 407.

    See also Mestmäcker and Schweitzer, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Article 106 (2) AEUV para 29.

  408. 408.

    See General Court, Case T-309 inter alia 04, ECLI:EU:T:2008:457 (para 102)—TV2/Danmark. Significance “emphasised”. See also Czerny (2009), p. 390 with additional citations, Schmidt (2003), 229.

  409. 409.

    Zuleeg (1987), 283 et seq.; Zuleeg (1993), 32 et seq.; Breier (1992), 180; Kahl (1993), p. 10 et seq.; Pernice (1990), 203; Scheuing (1989), 178 et seq.; Vorwerk (1990), p. 33 et seq.; Wasmeier (1995), p. 70; Wiegand (1993), 536; contra Everling, In: Behrens and Koch (1991), p. 44.

  410. 410.

    Güttler (2002), 233.

  411. 411.

    Applying a different, more refined approach, Calliess, In: Calliess and Ruffert, Art. 191 AEUV para 21.

  412. 412.

    Epiney (1995), 500; Epiney (2013), p. 119 et seq.; Kahl, In: Streinz (2012), Art. 191 AEUV para 31 et seq. with additional citations, including the contrary view, Scheuing (1989), 176 et seq.

  413. 413.

    In favour Krämer (2010), 41; Reese and Koch (2010), 1396.

  414. 414.

    For a detailed discussion, see Frenz (1997), p. 67 et seq.

  415. 415.

    Similar view, Zils (1994), p. 31 et seq.; specifically regarding competition policy, Commission 32nd Report on Competition Policy 1992, sub-section 77; Riesenkampff (1995), 838.

  416. 416.

    See by contrast, Gassner, In: Hendler et al. (2001), p. 350.

  417. 417.

    See previously. Frenz (2000a), 916 et seq.; Gaßner et al. (2000), p. 56; see also Schneider (2000), 1253 et seq. Contrary view, Tettinger, In: Hendler et al. (2001), p. 74; Weiß (2002), p. 408.

  418. 418.

    Lenz, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 14 AEUV para 9; Hatje, In: Schwarze (2012), Art. 14 AEUV para 9.

  419. 419.

    Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 52.

  420. 420.

    They retain the “primary responsibility”, Franzius (2006), 558.

  421. 421.

    Similarly, Economic- und Social committee, CES 949 (1999), p. 10: positive obligation under Art. 6.

  422. 422.

    Frenz (2011a), para 2433.

  423. 423.

    Knauff (2010), 734 et seq.

  424. 424.

    Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 52 citing inter alia AG Alber, ECJ, Case C-340/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:74 (para 94)—TNT Traco.

  425. 425.

    Wernicke, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 106 AEUV paras 69 et seq.; Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV paras 56 et seq.; Bartosch (1999), 180; Burgi (1997), 276.

  426. 426.

    See above para 4257.

  427. 427.

    Rejecting this as well, Linder (2004), p. 201 et seq.; see also Wernicke, In: Grabitz et al. (2014), Art. 14 AEUV para 46.

  428. 428.

    Ruge (2008), 264 et seq.; Schorkopf (2008), 258.

  429. 429.

    This only results in emphasis and not a limitation, Krajewski (2005), 669.

  430. 430.

    Krajewski (2010), 81 et seq.

  431. 431.

    Knauff (2010), 732; von Danwitz (2004), p. 261.

  432. 432.

    Knauff (2010), 732 contra Wuermeling (2008), 252.

  433. 433.

    Knauff (2010), 734.

  434. 434.

    Bußmann (2009), p. 128.

  435. 435.

    By contrast, precluding them as addressees, Burgi (2002), 266 with comment 45.

  436. 436.

    Gassner, In: Hendler et al. (2001), p. 351.

  437. 437.

    See, e.g. Krajewski (2010), 82.

  438. 438.

    On the basis of Protocol No. 26 Krajewski (2010), 92.

  439. 439.

    See fundamentally ECJ, Case C-2/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:310 (paras 34 et seq.)—Wallonische Abfälle; regarding expansion, see Frenz (2010), 293 et seq.

  440. 440.

    See Commission Communication of 20 September 2000, Services of General Interests in Europe, COM (2000), 580 final (sub-section 57).

  441. 441.

    See above paras 4257 et seq.

  442. 442.

    Additional discussion, Decker, In: Ludwig et al. (2013), Teil V, EG-Vertrag, Art. 16, p. 4.

  443. 443.

    Decker, In: Ludwig et al. (2013), Teil V, EG-Vertrag, Art. 16, p. 5 et seq.

  444. 444.

    See above para 4340.

  445. 445.

    Frenz (2011a), paras 2345 et seq.

  446. 446.

    Frenz (2011a), paras 2349 et seq., likewise with regard to expansions.

  447. 447.

    Burgi (1997), 287 et seq.

  448. 448.

    Burgi (1997), 288 et seq.

  449. 449.

    ECJ, Case 1/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:56 (para 19)—Frilli; Case 21/74, ECLI:EU:C:1975:24 (para 9, 12)—Airola; Case C-80/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:271 (para 17)—Wielockx; Case C-107/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:251 (para 40)—Asscher.

  450. 450.

    See fundamentally ECJ, Case 6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66 (1269)—Costa/E.N.E.L. Not only has Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court admonished strict treatment in this context, German Federal Constitutional Court, 89, 155 (200 et seq.); 123, 267 (347 et seq.), but the ECJ as well, Opinion C-2/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140 (para 30)—ECHR.

  451. 451.

    Cf. Jarass (1994), p. 67 et seq.

  452. 452.

    See, e.g. Sandmann (2005), p. 175 et seq. She accords Art. 14 TFEU no effect at all in this context.

  453. 453.

    Cf. on this topic Jung, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 106 AEUV para 48 with additional citations; Tettinger (1997), 344.

  454. 454.

    See above para 4206 in relation to the principle of locality.

  455. 455.

    Asserting an additional argument based on Art. 14 TFEU, Fehling (2001), p. 205.

  456. 456.

    See above para 4202.

  457. 457.

    See most recently, ECJ, Case C-262/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:851 (para 21)—Vent de Colére; Case 57/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:284 (paras 12 et seq.)—Greece/Commission; further discussion in the context of EU state aid proceedings related to the EEG, Frenz (2014), 28 et seq.

  458. 458.

    See ECJ, Case 229/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:1 (paras 15 et seq.)—Leclerc/Au blé vert; Frenz (2012), para 723.

  459. 459.

    ECJ, Case C-35/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:97 (para 43)—Arduino.

  460. 460.

    ECJ, Case C-198/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:430 (para 51)—CIF; cf. ECJ, Cases C-359 and 379/95 P, ECLI:EU:C:1997:531 (para 33)—Ladbroke Racing.

  461. 461.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case C-198/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:430 (para 46)—CIF.

  462. 462.

    See e.g. ECJ, Cases C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74 (para 52)—Deutsche Post; Case C-475/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:577 (paras 57 et seq.)—Ambulanz Glöckner.

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    Walter Frenz

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Table of Cases

Table of Cases

AG Alber, ECJ, Case C-340/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:74—TNT Traco

AG Léger, ECJ, Case C-309/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:390—Wouters

AG Maduro, Case C-205/03 P, ECLI:EU:C:2005:666—FENIN

AG Reischl, ECJ, Case C-188–190/80, ECLI:EU:C:1982:134—Transparency Directive

ECJ, Case 6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66—Costa/E.N.E.L.

ECJ, Case 1/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:56—Frilli

ECJ, Case 2/73, ECLI:EU:C:1973:89—Geddo

ECJ, Case 127/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:25—BRT/SABAM

ECJ, Case 155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40—Sacchi

ECJ, Case 21/74, ECLI:EU:C:1975:24—Airola

ECJ, Case 94/74, ECLI:EU:C:1975:81—IGAV

ECJ, Cases 9 and 10/77, ECLI:EU:C:1977:132—Eurocontrol

ECJ, Case 13/77, ECLI:EU:C:1977:185—Inno/ATAB

ECJ, Case 258/78, ECLI:EU:C:1982:211—Nungesser

ECJ, Case 172/80, ECLI:EU:C:1981:178—Züchner

ECJ, Cases 188–190/80, ECLI:EU:C:1982:257—France inter alia/Commission

ECJ, Case 271/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:175—Mialocq

ECJ, Case 7/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:52—GVL

ECJ, Case 172/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:69—Inter-Huiles

ECJ, Case 41/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:120—Italy/Commission

ECJ, Case 229/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:1—Leclerc/Au blé vert

ECJ, Cases 209–213/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:188—Asjes

ECJ, Case 311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394—CBEM

ECJ, Case 118/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:283—Commission/Italy

ECJ, Case 57/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:284—Greece/Commission

ECJ, Case 66/86, ECLI:EU:C:1989:140—Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen

ECJ, Case 30/87, ECLI:EU:C:1988:225—Bodson

ECJ, Case C-18/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:474—GB-Inno-BM

ECJ, Case C-202/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:120—Telecommunications devices

ECJ, Case C-260/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254—ERT

ECJ, Case C-2/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:310—Wallonische Abfälle

ECJ, Case C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161—Höfner and Elser

ECJ, Case C-48 and 66/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:63—Kurierdienste Niederlande

ECJ, Case C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464—Genova

ECJ, Case C-271 inter alia/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:440—Telecommunications services

ECJ, Case C-46/90 and 93/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:852—Lagauche

ECJ, Case C-159 and 160/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:63—Poucet and Pistre

ECJ, Case C-320/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:198—Corbeau

ECJ, Case C-364/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:7—SAT Fluggesellschaft

ECJ, Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171—Almelo

ECJ, Case C-18/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:195—Corsica Ferries

ECJ, Case C-323/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:368—La Crespelle

ECJ, Case C-387/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:439—Banchero

ECJ, Case C-2/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140—ECHR

ECJ, Case C-17/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:422—Gervais

ECJ, Case C-80/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:271—Wielockx

ECJ, Case C-107/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:251—Asscher

ECJ, Case C-157/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:499—Commission/Netherlands

ECJ, Case C-159/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:501—Commission/France

ECJ, Case C-244/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:392—Fédération française des sociétés d’assurance

ECJ, Case C-242/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:376—GT-Link

ECJ, Case C-359 and 379/95 P, ECLI:EU:C:1997:531—Ladbroke Racing

ECJ, Case C-35/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:303—CNSD

ECJ, Case C-55/96, ECLI:EU:C:1997:603—Job Centre

ECJ, Case C-67/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430—Albany

ECJ, Case C-163/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:54—Raso

ECJ, Case C-203/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:316—Dusseldorp

ECJ, Case C-266/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:306—Corsica Ferries II

ECJ, Case C-360/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:525—BFI Holding

ECJ, Case C-115–117/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:434—Brentjens

ECJ, Case C-147 and 148/97, ECLI:EU:C:2000:74—Deutsche Post

ECJ, Case C-219/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:437—Drijvende Bokken

ECJ, Case C-180–184/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:428—Pavlov

ECJ, Case C-209/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:279—Sydhavnens Sten & Grus/Kopenhagen

ECJ, Case C-35/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:97—Arduino

ECJ, Case C-157/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404—Smits and Peerbooms

ECJ, Case C-462/99, ECLI:EU:C:2003:297—Connect Austria

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Frenz, W. (2016). Services of General Interest and Special Rights. In: Handbook of EU Competition Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48593-4_11

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