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The Political Foundations of TRIPS Revisited

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TRIPS plus 20

Part of the book series: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law ((MSIP,volume 25))

Abstract

The contribution revisits the political foundations of the TRIPS Agreement with a view to determine its role and functioning under the changed socio-economic geopolitical conditions of today’s world economic order. The Agreement, which was concluded as part of and under the pressure of the GATT/WTO trade package, provides for internationally uniform standards of adequate protection of intellectual property in all States Members of the WTO, regardless of the differences of their economic development, industrial structures and social needs. As a global “deep trade agreement”, which governs not only cross border trade, but Members’ internal markets, it raises issues both of its compatibility with the principle of comparative advantage underlying international trade, and of the legitimacy of its interfering with domestic market regulation. The flexibilities, which have been built into the TRIPS Agreement, may mitigate concerns. However, the growing new bi- and pluri-lateralism of regional free trade agreements with their asymmetric intellectual property rules, the re-distribution of economic power among the developed and the emerging or rather the emerged countries, and the nature of strategic competition between globally acting multinational corporations have changed the rules of the game. The task ahead is to re-conceptualize the TRIPS Agreement as a framework regulation for national innovation markets, which at the same time are integrated into global markets to varying degrees. As such, it would form part of an open international economic law, which, in its turn, needs to be developed in order to overcome the rigid and already fading paradigms of international trade law. Only such a vision will help to accommodate intellectual property protection with the large diversity of industrial policies and with the many intellectual property-related public interests and policies, which WTO Members may or do adhere to.

Prof. Dr. Dr. eh. Hanns Ullrich is Professor Emeritus at the Universtität der Bundeswehr, Munich, Affliated Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, Brussels.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Signed at Marrakech on 15 April 1994. According to its Article II, the WTO Agreement provides the institutional framework for a series of agreements, namely, first, in Annex 1 thirteen, “Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods”, including in particular the revised “GATT 1994” (Annex 1A), the “General Agreement on Trade in Services” (GATS, Annex 1B), the “Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS, Annex 1(C))”. Second, in Annex 2, it contains the “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)”, and, third, in Annex 3 the “Trade Policy Review Mechanism”. Annex 4 covers four “Plurilateral Trade Agreements”. Whereas the Agreements contained in Annexes 1–3 are all “multilateral” and, as such, binding on all WTO members (Article II(2)), the Plurilateral Agreements of Annex 4, while parts of the WTO Agreement, bind only those Members, which have accepted them (Article II(3)). All the texts are accessible at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e.htm. The WTO Agreement entered into force on 1 January 1995 for 76 States including the EU as a Member (and EU Member States counted separately). As of July 2015 the WTO has 161 Members (EU Member States counted in addition to the EU), including the PR China (since 2001) and the Russian Federation (since 2012).

  2. 2.

    See WTO Agreement Annex 1A: In addition to goods in general, which come under GATT 94, there is the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothes. Plurilateral Agreements of Annex 4 relate to civil aircraft, dairy products, and bovine meat; the fourth concerns government procurement.

  3. 3.

    Although, in principle, the GATS Agreement covers all services equally, there are differentiated rules for some major sectors (see Article II(2) with Annex, and see specific annexes for air transport (exempt as such) and related services (which are covered), financial services, maritime transport, telecommunications). Telecommunications, in particular, remained the subject of continued negotiations and adjustments by way of protocols. Importantly, “services supplied in the exercise of government authority” are altogether excluded from the scope of GATS (see Article I(3), lit. b), lit. c).

  4. 4.

    See R. Senti (2000), WTO System und Funktionsweise der Welthandelsordnung, pp. 64 et seq. In fact, trade in manufactured products rose steeply from 1985 onwards, but not trade in agricultural goods, raw material or services, see P.-L. Girard (1995), De Punta del Este à Marrakech: Le Processus de Négociation, in Th. Cottier (Ed.), GATT-Uruguay Round: Nine Papers, pp. 23 et seq. (tableaux 1, 2).

  5. 5.

    Textiles came under the Multi-Fibre Agreement and its general market regulating mechanism, see M. Trebilcock & R. Howse (2005), The Regulation of International Trade, pp. 482 ff. seq.; K. Pfaue (2005) in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, pp. 315 et seq.; for the total of 173 export restraint arrangements in all sectors, including electronics, automobiles etc. see P.-L. Girard (1995), De Punta del Este à Marrakech: le processus de négociation, in Th. Cottier (Ed.), GATT-Uruguay Round: Nine Papers, p. 28 (tableau 5).

  6. 6.

    See Ch. Bail (1990), Das Profil einer neuen Welthandelsordnung: Was bringt die Uruguay Runde?, EuZW 1990, 433 (Teil 1), 465 (Teil 2), at 434 et seq.; J. Neugärtner (2010) in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, pp. 86 et seq. (no. 24).

  7. 7.

    Tariffs had already been reduced considerably, in particular by the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds of trade negotiations to an average of 6.3 %, see J. Neugärtner (2010) in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, p. 86 (no. 22). Although some products remained under high tariff protection, this reduction caused a shift to non-tariff barriers both as a means of protectionism and as an objective of trade negotiations, see J. Neugärtner (2010) in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, pp. 86 et seq. (nos. 2, 3 et seq.).

  8. 8.

    See supra n. 6.

  9. 9.

    See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations of 20 September 1986 (“Declaration of Punta del Este”), 25 Int’l Leg. Mat. 1623, sub A (iii), (iv).

  10. 10.

    See supra n. 9. The Declaration had two parts. Part I on “Negotiations on Trade in Goods” covered sub D a long list of subjects ranging from tariffs and non-tariff measures to types of products, types of measures, institutional issues (dispute settlement), “trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, including trade in counterfeit goods” and trade-related investment measures. Part II on “Negotiation of Trade in Services” was a rather general and vague mandate. In essence, it originated from a U.S. initiative undertaken right after the conclusion of the Tokyo Round.

  11. 11.

    Following a summary assessment of the state of international trade and the reasons of its crisis, the philosophy of the Uruguay Round, including its stress on trade in high technology goods (but with no mentioning of intellectual property) has found its politically widely accepted expression in “Trade Policies for a Better Future” – The Report. This was a report given by 7 eminent persons under the chairmanship of F. Leutwiler (= “Leutwiler Report”) upon the informal initiative of A. Dunkel, then Director-General of GATT, see A. Dunkel (1987), Trade Policies for a Better Future – The “Leutwiler Report”, the GATT and the Uruguay Round, pp. 9 et passim.

  12. 12.

    For a detailed historical account of the negotiations see J. Croome (1995), Reshaping the World Trading System – A History of the Uruguay Round, passim; R. Senti (2000), WTO System und Funktionsweise der Welthandelsordnung, pp. 75 et seq.; P.-L. Girard (1995), De Punta del Este à Marrakech: le processus de négociation, in Th. Cottier (Ed.), GATT-Uruguay Round: Nine Papers, pp. 1 et passim (tableaux 1, 2); Ch. Bail (1990), Das Profil einer neuen Welthandelsordnung: Was bringt die Uruguay Runde?, EuZW 1990, 435, 465 passim. As regards the TRIPS Agreement more particularly see G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System, pp. 29 et passim; more critical also with respect to the negotiation process P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite (2002), Information Feudalism – Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, pp. 132 et passim.

  13. 13.

    See the contributions in H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod & E. Gippini Fournier (1995), The Uruguay Round Results; with a comparison of economic estimates by J. Pelkmans, (1995), The Economic Significance of the Round, in H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod & E. Gippini Fournier (Eds.), The Uruguay Round Results, pp. 43, 51 et seq. and in OECD (1995), The New World Trading System – Readings. The reduction of tariffs by 38 % on average to an average of 3.9 % (F. Behrens (2010) in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, p. 95 (no. 19)) stands out more as a symbol than as a core result.

  14. 14.

    Supra n. 9, sub B(ii).

  15. 15.

    In the oilseed dispute, the EU preferred to give in when the US threatened to increase tariffs to a 100 %, see for this “Blair House” Agreement R. Senti (2000), WTO System und Funktionsweise der Welthandelsordnung, pp. 102 et seq.; J. Croome (1995), Reshaping the World Trading System – A History of the Uruguay Round, pp. 112 et passim, 238 et passim.

  16. 16.

    For details see K. Pfaue (2005), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht. pp. 317 et seq. (textiles), H. Jessen (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, pp. 366 et seq. (agriculture); M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, pp. 434 et passim, 447 et seq.

  17. 17.

    By contrast, the Agreement on Government Procurement, although most important, remained a plurilateral agreement (WTO Agreement, Annex 4, as amended by a Revision Agreement effective 6 April 2014) with only 44 members (including the EU and its Member States) almost all of them developed countries (in an economics sense), see for the problems of extending membership G. Göttsche (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, pp. 535 et seq. (no. 49), Currently, 11 more States are negotiating accession, including the PR China.

  18. 18.

    GATS contains a specific sort of “implementation/negotiation” agendas in Article VI(4) on “disciplines” relating to qualification criteria etc., Art. X on emergency safeguard measures, Article XIII on public procurement of services (which are not yet included in GATS) and Article XV on subsidies. In addition, Article XIII provides for “Negotiations of Specific Commitments” for progressive liberalization, which, may be bi-, pluri-, or multilateral. For the state of progress see M. Michealis (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, pp. 447 et seq. (no. 49). The most ambitious project are the negotiations for a plurilateral “Trade in Services Agreement (TISA)”, see J. Marchetti & M. Roy (2014), The TISA Initiative: An Overview of Market Access Issues, 48 J.W.T. 2014, 683.

  19. 19.

    For the “post Uruguay” process see S. Hörmann (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, pp. 687 et passim; also infra Sect. 2.3.

  20. 20.

    For the principles governing the WTO as a legal order see also G. Göttsche (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, pp. 15 et seq.; P.-T. Stoll & F. Schorkopf (2006), WTO – World Economic Order, World Trade Law, pp. 31 et passim.

  21. 21.

    Including the EU as a member of WTO in its own right, see S. Hörmann (2005), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, § 3 (nos. 18 et seq.) and § 6 (no. 45).

  22. 22.

    See WTO Agreement, Preamble, recital 3; GATT 1947, preamble, recital 3; not mentioned in the preamble of GATS, as GATS signals the transition to new concepts, see infra Sect. 2.3.3.

  23. 23.

    Articles I, II GATT 47, Article II GATS. This most-favored-nation (MFN) rule is frequently seen as one prong of a more general principle of non-discrimination (G. Göttsche (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, § 4, nos. 40 et seq.; M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, pp. 29 et seq.), the other prong being the principle of national treatment (infra n. 24). However, due to the difference of the connecting factor – States v. goods – the difference is not only one of outbound v. inbound effects, but of levels of discrimination, the MFN rule producing rather ambivalent, if not anti-liberalization effects.

  24. 24.

    Article III GATT 47, Article 2 TRIMS Agreement, Article 2(3) SPS Agreement; Article XVI(1), XVII GATS, Art.: III Government Procurement Agreement. The latter two rules extend national treatment to the persons supplying goods or services. By contrast, the national treatment rules of international conventions on intellectual property, such as Article 2 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Article 15 Berne Convention on the Protection of Works of Literature and the Arts, protect persons, and so does Article 3 TRIPS Agreement.

  25. 25.

    Typical examples are tariffs and quantitative restrictions (Articles II, XI, XIII GATT 47), antidumping measures (Article VI GATT and the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI GATT 94), or the Agreement on Safeguards (implementing Article XIX GATT 94). Again, the GATS Agreement signals a transition to new concepts, as services need to be rendered in the “importing” country (or country of destination), whose internal market regulation then becomes a matter of trade, and it does so even if the regulation does not constitute a discriminatory measure, but only an “unnecessary impediment to trade” see M. Michealis (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, § 20, nos. 101 et seq., see also Article 2.2 TBT Agreement.

  26. 26.

    Typical examples are the Agreement on Subsidies and Compensatory Measures, but also Article 2.1. TBT Agreement.

  27. 27.

    This is the issue of direct applicability of WTO law at the national level, see S. Hörmann & J. Neugärtner (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, § 8, nos. 27 et passim.

  28. 28.

    See M. Hilf (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, § 7, no. 1 (the “heart of the WTO”), and the place given to the Dispute Settlement Understanding by e.g. M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, pp. 12 et passim; A. Lowenfeld (2002), International Economic Law, pp. 151 et passim.

  29. 29.

    See Article 22 DSU, for details M. Hilf (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, § 7, nos. 58 et passim.

  30. 30.

    See J. Neugärtner (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, § 8, nos. 1 et passim; see also J. Neugärtner (2005), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, § 28, nos. 51 et passim regarding reform concepts.

  31. 31.

    See Article XVIII GATT 47/94 (State Trading Enterprises); Articles VIII, XI GATS (monopolies and exclusive service supplies) Article IX GATS (business practices); in essence, the latter rules of GATS represent competition rules, which Members are obliged to implement.

  32. 32.

    See TRIPS Preamble, 1st recital, adopting the objective as set by the Declaration of Punta del Este. Negotiations seem to have been conducted also under the heading of “fairness” (Ch. Bail (1990), Das Profil einer neuen Welthandelsordnung: Was bringt die Uruguay Runde?, EuZW 1990, 467; for a detailed account J. Croome (1995), Reshaping the World Trading System – A History of the Uruguay Round, pp. 11 et seq., 130 et passim, 251 et passim, 283, 318 et seq.), although that heading fits the counterfeiting issue better than intellectual property in general (see M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, pp. 515 et seq.) More to the point is the heading chosen by A. Otten (1995), Improving the Playing Field for Exports: The Agreement on Intellectual Property, Investment Measures and Government Procurement, in Th. Cottier (Ed.), GATT-Uruguay Round: Nine Papers, p. 67. A broader picture is presented by G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System, pp. 29 et seq.

  33. 33.

    The concern is about bilateral or regional agreements providing for preferential treatment. However, the MFN-rule of Article 4 TRIPS is difficult to apply, see UNCTAD–ICTSD (2005), Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, pp. 63 et seq., 77 et passim; G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System, pp. 102 et seq.; A.M. Pacon (1996), What will TRIPS Do for Developing Countries?, in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (Eds.), From GATT to TRIPS, pp. 329, 335 et seq.; P. Katzenberger (1996), TRIPS and Copyright Law, in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (Eds.), From GATT to TRIPS, pp. 59 et seq.

  34. 34.

    Article 2 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 1883; Article 5 Berne Convention for the Protection of Works of Literature and the Arts of 9 September 1886.

  35. 35.

    TRIPS, Preamble, recital 2, lit. b).

  36. 36.

    TRIPS, Preamble, recital 2, lit. c).

  37. 37.

    At the time mainly the East Asian “Tiger States”, then not yet being considered as “emerging markets”, but as emerging rivals.

  38. 38.

    See only R. Knaak (1988), National and International Efforts Against Trademark Counterfeiting – A Progress Report, 19 IIC 1988, 581; E. Vermulst et al. (1988), Counterfeiting in GATT, the EEC and the Netherlands, Searching for New Remedies, Leg. Iss. Eur. Integr. 1988, 61. Counterfeiting had already been suggested as a topic for the Tokyo Round, see Ch. Bail (1990), Das Profil einer neuen Welthandelsordnung: Was bringt die Uruguay Runde?, EuZW 1990, 468 with references. While at the time it failed to make its way into a code, it definitely was on the subjects list of the Punta del Este Declaration. In fact, an Anti-Counterfeiting Code would have been accepted even by TRIPS-reluctant developing countries, see J. Croome (1995), Reshaping the World Trading System – A History of the Uruguay Round, pp. 11 et seq., 225.

  39. 39.

    See Leutwiler–Report in A. Dunkel (1987), Trade Policies for a Better Future – The “Leutwiler Report”, the GATT and the Uruguay Round, pp. 11, 18 et seq.; Declaration of Punta del Este, sub I.A(iii). The link to intellectual property is missing in the Leutwiler-Report just as (or because) nowhere does it take account of the role of multi-national companies as the main actors of international trade. Given that the role of these undertakings had been a main point of discussion and controversy in the late sixties and the seventies of the last century, this lacuna actually is a deficit of the Leutwiler-Report.

  40. 40.

    For the following see also W. Cornish & K. Liddell (2015), The Origins and Structure of the TRIPS Agreement, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 3 (this volume); P. Roffe (2015), Overview of the Normsetting Developments in the New TRIPS World, in A. Autenne et al. (Eds.), Droit, Économie et Valeurs, Hommage à B. Remiche, p. 673 et passim. Other agreements regulating the market “behind the border” are the TBT-Agreement and, most important, the GATS Agreement, see infra Sect. 2.3.3. However, the GATS Agreement has not held its promises precisely because of its claim to behind the border-regulation, see supra n. 18, infra n. 142.

  41. 41.

    Certainly not if the protection of intellectual property is advocated on grounds of natural rights/human rights, because then it is a matter of law, not of trade. This is not the place to discuss the legitimacy and limits of intellectual property in the former respect; for a short to the point discussion from a trade perspective see M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, pp. 515 et seq. A broader discussion would have to start with P. Drahos (1996), A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, passim; and would lead into the labyrinth of constitutional law.

  42. 42.

    See H. Ullrich (1996), Technology Protection According to TRIPS: Principles and Problems, in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (Eds.), From GATT to TRIPS, p. 357, 361 et passim, with references.

  43. 43.

    TRIPS Agreement, Preamble, 1st recital.

  44. 44.

    See The Intellectual Property Committee (USA), Keidanren (Japan), UNICEC (Europe), Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property – Statement of Views of the European, Japanese and United States Business Communities, June 1988, reprinted in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (1989), GATT or WIPO – New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property, p. 355. The Intellectual Property Committee grouped 13 major U.S. multinational companies mainly from the pharmaceutical and information industries. For the increasing involvement and influence of industry as regards strengthening of international intellectual property in general and the TRIPS Agreement in particular see D. Matthews (2002), Globalizing Intellectual Property Rights the TRIPS Agreement, p. 12 et passim.

  45. 45.

    See the Suggestion by the United States for Achieving the Negotiation Objective, MTN. GNG/NG 11/W/14 of 20 October 1987 and MTN. GNG/NG 11/W/16 of 17 October 1988 in F. -K. Beier & G. Schricker (1989), GATT or WIPO – New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property, pp. 187, 203. The EU followed only slowly, see Guidelines proposed by the European Community for the negotiations on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, MTN.GNG/nG117W/16 of 19 November 1987, reprinted in ibid., p. 203.

  46. 46.

    Part of this is the “technology transfer” debate, see P.-T. Stoll (1994), Technologietransfer – Internationalisierungs- und Nationalisierungstendenzen, passim, regarding a revision of the Paris Convention, p. 235 et passim; P.G. Sampoth & P. Roffe (2012), Unpacking the International Technology Transfer Debate: Fifty Years and Beyond, ICTSD Discussion Paper; for a summary presentation P. Roffe & T. Tesfachew (2001), The Unfinished Agenda, in S. Patel, P. Roffe & A. Yusuf (Eds.), International Technology Transfer: The Origins and Aftermath of the United Nations Negotiations on a Draft Code of Conduct, pp. 381, 386 et seq.

  47. 47.

    With the cold war ending and the general economic liberalization beginning, political and/or ideological cohesion between the developing countries (and their allies outside WIPO or GATT) also loosened, see A.M. Pacon (1996), What will TRIPS Do for Developing Countries?, in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (Eds.), From GATT to TRIPS, pp. 332 et seq.

  48. 48.

    As evidenced by ever stricter and broader, yet unsatisfactory border control regulation, see for the EU lately Regulation (EU) No. 608/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 June 2013 concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1383/2003, OJEU 2013 l 181, 15; Th. Jaeger et al. (2010), Statement of the Max Planck-Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law on Customs Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 41 IIC 2010, 674; S. Rinnert (2014), Die neue Customs-IP-Enforcement-Verordnung, GRUR 2014, 241. See also infra n. 127.

  49. 49.

    See J.A. Young et al. (1985), Global Competition – The New Reality, Vol. II of the Report of the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, pp. 8 et passim, 59 et passim, 91 et seq.; 303 et passim; S. Ostry & R. Nelson (1995), Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism, pp. 1 et passim; R. Norton (1986), Industrial Policy and American Renewal, 24 JEL 1986, 1.

  50. 50.

    See J.A. Young et al. (1985), Global Competition – The New Reality, Vol. II of the Report of the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, pp. 59 et seq., 253 et seq., 304 et seq. Recurrent themes are linking university and industry research, increasing both public and private Rand D–spending, facilitating joint Rand D by industry by the National Cooperative Research Act, and enhancing intellectual property for cutting-edge technology (e.g. biotechnology, computer hardware and software, aircraft), an infamous illustration being semi-conductor technology, whose protection the U.S. imposed globally by virtue of the reciprocity principle, but whose importance was to vanish within a few years completely as a result of technological change, see E.-P. Heilein (2002), Die Bedeutung des Rechtsschutzes für integrierte Halbleiterschaltkreise in der Praxis, passim.

  51. 51.

    See for the expansion of the EU research and technology policy by framework programs L. Guzetti (1995), A Brief History of European Research Policy, pp. 71 et passim; for the facilitation of cooperative Rand D by industry through exempting categories of cooperation agreements from the application of Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 85 TEC) by way of so-called group (or block) exemption regulations, see H. Ullrich (1988), Kooperative Forschung und Kartellrecht – eine Kritik der Wettbewerbsaufsicht über die Forschungsgemeinschaften in den USA, der EWG und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, passim, comparing the U.S., the EU and the German approaches at the time. As regards intellectual property protection, the major moves at the time (in addition to the modernization of trademark law by the Directive 89/104/EC of 21 December 1988 on the approximation of the law of trade marks, OJEC 1989 L 40, 1 (now Directive 2008/95/EC of 22 October 2008, OJEU 2008 L 299/25) and the introduction of the Community Trade Mark by Reg. 40/94 of 20 December 1993, OJEC 1994 L 11, 1 (now Reg. 207/2009 of 26 February 2009, OJEU 2009 L 78, 1) were the adoption of Directive 91/250 EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, OJEC 1991, l 122, 2 (now Directive 2009/24/EC of 23 April 2009, OJEU 2009 L 111, 16) and the Directive 92/100 EEC of 19 November 1992 on the rental right and lending right and on certain copyright related rights in the field of intellectual property, OJEC 1992 L 246, 61 (now Directive 2006/115/EC of 12 December 2006, OJEU 2000 L 376, 28).

  52. 52.

    See references supra n. 49.

  53. 53.

    See J.A. Young et al. (1985), Global Competition – The New Reality, Vol. II of the Report of the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, p. 324 et passim; see also A. Otten (1995), Improving the Playing Field for Exports: The Agreement on Intellectual Property, Investment Measures and Government Procurement, in Th. Cottier (Ed.), GATT-Uruguay Round: Nine Papers, p. 72. The problem with this argument is the implicit assumption that export markets somehow “belong” to the owner of intellectual property rights in that they should yield protected profits in the same way as does the domestic market (to which these profits would then be “repatriated”). The proper substance of the argument is that it points to risks of distorted competition, which become relevant when geographic markets are no longer seen as separate but as – economically, if not legally – integrated.

  54. 54.

    According to OECD (1996), Globalization of Industry – Overview and Sector Reports, pp. 22 et passim, it is due to globalization that international trade had changed in that high technology and high wage industries had spread across more countries, international sourcing of intermediate products had taken an increasing share of international trade (50–70 % of manufactured imports) and had risen more rapidly than domestic sourcing. Also intra-firm trade had grown rapidly (1/3 of U.S. trade; 43 % on average of US–EU merchandise trade, 71 % of US–Japan merchandise trade); i.e., market transactions were replaced by international transactions within the (multi-national) firm. Inter-industry trade (meaning trade between countries within the same industry group) also grew typically for major countries from around 50 % in 1970 to 70 % and beyond in 1990. All this meant that “In the future trade will be structured particularly by strategies in high technology, knowledge-intensive industries that reflect the importance of local supply relationships, the necessity for firms to be close to markets for final products and to highly control trade in intermediate products” (ibid. p. 31). The Report also notes (pp. 41 et seq.) globalization of Rand D and technology (e.g. high Rand D intensity of foreign subsidiaries, p. 42, fig. 1.3), and strong trends of foreign direct investment due to technology-related factors (pp. 31 et seq.) and due to international inter-firm collaboration, including technology-based strategic alliances (pp. 43 et seq., table 1.18: 1660 in information technology alone out of a total of 4182, the main factor being technological complementarity (30–40 %) and market access (up to 50 %)). See also S. Ostry & R. Nelson (1995), Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism, p. 10 et passim, and infra n. 134.

  55. 55.

    As regards bi-lateral or regional (free) trade agreements, the prototype was Chapter 17 (Articles 1701–1721 with annexes) of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was negotiated in parallel with the TRIPS Agreement by Canada, Mexico and the USA and concluded on 17 December 1992 (32 Int’l-Lag. Mat. 1993, 605), see I. Govaere (1997), Convergence, Divergence and Interaction of Regional Trade Agreements and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in P. Demaret et al. (Eds.), Regionalism and Multilateralism After the Uruguay Round, pp. 465, 479 et seq.

  56. 56.

    See J.A. Young et al. (1985), Global Competition – The New Reality, Vol. II of the Report of the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, p. 344 et passim, analyzing the strategic advantages of various uni-, bi- and multi-lateral approaches.

  57. 57.

    See M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, pp. 524 et seq.; M. Haedicke (1997), Urheberrecht und die Handelspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, p. 76 et passim.

  58. 58.

    In that respect, the DSU (supra n. 28) constitutes a good compromise between outright retaliation for breach of an international trade agreement and non-availability of practically effective sanctions at all, as is the case for international intellectual property conventions.

  59. 59.

    See M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, pp. 4 et seq.; A. Lowenfeld (2002), International Economic Law, pp. 7 et seq.; St. Oeter (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, § 1, no. 5 with references; WTO (2009), World Trade Report 2008 – Trade in a Globalizing World, p. 70 (with p. 65, Box 8).

  60. 60.

    Pro-innovation rankings of States mirror such institutional competition. As regards intellectual property, see Taylor Wessing Global Intellectual Property Indices, 4th Report 2013.

  61. 61.

    The “development issue” is outside the scope of this paper. Its assessment varies considerably over time and with the countries considered or the perspective of the authors, see for early assessments A.M. Pacon (1996), What will TRIPS Do for Developing Countries?, in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (Eds.), From GATT to TRIPS, p. 329 et passim; UNCTAD (1997), The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries, UNCTAD/ITE/1 of May 1997; recently R.M. Olwan (2013), Intellectual Property and Development: Theory and Practice, passim; P.K. Yu (2011), Are Developing Countries Playing a Better Game?, 16 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 2011, 311; D. Gervais (2009), (Re)Implementing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to Foster Innovation, 12 J. W. Intell. Prop. 2009, 348; for excellent analytical surveys see A. Peukert (2014), Immaterialgüterrecht und Entwicklung, in Ph. Dann et al. (Eds.), Entwicklung und Recht: Eine systematische Einführung, p. 189; S. Sell (2011), Everything Old is New Again: The Development Agenda Then and Now, 3 WIPO J. 2011, 17; for a review of literature see E. Hassan et al. (2010), Intellectual Property and Developing Countries. See also infra n. 155.

  62. 62.

    For the combined influence a few developed countries and multinational enterprises exercise on international trade regulation, in particular on TRIPS see supra n. 44; P. Drahos (2002), Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting, 5 J. W. Intell. Prop. 2002, 765; P. Drahos (2004), The Regulation of Public Goods, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2004, 321.

  63. 63.

    Which, of course, it also frequently is, the most prominent example being presented by the problems of access to affordable medicines. While the many specific issues (others are climate change, energy supply, etc.) cannot be dealt with here (as to access to essential medicines see the contributions by F. Abott et al. (2005), in K. Maskus & J. Reichman (Eds.), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, Part III, Sect. 1; O. Aginam et al. (2013), The Global Governance of the HIV/AIDS – Intellectual Property and Access to Essential Medicines; G. Dutfield (2008), Delivering Drugs to the Poor: Will the TRIPS Amendment Help?, 34 Am. J.L. & Med. 2008, 1; D. Matthews (2011), When Framing Meets Law: Using Human Rights as a Practical Instrument to Facilitate Access to Medicines in Developing Countries, 3 WIPO J. 2011, 113), it may be noted that they tend to divert attention from the general problem as they may be tackled, albeit not solved, in their own terms either in TRIPS (see the “Doha Waiver” resulting in Article 31bis TRIPS, for details UNCTAD–ICTSD (2005), Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, pp. 44 et seq., 489 et seq.; J. Watal (2011), From Punta del Este to Doha and Beyond: Lessons from the TRIPS Negotiation Processes, 3 WIPO J. 2011, 24, 28 et passim; K. Paas (2009), Compulsory Licensing under the TRIPS Agreement: A Cruel Taunt for Developing Countries?, 31 E.I.P.R. 2009, 609; J. Wakely (2011), Compulsory Licensing under TRIPS: An Effective Tool to Increase Access to Medicines in Developing and Least Developed Countries?, 33 E.I.P.R. 2011, 299; J. Wakely (2011), The Impact of External Factors on the Effectiveness of Compulsory Licensing as a Means of Increasing Access to Medicines in Developing Countries, 33 E.I.P.R. 2011, 756; M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, pp. 546 et seq.) or on the national level by using TRIPS “flexibilities” (see infra section “TRIPS Flexibilities”). As regards, e.g. “evergreening” of patents see Novartis AG v. Union of India, 6 SCC 2013, 1 = GRUR Int. 2013, 902.

  64. 64.

    See H. Ullrich (2012), Intellectual Property: Exclusive Rights for a Purpose – the Case of Technology Protection by Patents and Copyright, in K. Klafkowska – Wasniowska et al. (Eds.), Problemy Polskiego i Europejskiego Prawa Priwatnego (Contributions in Honour of M. Kepinski); for the factors determining the necessary and necessarily country-specific policy mix see M. Perez Pugatch (2011), Intellectual Property Policy Making in the 21st Century, 3 WIPO J. 2011, 71.

  65. 65.

    This is not a matter of preventing intellectual property-related restrictions of competition, but of establishing and maintaining competitively functioning markets as a systemic pre-requisite to the satisfactory operation of property rights as a means of allocating resources for efficient, welfare-enhancing use, see H. Ullrich (2011), Intellectual Property, Access to Information, and Antitrust: Harmony, Disharmony and International Harmonization in R. Dreyfuss et al. (Eds.), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property, pp. 365, 371 et seq.

  66. 66.

    Even leaving aside the fundamental problem of whether, e.g. patents help to stimulate or only to defend innovation, any fine-tuning of the systemic operation of protection by exclusive rights poses enough questions, see only D. Burk & M. Lemley (2009), Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 2009, 1575; M. Carroll (2010), American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2010–07; G. Van Overwalle (2011), Policy Levers Tailoring Patent Law to Biotechnology: Comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 1 U.Cal. Irvine L. Rev. 2011, 435. For the related debate on TRIPS flexibilities see infra section “TRIPS Flexibilities”.

  67. 67.

    For the dissatisfaction with the “bargain” struck see references infra n. 81, 137. The socio-political dimensions of the “trade approach” are outside the scope of this paper, see P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite (2002), Information Feudalism – Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, pp. 11 et seq., 187 et passim.

  68. 68.

    For the following see M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, p. 514 et passim; J. Drexl (2015), The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 53 (this volume) (at Sect. 4).

  69. 69.

    Similar lines of argument apply to all incentive-oriented forms of intellectual property following an innovation rationale, such as the protection of designs, of plant varieties and software and databases (the latter with an inappropriate copyright twist). As regards trademarks (incentive to invest in distribution), the analyses needs modification (no term of protection), and so does the analysis of general copyright. However, in essence, the problem of over-protection v. under-protection with the ensuing trade off- issues exists for all intellectual property rights, see for a general presentation K. Maskus (2000), Intellectual Property Rights in the Economy, p. 28 et passim; for an excellent summary P. David (1993), Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda’s Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History, in M. Wallerstein (Ed.), Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, p. 19.

  70. 70.

    See in particular S. Scotchmer (2004), Innovation and Incentives, p. 97 et passim.

  71. 71.

    See L. Bently (2011), Exclusions from Patentability and Exceptions to Patentee’s Rights: Taking Exceptions Seriously, 64 Current Legal Problems 2011, 315; and the special studies in WIPO (2010), Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Exclusions from Patentability and Exceptions and Limitations to Patentee’s Rights, SCP/15/3, Annexes I to VI.

  72. 72.

    For the possibilities and systemic limits of “tailoring” intellectual property protection, see references supra n. 66. Clearly, the costs of a misfit are magnified, where a system of protection misses not only the characteristics of a technology or the needs of an industry, but the structure of a national economy altogether.

  73. 73.

    According to M. Finger (2007), Implementation and Imbalance. Dealing with Hangover from the Uruguay Round, 23 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 2007, 440, 443, for many developing countries “the new obligation to pay for intellectual property that the old rules allowed them to use without paying is several times larger than the gain they will enjoy from the entire Uruguay Round of trade liberalization”. A. Peukert (2014), Immaterialgüterrecht und Entwicklung, in Ph. Dann et al. (Eds.), Entwicklung und Recht: Eine systematische Einführung, p. 189 concludes that, in the absence of positive effects on domestic development – e.g. in least developed countries –, the better choice is not to introduce a system of protection at all, since this would allow avoiding the social costs that come with it in any case.

  74. 74.

    See M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, p. 58.

  75. 75.

    Such as that proposed by A. Deardorff (1990), Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Countries?, 13 World Econ. 1990, 497, who questions that extending intellectual property protection to all countries would necessarily enhance global welfare. In essence, his argument is that the incentive gains in poor developing countries are not large enough to outweigh the losses from forgone competition by imitation/cheaper supply of consumers. Basically, this is a tradeoff-argument similar to that underlying patent protection in general. The obvious problem again is to empirically determine in advance which countries qualify for what, given that there must be a limit, that economies change, and that intellectual property systems need time to be established or reformed, and that they do unfold their effects only over time.

  76. 76.

    Commonly referred to as “TRIPS flexibilities”, see infra section “TRIPS Flexibilities”.

  77. 77.

    See K. Maskus (2000), Intellectual Property Rights in the Economy, p. 143 et passim, 181 et passim.

  78. 78.

    In terms of a well-functioning educational systems, a sufficient science base, an appropriate infrastructure and adequate, possibly also compensatory market regulation, see only K. Maskus (2000), Intellectual Property Rights in the Economy, p. 199 et passim.

  79. 79.

    The divide between some Asian and Latin American countries, and, e.g. African countries, immediately comes to mind, see for empirical estimates K. Maskus (2000), Intellectual Property Rights in the Economy, pp. 186 et seq.; P.K. Yu (2013), The Rise of China and Other Middle Intellectual Property Powers, Drake Univ. School of Law, Occasional Papers in Intellectual Property Law No. 8, passim; generally WTO (2014), World Trade Report, p. 52 et passim.

  80. 80.

    See for rent transfers mainly to the U.S.A., to a lesser, still considerable degree to Germany K. Maskus (2000), Intellectual Property Rights in the Economy, pp. 181 et seq.

  81. 81.

    Much of the dissatisfaction of developing countries led them to push the “Doha Development Agenda” within the current round of trade negotiations, see S. Hörmann (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, § 32 nos. 2 et passim.

  82. 82.

    Contra J. Straus (2012), A Marriage of Convenience: World Economy and Intellectual Property from 1990 to 2012, 40 AIPLA Qu. J. 2012, 633. The author finds growth rates to be positive for 1999 to 2011 across all countries (from which level?), but does not correlate them with intellectual property statistics, presumably precisely because he assumes no direct interdependency between the level of intellectual property protection and other WTO-advantages (see ibid., pp. 664 et seq.). Although, in this respect his position is not quite clear, in his view the “marriage of convenience” seems to consist of accepting a sub-optimal intellectual property regime in exchange for some other benefits, so a sacrifice to be compensated by other gains. Yet Straus also notes that “ironically, improving the enforcement of IP rights in the developing world and hence increasing the attractiveness of the location, may (and probably has) adversely affected the national economies of the developed world” (p. 665). These are no comforting conclusions. After all, one would tend to expect optimizing the intellectual property system everywhere would best reflect comparative advantages and thus maximize both global and local welfare.

  83. 83.

    See M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, p. 7. The contribution of foreign trade to GDP varies considerably from country to country (USA: ~ 25 %: D. ~ 75 %; EU: ~ 33 %), see Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (2013), Fakten zum deutschen Außenhandel 2012. It is heavily influenced by trade in intermediate products/global value chains, see infra n. 134, 136.

  84. 84.

    As all textbooks remind us, it is firms, not States, which trade (A. Lowenfeld (2002), International Economic Law, p. 7; M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, p. 4). Indeed, in the case of TRIPS, it is industry, which pushed for its benefits, see references supra n. 44

  85. 85.

    See UNCTAD (1997), The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries, p. 32 et passim (nos. 123 et passim); J. Reichman (1996–1997), From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 NYU J. Int.’l L.Pol. 27 et seq. (1997); J. Reichmann & D. Lange (1998), Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. L., 21 et seq. (1998).

  86. 86.

    For instance, in addition to copyright protection of databases, the EU has introduced a sui generis form of protection (Articles 7 et seq. Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases), which pursuant to Article 11 of the Directive will be extended to non-EU nationals/residents on the basis of reciprocity only. For a discussion of the rule’s compatibility with TRIPS see G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System, pp. 92 et seq.

  87. 87.

    See Articles 13, 17, 26(2), 30 TRIPS. As regards more particularly Article 17, see Ch. Geiger, J. Griffiths & R. Hilty (2008), Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 39 IIC 2008, 707; A. Kur (2011), Limitations and exceptions under the three-step test – how much room to walk the middle ground?, in A. Kur (Ed.), Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System – Proposals for Reform, pp. 208, 222 et passim.

  88. 88.

    See references supra n. 85; M. Lamping (2014), Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, 45 IIC 2014, 679.

  89. 89.

    E.g., the principle of exhaustion, which Article 6 exempts from the dispute settlement mechanism, if not from TRIPS altogether (see UNCTAD–ICTSD (2005), Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, pp. 104 et seq.) or the matter of compulsory licensing of patents, which Article 31 essentially subjects to procedural constraints only. For the different national approaches, see H. Ullrich (2014), Compulsory Licenses Under Patent Law: European Concepts, in W. Kaal et al. (Eds.), Festschrift Chr. Kirchner, p. 399 and the contributions in R.M. Hilty & K.-Ch. Liu (2015), Compulsory Licensing – Practical Experiences and Ways Forward, passim.

  90. 90.

    See A. Slade (2011), Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement: A Force for Convergence with the International IP System, 14 J.W. Intell. Prop. 2011, 413; H. Grosse Ruse-Kahn (2011), Assessing the Need for a General Public Interest Exception in the TRIPS Agreement, in A. Kur (Ed.), Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System – Proposals for Reform, p. 167 et passim.

  91. 91.

    See in particular A. Kur et al. (2011), Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System – Proposals for Reform, p. 455 et passim, 526 et passim; G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System, passim. There are, of course, many other suggestions to review TRIPS, such as to make it at least work more “objectively”, see inter alia F. Abbott (2005), Toward a New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field of TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism, 8 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2005, 77. However, the purpose of this paper is too modest to examine all of them.

  92. 92.

    Thus, G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System, p. 5 et passim, object to a widely held view of TRIPS as a “code” of international intellectual property protection.

  93. 93.

    It is, indeed, not simply “the owner v. the others”, see ibid., p. 9 referring to the “vertical dilemma” of sequential innovation/creation (see also supra n. 70).

  94. 94.

    See also references supra n. 69.

  95. 95.

    G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System, p. 10 et passim; see also infra Sect. 2.3.3.

  96. 96.

    See A. Kur et al. (2011), Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System – Proposals for Reform, pp. 535 et seq. (amendment Article 8(1), p. 464); G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System, pp. 9 et seq., 111 et seq., 152 et seq. For the increasing emphasis in literature on respecting other public interests see M. Lewin (2011), The pendulum keeps swinging – present discussions on and around the TRIPS Agreement in A. Kur (Ed.), Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System – Proposals for Reform, p. 3, 25 et passim.

  97. 97.

    Thus, G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System, p. 145, et passim, 174 et passim, propose some form of integrated international law-making that would associate WTO, WIPO and other international organizations such as WHO, and they want to see an “international acquis” of common principles of intellectual property to be recognized.

  98. 98.

    See the amendments to TRIPS proposed by A. Kur et al. (2011), Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System – Proposals for Reform, p. 455 et passim.

  99. 99.

    G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System, pp. 115 et seq., also advocate for more respect of State self-determination and of the (democratic) particularities of national law-making.

  100. 100.

    See the plea by G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System p. 49 et passim, for a more subtle or circumspect review of the compatibility of national law with TRIPS, if not for some “judicial self-restraint”.

  101. 101.

    See ECJ, Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland, C-414/11, EU:C:2013:520, nos. 40 et seq., overriding ECJ, Merck Genéricos Produtos Farmacêuticos, C-431/05, EU:C:2007:496, nos. 41 et seq., 47; ECJ, Schieving-Nijstad and others, C-89/99, EU:C:2001:438, nos. 51 et seq. with references to prior decisions. For national case law see conclusions Advocate General Cruz Villalon of 31 January 2013 in case ECJ, Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland, C-414/11, EU:C:2013:520, nos. 83 et seq. See also L. Ankersmith (2014), The scope of the Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: The Daiichi Sankyo and Conditional Access Services Grand Chamber Judgments, 41 Legal Iss. Econ. Integr. 2014, 193; G. Tritton (2008), Intellectual Property in Europe, sub. 1–071.

  102. 102.

    See G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System, p. 49 et passim; contra: J. Pauwelyn (2010), The Dog That Barked But Didn’t Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. Int’l. Dispute Settlement 2010, 389.

  103. 103.

    See H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2008), A Pirate of the Caribbean? The Attraction of Suspending TRIPS Obligations, 11 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2008, 313; F. Abbott (2009), Cross Retaliation in TRIPS: Options for Developing Countries, ICTSD Issue Paper No. 8, passim; Ph. Coppens & H. Culot (2015), La Suspension de l’Accord ADPIC comme sanction de la violation des règles de l’OMC, in A. Autenne et al. (Eds.), Droit, Économie et Valeurs, Hommage à B. Remiche, p. 719.

  104. 104.

    See H. Grosse Ruse-Khan et al. (2013), Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 44 IIC 2013, 878, with introduction by H. Grosse Ruse-Khan, ibid. p. 873 and complementary contributions by several authors.

  105. 105.

    See supra n. 55 regarding NAFTA.

  106. 106.

    See generally Huawein He (2010), The Development of Free Trade Agreements and International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO Era – New Bilateralism and Its Future, 41 IIC 2010, 253; for USA agreements M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, pp. 561 et seq. (with a systematic overview in table 14.2); G. Krikorian & D. Szymkowiak (2007), Intellectual Property Rights in the Making: The Evolution of Intellectual Property Provisions in USA Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines, 10 J. W. Intell. Prop. 2007, 388; H. Rangel-Ortiz (2014), Patent and Trademark Rights in Commercial Agreements entered by the United States with Latin American Nations in the First Decade of the Twenty-first Century: Divide et Vinces, in G. Ghidini et al. (Eds.), TRIPS and Developing Countries, p. 72. For the EU see B. Melo Aranjo (2013), Intellectual Property and the EU’s Deep Trade Agenda, 16 J. Int’l. Econ. L. 2013, 439; M. Santa Cruz (2007), Intellectual Property Provisions in European Union Trade Agreements, ICTSD Issue Paper, p. 20; D. Matthews (2010), The Lisbon Treaty, Trade Agreements and the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 32 E.I.P.R. 2010, 104, and the contributions in J. Drexl et al. (2014), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse.

  107. 107.

    Article 1(1, 2nd sentence) TRIPS addresses “more extensive protection” on the national level only, so as a matter of national intellectual property protection for the domestic markets and its needs. By contrast, the bilateral agreements raise issues as to their impact on TRIPS and, more generally, on international standards of intellectual property protection, see J.F. Morin (2009), Multilateralizing TRIPS-Plus Agreements: Is the USA-Strategy a Failure?, 12 J. W. Intell. Prop. 2009, 175; P. Roffe (2014), Intellectual Property Chapters in Free Trade Agreements: Their Significance and Systematic Implications, in J. Drexl et al. (Eds.), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse, pp. 10, 28 et seq.; H. Aleman (2014), Impact of TRIPS-Plus Obligations in Economic Partnership- and Free Trade Agreements in International IP Law, in J. Drexl et al. (Eds.), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse, p. 61.

  108. 108.

    See supra n. 106. As regards enforcement rules, see Th. Jaeger (2014), IP-Enforcement Provisions in EU Economic Partnership Agreements, in J. Drexl et al. (Eds.), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse, p. 189; X. Seuba (2013), Checks and Balances in the Intellectual Property Enforcement Field: Reconstructing EU Trade Agreements, in Ch. Geiger (Ed.), Constructing European Intellectual Property, p. 409, stressing that the FTAs of the EU provide for enforcement rules, which are even stricter than those of the EU Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.

  109. 109.

    See H. Grosse Ruse-Khan et al. (2013), Principles for Intellectual Property Protection in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 44 IIC 2013, 878, sub 1.3, 2.3 (no. 21); generally A. Kur & H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2011), Enough is Enough – The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection, in A. Kur (Ed.), Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System – Proposals for Reform, pp. 359, 375 et seq.; more pro-active than the former S. Frankel (2009), Challenging TRIPS-Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. Int’l. Econ. L. 2009, 1023; C. Correa (2014), The Impact of Economic Partnership Agreements on WTO Law, in J. Drexl et al. (Eds.), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse, p. 87.

  110. 110.

    That has also been this author’s perspective, see H. Ullrich (1996), GATT, Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Development, in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (Eds.), From GATT to TRIPS, p. 127.

  111. 111.

    Witness the fight over geographical indications (dear to the EU), over the protection of semi-conductor chips (once dear to the USA, see supra n. 50) or over the extent of database protection (dear to the EU, see supra n. 86). More generally, it is about the concepts governing implementation of the notions of protection and its exceptions as they determine the scope of actually available exclusivities (e.g. the U.S./EU divide as regards patent protection of computer programs). It would be interesting to compare in detail the TRIPS-plus requests made by the EU and the USA respectively, and to do so against the background of the controversies over the desirability/workability on their domestic markets of the kind of protection, which the USA and the EU claim with respect to their export markets (see also infra n. 129, 130).

  112. 112.

    As impressively advocated for by G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: Building a Resilient International Intellectual Property System, pp. 5 et seq., 10 et seq., et passim. While this is the better view, it looks at reality too idealistically.

  113. 113.

    This is a matter of how far the USA or the EU will or may go, given that many of the agreements do follow a development perspective and, thus, include rules on development support of various kinds, see for an assessment F. Abbott (2014), Trade Costs and Shadow Benefits: EU Economic Partnership Agreements as Models for Progressive. Development of International IP Law, in J. Drexl et al. (Eds.), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse, p. 159; K. Maskus (2014), Assessing the Development Promise of IP Provisions in EU Economic Partnership Agreements, in J. Drexl et al. (Eds.), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse, p. 171. Again, as with respect to TRIPS, the question is whether the costs of asymmetrically operating intellectual property protection may be balanced against other trade benefits or whether intellectual property protection should rather be considered as a regulation of and for domestic markets.

  114. 114.

    See infra Sect. 2.3.3.

  115. 115.

    The inherent difficulties of the trade issues, which are raised by agreements such as the TBT or GATS Agreements or precisely by TRIPS (see infra Sect. 2.3.3), are compounded by the diversity of the structures and of the interests of by now 161 WTO Members, i.e. more than twice the number of the 1994 Signatory States. Among trade lawyers, therefore, opinions are split as regards the pros and cons of the current tide of preferential trade agreements of all sorts, see for the diversity of views S. Hörmann (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, §31, passim (in particular nos. 60 et seq.), § 32, nos. 5 et passim; M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, pp. 87 et seq., 95 et seq.; R. Senti (2013), Regionale Freihandelsabkommen, p. 231 et passim; E.-U. Petersmann (2014), Multilateral Governance Problems of the World Trading System beyond the WTO Conference at Bali, 17 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2014, 233; K. Heydon (2014), Plurilateral Agreements and Global Trade Governance: A Lesson from the OECD, 48 J.W.T. 2014, 1039.

  116. 116.

    See WIPO (2014), World Intellectual Property Indicators 2013, p. 6 (growth rate worldwide in 2011/2012 for patents 9 %, for marks 6 %, for designs 17 %, with PR China having the highest growth rates: 24 %, 16.5 %, 26.1 % respectively as compared to the USA: 7.8 %, 4 % (no designs indicated) or to the EU (EPO/OHIM) with 4 %, 3.2 %, 12 %). From 1995 to 2012 patent applications worldwide rose almost continuously from barely over a million to 2.35 million, with PR China and the USA contributing by far the most to growth (ibid. p. 46, Fig. A. 1.1.1, A 1.1.2). These numbers must be put in relation to the number of patent families, which rose from about 500.000 to about 1 Mio. during the same period (ibid. p. 63, Fig. A.4.1). For trademarks, the overall growth of application numbers (from 4.45 Mio to 6.4 Mio all classes counted) and growth rates (2004–2013) are lower (ranging from 4.2 % to 6.4 % with −5 % in 2009, thus showing a clear correlation to economic cycles), ibid., pp. 101 et seq., Fig. B. 1.1.1 (applications), B. 1.21 (registrations). As to designs, from 2004–2013 the number of applications has more than doubled (from 600,000 to over 1.2. Mio), and so has the number of registrations, with PR China heavily influencing the trend (ibid., pp. 138 et seq., Fig. C.1.1.1, C. 1.2.1).

  117. 117.

    See for trademarks and designs, where emerging countries (India, Brazil, PR China) have come to be major stakeholders, WIPO (2014), World Intellectual Property Indicators 2013, p. 102, 106 (trademarks: Fig. B.2.1.2.), 143 (designs: Fig. C.2.1.2), with China’s contribution being always by far the highest.

  118. 118.

    See for the top 5 (PR China, USA, Japan, Korea, EPO) and top 20 countries (Germany, Russian Federation, India, Canada, Brazil, Australia, UK, France, etc in ranking order, with EPC countries counted separately only as to patent applications filed nationally), WIPO (2014), World Patent Indicators 2013, pp. 51 et seq., Fig. A.2.12, A.2.1.3. For the top 5, which cooperate as Five IP Offices (IP5), see IP5 Statistics Report 2013, passim. Other national patent offices also cooperate internationally. For the “Global Patent Prosecution Highway”, which provides for accelerated examination of international patent filings, 17 patent offices collaborate, mainly those of the top 20 group.

  119. 119.

    See WIPO (2014), World Intellectual Property Indicators 2013, pp. 47 et seq., Fig. A.1.1.3 (applications, the share of non-resident applications varying between 35–40 %), Fig. 1.1.2.3 (grants, shares of grants to non-residents around 39 %). The shares are heavily influenced by the respective increases in the PR China; see also for details IP5-Statistics Report 2013, p. 30 et passim. For a general trend of a geographic, but clustered spread of technology leaders in terms of RandD efforts and patenting activity see WTO (2013), World Trade Report 2013 – Factors Shaping the Future World Trade, pp. 152 et seq.

  120. 120.

    See WIPO (2014), World Intellectual Property Indicators 2013, p. 52, Table A.2.1.1: high-income countries have a share of world total applications of 78.5 % (2007) resp. 64.5 % (2012) and upper-middle income countries one of 17.7 % (2007) resp. 32.1 % (2012) with 17.9 % growth; if China is excluded, it is only a 4.6 % share in 2007 and 4.3 % share in 2012. By contrast, lower middle-income countries and low-income countries have shares of 3.3 % (2007), 2.9 % (2012) and 0.5 % (2007), 0.4 % (2012) resp., with growth rates of 2.5 % (2007) or 3.8 % (2012). For trademarks high-income countries had 58.7 % (2007) and 47.% (2012), upper-middle-income countries 30.3 % (2007) and 42 % (2012) including China; low middle-income countries and low-income countries 9.8 % (2007) and 9.4 % (2012) resp. 1.2 % in 2007 and 2012 (ibid. p. 105, table b.2.1.1). For designs, the picture is similar (ibid. p. 142, table C.2.1.1).

  121. 121.

    Patent propensity and growth rates vary from industry to industry and over time, with communication technologies showing a steady increase and large numbers, possibly in view of their specific forms of exploitation (standardization and pooling), see for 2007 – 2011: WIPO (2014), World Intellectual Property Indicators 2013, pp. 66 et seq., for 1980–2011; EPO (2014), Patent Information News 2014 (March), p. 7.

  122. 122.

    Catchwords are the use of patents, but also of trademarks as assets, exploitation by licensing as a main rather than a fringe business, use of patents in (open) standardization and in many forms of (open) innovation by international cooperation, see WIPO (2012), World Intellectual Property Report 2011 – The Changing Face of Innovation, pp. 23 et passim; D. Somaya & D. Teece (2008), Patents, Licensing, and Entrepreneurship: Effectuating Innovation in Multi-Invention Contexts, in D. Teece (Ed.), The Transfer and Licensing of Knowhow and Intellectual Property, p. 123.

  123. 123.

    In regard of patents, the typical considerations are the costs of acquiring and maintaining patents, the availability of effective means of protection and monitoring problems, the locations of actual or of potential imitators (competitors or users) etc., see only A. Pham et al. (2010), Identifying the Optimal Global Patent Protection Strategy, 2010/2 VPP-Rundbrief 77; G. Weber et al. (2007), Patentstrategien, p. 17 et passim.

  124. 124.

    For the rapidly changing composition of the groups of developed, emerging and developing countries, and, as a result, of the power relations between countries, as symbolized by the rise of BRIC, see WTO (2014), World Trade Report 2014 – Trade and Development: Recent Trends and the Role of the WTO, p. 54 et passim.

  125. 125.

    One model strategy for such counter-attack had been developed by Japan, see O. Granstrand (1999), The Economics and Management of Intellectual Property, p. 134 et passim, 218 et passim. Note that in 2013 Samsung had become the top ranking patent applicant at both the USPTO and the EPO, with Huawei ranking 11, see EPO (2013), Annual Report 2013, Top 25 applicants, with indication of origin; Intellectual Property Owners, TOP 300 Organizations Granted US Patents in 2012 (Samsung 2nd rank with 5.043 patents, IBM being first with 6.457 patents). While the individual ranking changes over time, and has changed since, the composition of the lead group of patent applicants and of patentees tends to remain fairly stable.

  126. 126.

    Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the EU has systematically up-graded its system of intellectual property protection, generally with the explicit aim of enhancing its international competitiveness: Directive 98/44 of July 1988 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (JOEC 1998 L 213,13); the introduction of supplementary certificates for medicinal and phyto-sanitary products (Reg. 1798/92 of 18 June 1992, JOEC 1992 L 182,1 – now Reg. 469/2009 of 6 May 2009, OJEC 2009 L 152,1 and Reg. 1610/96 of 23 July 1996, OJEC 1996 L 198/30); Reg. 2100/94 of the Council of 27 July 1994 on the protection of Community Plant Variety Rights (OJEC 1994 L 227,1); Directive 98/71/EC of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of designs (OJEC 1998 L 289, 28); Reg. 6/2002 of the Council of 12 December 2001 on the Community Design (OJEC 2002 L 3, 1); Directive 93/98/EC of 29 October 1993 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (OJEC 1993 L 290, 9, now Directive 2006/116/EC of 12 December 2006, OJ EU 2006 L 372, 12); Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases (OJEC 1996 L 77, 20); Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJEC 2001 L 167,10); Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (OJEC 2004 L 157, 45); see also supra n. 51 and H. Ullrich (2012), Intellectual Property: Exclusive Rights for a Purpose – the Case of Technology Protection by Patents and Copyright, in K. Klafkowska–Wasniowska et al. (Eds.), Problemy Polskiego i Europejskiego Prawa Priwatnego (Contributions in Honour of M. Kepinski), p. 433 et passim (sub III.).

  127. 127.

    See Articles 52 et seq. TRIPS; for the EU see supra n. 48. Whether such border control is equally effective everywhere may be another matter. Customs control statistics of the Commission show a steady and steep increase in the number of cases of alleged imports of counterfeit and pirated goods, but after years of fluctuation at high levels there is a sharp decline of the number of articles detained (see European Commission (2013), Report on EU Customs Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights – Results at the EU Border 2012, sub 4). These statistics show the increasing use intellectual property owners make of customs control to stop infringement. They do not testify to any broader phenomenon of non-acceptance of the intellectual property regime of TRIPS by market actors in the exporting countries, the less so as much of counterfeiting and piracy is attributed to organized crime (see European Commission (2014), Towards a Renewed Consensus on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: An EU Action Plan, COM(2014)392/2 of 1 July 2014).

  128. 128.

    As early as 1997, J. Reichman (1996–1997), From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 NYU J. Int.’l L.Pol., 27 et seq. (1997), stressed that TRIPS essentially related to the established principles of intellectual property protection.

  129. 129.

    As regards the former, examples are the EU’s interest in geographical indications or in extended protection of databases, or the USA’s interest in patent protection of software-supported business methods (see supra n. 111). For the latter think of the many IP-related issues raised by the Internet, from the making available-right introduced by the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 to Internet service providers’ liability or the introduction of copyright related rights to protect newspaper snippets against use by search engine providers.

  130. 130.

    For examples, see supra n. 129. In the EU, protection of must-match spare parts became controversial enough not to make it into the law (see Article 14 Design Directive; Article 110 Community Design Regulation, both supra n. 126), and the once proposed directive on the protection of computer-implemented software failed altogether. The Commission’s project to harmonize the law of international exhaustion did not even mature into a proposal. The Directive on the protection of biotechnological inventions needed to contain its own “flexibilities” to pass through Parliament, and thereupon has been transposed differently into the national laws of Member States (see M. Varju & J. Sandor (2012), Patenting Stem Cells in Europe: The Challenge of Multiplicity in European Union Law, 49 CML Rev. 2012, 1007; Chr. Kilger & H.-J. Jaenichen (2005), Ende des absoluten Stoffschutzes? Zur Umsetzung der Biotechnologie-Richtlinie, GRUR 2005, 984). The protection of databases remains controversial at least as regards its contours (see E. Derclaye (2013), Database Rights: Success or Failure? The Chequered Yet Exciting Journey of Database Protection in Europe, in Chr. Geiger (Ed.), Constructing European Intellectual Property, p. 340), and even in the EU the protection of geographical indications is not well settled yet (see G. Evans (2013), The Simplification and Codification of European Legislation for the Protection of Geographical Indications, in Chr. Geiger (Ed.), Constructing European Intellectual Property, p. 177).

  131. 131.

    See UNCTAD (2013), World Investment Report 2013 – Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, p. 1 et passim (Chapters I-III). For a discussion of the controversial relationship between levels of intellectual property protection and foreign direct investment, see K. Maskus, K. Saggi & Th. Puttitanum (2005), Patent Rights and International Technology Transfer Through Direct Investment and Licensing, in K. Maskus & J. Reichman (Eds.), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, p. 265 (with comment S. Kortum, ibid., p. 282).

  132. 132.

    See UNCTAD (2011), World Investment-Report 2011 – Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development, p. 12 et passim; WIPO (2012), World Intellectual Property Report 2011 – The Changing Face of Innovation, p. 23 et passim.

  133. 133.

    Such cooperation is not limited to “North–South” cooperation, see UNCTAD (2012), Technology and Innovation Report 2012 – Innovation, Technology and South-South Collaboration, passim.

  134. 134.

    See UNCTAD (2013), World Investment Report 2013 – Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, General Overview, Key Messages, p. X, and Report at p. 121 et passim (Chapter IV); WTO (2013), World Trade Report 2013 – Factors Shaping the Future World Trade, p. 78 et passim, WTO (2014), World Trade Report 2014 – Trade and Development: Recent Trends and the Role of the WTO, p. 78 et passim; see also supra n. 54. Intra-firm trade also seems to have become more intense, albeit varying considerably from country to country (e.g. for the U.S.A.: 48 % of exports, 30 % of imports in 2009; for US – EU trade 47 % in 2002 and 50 % in 2012) and with industries, see R. Lanz & S. Miroudot (2011), Intra-Firm Trade: Patterns, Determinants and Policy Implications, OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 114, p. 12 et passim; European Commission (2013), DG Trade, Chief Economist Note: EU – US Economic Linkages: The Role of Multinationals and Intra-Firm Trade, ISSN 2034–9815 Issue Paper 2–2013.

  135. 135.

    UNCTAD (2013), World Investment Report 2013 – Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, p. 144 et passim; WTO (2013), World Trade Report 2013 – Factors Shaping the Future World Trade, p. 160 et passim (stressing mutually reinforcing effects of trade and technological development).

  136. 136.

    UNCTAD (2013), World Investment Report 2013 – Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, p. 148 et passim; WTO (2013), World Trade Report 2013 – Factors Shaping the Future World Trade, pp. 165 et seq.; WTO (2014), World Trade Report 2014 – Trade and Development: Recent Trends and the Role of the WTO, p. 94 et passim. The real effects are controversial and at least ambivalent for all countries concerned, see WTO (2014), World Trade Report 2014 – Trade and Development: Recent Trends and the Role of the WTO. As regards in particular a developed economy like Germany, see the “Basar-Ökonomie” dispute triggered by H.-W. Sinn (2005), Basar-Ökonomie Deutschland – Exportweltmeister oder Schlußlicht?, 58 (6) Ifo-Schnelldienst 3, 2005; H.-W. Sinn (2006), Der pathologische Exportboom, 59 (1) Ifo-Schnelldienst 1, 2006, with comments by various authors.

  137. 137.

    For the problems see S. Hörmann (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, p. 687 et passim; P.-T. Stoll & F. Schorkopf (2006), WTO – World Economic Order, World Trade Law, pp. 275 et seq.

  138. 138.

    See WTO, Ministerial Conference, 9th Sess., Bali 3–6 December, Ministerial Declaration of 7 December 2013, with decisions and the “Agreement on Trade Facilitation” (TFA); WTO: News Items 27 November 2014, General Council, “WTO is “back on track”, Azvedo says with Statement by the Chair of the General Council and Protocol WT/PCTF/W/28. For an early analysis of the TFA see G. Felbermayr et al. (2014), Bali-Abkommen: Wer gewinnt und wer trägt die Kosten?, 67(3) Ifo-Schnelldienst 3, 2014; J.M. Finger (2014), The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement: Form Without Substance Again, 48 JWT 2014, 1279.

  139. 139.

    See WTO (2013), World Trade Report 2013 – Factors Shaping the Future World Trade, pp. 5 et seq., 20 et passim (average growth rate 1980 – 2011: 7 % for goods, 8 % for services; developing countries increasing their share from, 34 % to 47 %, with China having a major impact as its share rose from 1 % to 11 %); also WTO (2014), World Trade Report 2014 – Trade and Development: Recent Trends and the Role of the WTO, pp. 24 et seq.

  140. 140.

    For intra- and inter-regional trade see WTO (2013), World Trade Report 2013 – Factors Shaping the Future World Trade, pp. 75 et seq. About 575 bilateral or regional trade agreements have been notified to the WTO for “approval” under Article XXIV GATT, with 379 being in force, see W. Kohler (2014), Das Welthandelssystem und die WTO nach “Bali 2013”, 67 (3) Ifo-Schnelldienst 10, 2014; see generally for the regionalization of trade S. Boysen (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, pp. 669 et seq. (§ 31, II.2); R. Senti (2013), Regionale Freihandelsabkommen, p. 19 et passim.

  141. 141.

    See WTO (2013), World Trade Report 2013 – Factors Shaping the Future World Trade, p. 63 et passim, 82 et passim.

  142. 142.

    This is the problem of GATS, see M. Michaelis (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, § 20, nos 7 et passim; M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, p. 474 et passim.

  143. 143.

    See Articles 2, 10 TBT Agreement, Articles 2, 3, 5 SPS Agreement; P.-T. Stoll & F. Schorkopf (2006), WTO – World Economic Order, World Trade Law, Nos. 100, 397, 404, 443 et seq., Generally P. Van den Bossche (2008), Looking for Proportionality in WTO Law, 35 Leg. Iss. Econ. Integr. 2008, 283; with regard to TRIPS more specifically M. Wallot (2015), The Proportionality Principle in the TRIPS Agreement, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 213 (this volume).

  144. 144.

    See H. Ullrich (2012), Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht im Binnenmarkt, in U. Immenga & E.J. Mestmäcker (Eds.), Wettbewerbsrecht Band 1, Teil 2, p. 1589 et passim (nos. 33 et passim).

  145. 145.

    As illustrated in the EU by the Cassis de Dijon- case law (ECJ, Rewe/Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, C-120/78, EU:C:1979:42), which sidestepped Article 36 TFEU only to have to be limited subsequently in Keck et Mithouard (ECJ, Keck and Mithouard, C-267/91 and C-268/91, EU:C:1993:905) and its follow-up decisions, see P. Oliver & St. Enchelmaier (2010), Free Movement of Goods in the European Union, p. 104 et passim; H. Ullrich (2012), Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht im Binnenmarkt, in U. Immenga & E.J. Mestmäcker (Eds.) Wettbewerbsrecht, Band 1, Teil 2, 5. Auflage, Nos. 34 et seq., 37 et seq., p. 1590 et seq.

  146. 146.

    Such as the protection of consumers or of the environment, public health, human rights, etc., with, as a result, more interest groups becoming involved in the “trade”-law-making process.

  147. 147.

    In the European Union, these are the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5 TEU) and the criterion of “distortion of trade” or of “the functioning of the internal market” (Articles 26, 114, 118 TFEU).

  148. 148.

    The regulation of customs unions and free trade areas by Article XXIV GATT does not work as a dividing line between “trade approaches” and “integration approaches” to international regulation of markets. It does not allow control over the constitutional organization of regional or of other forms of integration, and it seems to be ineffective even within its genuine ambit, see W. Kohler (2014), Das Welthandelssystem und die WTO nach “Bali 2013”, 67 (3) Ifo-Schnelldienst 10, 2014; S. Boysen (2010), in M. Hilf & St. Oeter (Eds.), WTO-Recht, p. 673 et passim (685 et seq.); M. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), The Regulation of International Trade, p. 83 et passim.

  149. 149.

    As is the case on the State level or in highly advanced types of regional integration, such as e.g. the EU.

  150. 150.

    See supra Sect. 2.2.4, text accompanying n. 110 et seq.

  151. 151.

    See supra n. 112.

  152. 152.

    Some countries seek to accommodate for the different innovation capacities and needs by establishing a two tier system of patent protection for utility models and for higher level inventions respectively (see H. Grosse Ruse- Khan (2013), The International Legal Framework for the Protection of Utility Models, 4 WIPO J. 2013, 175). However, as useful as a system of protecting petty patents may be, domestic industry also needs equal access to patent protection for genuine inventions, and foreign competitors ought to be equally subject to that form of protection that best meets the needs of the domestic economy and the objectives of domestic policies.

  153. 153.

    See TRIPS, Preamble, 1st sentence and its lit. b), c).

  154. 154.

    See J. Drexl (2015), The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 53 (this volume), Sect. 4.4, and references infra n. 155.

  155. 155.

    See supra n. 61, 63. The WIPO Development Agenda, as decided in 2007 seeks to specifically address a number of the issues of intellectual property and development, but does not seem to make much progress (see C. Saez (2009), Crisis at WIPO over Development Agenda, Overall Objectives in Question, in IP Watch of 24 May). For this Agenda see generally the contributions in N. Weinstock Netanel, Ed. (2009), The Development Agenda, Oxford.

  156. 156.

    See M. Hilf & St. Oeter (2010), WTO-Recht, § 33 III and the references supra n. 115. See, however as regards even TRIPS the drastic presentation of the TRIPS negotiation process by P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite (2002), Information Feudalism – Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, pp. 133 et seq.

  157. 157.

    See supra Sect. 2.2.2. An illustration of such failure is the 70 years pma term of copyright protection for computer programs; another is the purposive neglect of compulsory licensing as way to overcome blocking situations between patents, see H. Ullrich (2014), Compulsory Licenses Under Patent Law: European Concepts, in W. Kaal et al. (Eds.), Festschrift Chr. Kirchner, p. 404 et passim.

  158. 158.

    For the “one-size-fits-all” problem, see references supra n. 66.

  159. 159.

    Which is not only a development issue (see supra n. 63), but one that exists in the USA and the EU as well, see for the EU Ch. Godt (2010), Differential Pricing of Patent-Protected Pharmaceuticals for Life-Threatening Infectious-Diseases inside Europe – Can Compulsory Licenses be Employed, in Ch. Godt (Ed.), Differential Pricing of Pharmaceuticals inside Europe, p. 27 et passim.

  160. 160.

    See A. Ohly (2015), TRIPS and Consumer Protection, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 681 (this volume). The relationship between consumer protection and intellectual property protection varies with the category of intellectual property; typically, it is rather ambivalent. Concerns for affordable access to medicines (or food) have accompanied the development of patent law ever since and in almost all countries (see e.g. Ph. Johnson (2013), Access to Medicines and the Growth of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Britain, in G. Dinwoodie (Ed.), Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property, p. 329), consumer protection against deception is at the root of trademark law, and the Internet has made everybody aware of the impact of copyright on consumer interests. Yet, legal literature on TRIPS has not developed a specific analytical focus on “TRIPS and consumer protection”. For the WTO in general see Th. Voland (2007), Verbraucherschutz und Welthandelsrecht, passim (examining TRIPS only as regards access problems, p. 262 et passim).

  161. 161.

    See the contribution by A.A. Machnicka (2015), TRIPS and Climate Change in the International Economic Order, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 415 (this volume).

  162. 162.

    One example is the failure of ACTA, see T. Jaeger (2015) Merging ACTA into TRIPS: Does TRIPS-Based IP Enforcement Need Reform?, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 621 (this volume). Another even more worrying example is presented by the broad political controversies on Internet-related copyright protection, which raise fundamental issues of acceptance of the law not only by “stakeholders”, but by the general public, see S. Ericsson (2015), The Commodification of Internet Intermediary Safe Harbors: Avoiding Premature Harmonization around a Suboptimal Standard, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 245 (this volume); M. Lamping (2015), Intellectual Property Harmonization in the Name of Trade, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 313 (this volume). On the need to “democratize intellectual property” see in particular P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite (2002), Information Feudalism – Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, pp. 189 et seq.

  163. 163.

    See references supra n. 65, 66; H. Ullrich (2009), Propriété intellectuelle, concurrence et régulation – Limites de protection et limites de contrôle, R.I.D.E. 2009, 399, 407 et passim, 411 et seq.

  164. 164.

    See U.S. Department of Commerce, National Economic Council (2012), The Competitiveness and Innovative Capacity of the United States, passim (pp. 7–11 et seq.); European Commission (2011), Communication of 24 May 2011 to the European Parliament and the Council, A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights: Boosting Creativity and Innovation to Provide Economic Growth, High Quality Jobs, and First Class Products and Services, COM(2011), 287 final, sub 1, 2.

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Correspondence to Hanns Ullrich .

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Ullrich, H. (2016). The Political Foundations of TRIPS Revisited. In: Ullrich, H., Hilty, R., Lamping, M., Drexl, J. (eds) TRIPS plus 20. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol 25. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48107-3_3

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