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From Transfer of Technology to Innovation Through Access

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TRIPS plus 20

Part of the book series: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law ((MSIP,volume 25))

Abstract

While, in a traditional perception, IP law is all about protection and exclusivity, recent developments such as the strategic use of standard-essential patents (SEPs) present access rather than exclusion as a key driver for innovation. Although standardization generates important benefits to society it does also entail substantial risks such as the abuse of SEPs. From an analysis of important SEP-related practices it becomes evident that they constitute an important context in which a new demand for access to proprietary technology arises. When TRIPS is put to their litmus test, the result is double-edged. On the level of its fundamental provisions TRIPS cannot only accommodate the need for access. With its goal to balance the interests of technology owners and those who urge for a right to use protected technology TRIPS is even in the position to foster fair access. However, specific provisions on access requirements, such as Article 31 TRIPS on compulsory licenses, prove unsatisfactory. Until reform is brought about, the existing set of provisions must be read appropriately.

Dr. Peter Picht, LL.M. (Yale) is Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    H. Ullrich (2004), Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPs-Perspective, J. Int’l Econ. L. 2004, 401; D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS-Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, No. 2.342.

  2. 2.

    G.E. Evans (1994), Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue – The Making of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 18 World Comp. L. Rev. 1994, 141 et seq.

  3. 3.

    Cf. for example G. Becker (2013), On Reforming the Patent System; R. Posner (2013), Patent Trolls.

  4. 4.

    T.P. Stoll (2014), Are You Still in? – The Impact of Licensing Requirements on the Composition of Standard Setting Organizations, Essays on the Economics of Patents, Standards, and Innovation, pp. 41 et seq.

  5. 5.

    Information and Communications Technology.

  6. 6.

    Another tool, not addressed by this contribution but at least potentially important, are SSO rules that require patent holders to display a certain conduct, such as disclosing SEPs, committing to FRAND licensing, etc.

  7. 7.

    Famous examples for such standards wars are the VHS-Betamax battle or the fight HD-DVD vs. Blu-Ray; cf. P. Grindley (1995), Standards, Strategy and Policy, pp. 74 et seq.

  8. 8.

    This type of standard is oftentimes referred to as “de jure-standard”. Importantly, however, such standards are sometimes, but not necessarily declared binding by an act of law. Even absent codification, collective standards can and do often dominate the markets for which they are set because of their wide acceptance by market participants.

  9. 9.

    American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law (2004), Handbook on the Antitrust Aspects of Standards Setting, pp. 4 et seq.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    For an overview, see P. Picht (2014), Strategisches Verhalten bei der Nutzung von Patenten in Standardisierungsverfahren aus der Sicht des europäischen Kartellrechts, pp. 179 et seq.

  12. 12.

    Cf. e.g. U. S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission (2007), Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, pp. 33 et seq.

  13. 13.

    Agreements obliging the parties to use particular technologies can in fact violate Article 101 TFEU; cf. ECJ, IAZ v. Commission, joined cases C 96-110/82, EU:C:1983:310.

  14. 14.

    Another important aspect is the risk that the standard-setting process is used, by the participating competitors, to cover cartel agreements violating Article 101 TFEU. Cf. on these and further aspects P. Picht (2014), Strategisches Verhalten bei der Nutzung von Patenten in Standardisierungsverfahren aus der Sicht des europäischen Kartellrechts, pp. 183 et seq.

  15. 15.

    On lock-in, see e.g. J.S. Miller (2007), Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-in: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 Ind. L. Rev. 2007, 351.

  16. 16.

    P. Chappatte (2009), FRAND Commitments – The Case for Antitrust Intervention, 5 Euro. Comp. J. 2009, 319, 325 et seq.

  17. 17.

    On the facts of the Rambus case, see Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Rambus Inc., Administrative Complaint of 18 June 2002, Docket No. 9302.

  18. 18.

    Fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory.

  19. 19.

    European Commission, Rambus, Decision of 9 December 2009, Case COMP/38.636.

  20. 20.

    Federal Trade Commission.

  21. 21.

    Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F. 3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

  22. 22.

    Private patent enforcement litigation by NPEs does, however, flourish; cf. F. Mueller (18 June 2013), Patent Firm IPCom settles with T-Mobile, will be more active in U.S. with ex-Hitachi Patents, FOSS Patents Blog Entry of 18 June 2013.

  23. 23.

    European Commission (2012), Antitrust: Commission welcomes IPCom’s public FRAND Declaration, press release of 10 December 2012, MEMO/09/549.

  24. 24.

    For instance, the $3 billion in licensing earnings reported by the NPE “Intellectual Ventures” do most likely result in large part from out of court-settlements; cf. A. Robertson (2014), The Ultimate Patent Troll is going to Trial against Google and Motorola, The Verge of 4 February 2014. As a further example for troll activity, see K. Finley (2014), World’s Most Innovative Patent Troll sues the Government, WIRED of 15 January 2014.

  25. 25.

    See e.g. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (W.D. Wash. 2013); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013); ECJ, Huawei Technologies, C-170/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:477.

  26. 26.

    E.g. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (W.D. Wash. 2013).

  27. 27.

    E.g. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

  28. 28.

    Cf. on the background of the Huawei v. ZTE lawsuit fought between two (at least in part) government-controlled Chinese companies J. Drexl (2014), Zugang zu standardessenziellen Patenten als moderne Regulierungsaufgabe: Wie reagiert das EU-Kartellrecht auf Patentkriege zwischen chinesischen Unternehmen.

  29. 29.

    Cf., for instance, European Commission (2012), Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Samsung on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents, press release of 21 December 2012.

  30. 30.

    As an impressive example, see Judge Posner’s ruling dismissing Motorola’s SEP infringement action against Apple: Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.Supp.2d 901 (N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division 2012).

  31. 31.

    An exception may apply with regard to subsequent generations of standards that are quite similar. A SEP on one of the standard generations is not then unlikely to catch subsequent generations as well.

  32. 32.

    J. Drexl (2011), Intellectual Property in Competition: How to Promote Dynamic Competition as a Goal, in J. Drexl et al. (Eds.), Common Ground for International Competition Law, pp. 210, 220.

  33. 33.

    J. Drexl et al. (2006), Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law on the Directorate-General Competition Discussion Paper of December 2005 on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Practices, IIC 2006, 558, 567 et seq.

  34. 34.

    It is important to notice that “access” does not mean access regardless of its conditions but access on fair terms. Neither can standard users compete vigorously in the market if they have to pay suffocating royalties for standard-essential technologies. Nor do unrewarding licensing obligations foster the long-term readiness of SEP holders to invent and to make their inventions available for standardization.

  35. 35.

    For instance, the annual rate of patents granted in China increased by a factor of 15 between 2001 and 2012; SIPO Annual Reports, Evolution of Granted Patents, available at http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/116E0662A216E8A4C125761000482C99/$File/evolution_of_granted_patents_cn.gif.

  36. 36.

    From an empirical point of view T.P. Stoll (2014), Are You Still in? – The Impact of Licensing Requirements on the Composition of Standard Setting Organizations, Essays on the Economics of Patents, Standards, and Innovation.

  37. 37.

    By way of example: 72 firms claim to hold in total 1,227 unique essential patents in ETSI’s UMTS/3G standard; T.P. Stoll (2014), Are You Still in? – The Impact of Licensing Requirements on the Composition of Standard Setting Organizations, Essays on the Economics of Patents, Standards, and Innovation, pp. 42 et seq.

  38. 38.

    Cf. also the unsettling estimates on the overall percentage of unjustly granted patents: J.R. Allison & M.A. Lemley (1998), Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, AIPLA Qu. J. 1998, 185, 205 et seq.; T. Bausch (2007), Nichtigkeitsrechtsprechung in Patentsachen, p. IX; D. Harhoff et al. (2013), Patent Litigation in Europe, ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 13-072, find a wide range of revocation percentages (approx. 15 %-70 % for litigated revocation claims) in various European countries for the period of 2000–2008.

  39. 39.

    On the reduction of patent challenges in patent thickets, see D. Harhoff, G. von Graevenitz & S. Wagner (2013), Conflict Resolution, Public Goods and Patent Thickets, CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 9468.

  40. 40.

    It therefore comes as no surprise that antitrust agencies of developing countries start to focus on SEP issues. An example is provided by the investigation of Ericsson’s assertion of its SEP launched by the Competition Commission of India; Competition Commission of India Order under Sec. 26(1) of The Competition Act 2002 of 16 January 2014, Case No. 76/2013 – In Re Intex Technologies, Ltd., and Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ), available at: http://www.cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/261/762013.pdf.

  41. 41.

    ECJ, Huawei Technologies, C-170/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:477.

  42. 42.

    Cf., with a similar general view and a similar interpretation of Article 7, 8 TRIPS, Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS (Version 1.0 of 15 April 2014), published in 45 IIC 2014, 679.

  43. 43.

    In more detail on the interrelation between the paragraphs of Article 40 TRIPS cf., Bakhoum and Conde Gallego (2015).

  44. 44.

    O.F. von Gamm (1997), TRIPS und das nationale Wettbewerbs- und Kartellrecht, in E. Niederleithinger (Ed.), Festschrift Lieberknecht, pp. 197, 203.

  45. 45.

    On the various proposals regarding the precise dogmatic relation between Articles 40 and 8 TRIPS, see O. Brand (2013), in J. Busche, P. Stoll & A. Wiebe (Eds.), TRIPS, Article 40, para. 12, with further references.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., para. 7.

  47. 47.

    Ibid., para. 23.

  48. 48.

    H. Ullrich (2004), Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPs-Perspective, J. Int’l Econ. L. 2004, 401, 407; opposing that concept i.a. A. Heinemann (1995), Das Kartellrecht des geistigen Eigentums im TRIPS-Übereinkommen der Welthandelsorganisation, GRUR Int. 1995, 535, 538.

  49. 49.

    In the same vein M. Bakhoum & B. Conde Gallego (2015), TRIPS and Competition Rules: From Transfer of Technology to Innovation Policy.

  50. 50.

    O. Brand (2013), in J. Busche & P. Stoll (Eds.), TRIPS, Article 40, paras. 27 et seq.

  51. 51.

    Arriving, in a broader perspective, at the same conclusion M. Bakhoum & B. Conde Gallego (2015), TRIPS and Competition Rules: From Transfer of Technology to Innovation Policy.

  52. 52.

    P. Picht (2013), Von eDate zu Wintersteiger – Die Ausformung des Art. 5 Nr. 3 EuGVVO für Internetdelikte durch die Rechtsprechung des EuGH, GRUR Int. 2013, 22; T. Körber (2013), Standardessentielle Patente, FRAND-Verpflichtungen und Kartellrecht, pp. 59 et seq. Cf. also ECJ, Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, EU:T:2007:289, paras. 649 et seq.

  53. 53.

    On this and further types of abusive conduct P. Picht (2013), Von eDate zu Wintersteiger – Die Ausformung des Article 5 Nr. 3 EuGVVO für Internetdelikte durch die Rechtsprechung des EuGH, GRUR Int. 2013, 15 et seq.

  54. 54.

    T. Körber (2013), Standardessentielle Patente, FRAND-Verpflichtungen und Kartellrecht, pp. 72 et seq. Cf. also European Commission (2012), Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Samsung on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents, press release of 12 December 2012, IP/12/1448; European Commission (2013), Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents, press release of 6 May 2013, IP/13/406.

  55. 55.

    P. Picht (2013), Von eDate zu Wintersteiger – Die Ausformung des Article 5 Nr. 3 EuGVVO für Internetdelikte durch die Rechtsprechung des EuGH, GRUR Int. 2013, 24 et seq.

  56. 56.

    The wording of Article 30 TRIPS (“exceptions to the exclusive right conferred by a patent”) might cover compulsory licenses as well. However, the dichotomy of Article 31 TRIPS (dealing with licenses) and Article 30 TRIPS (dealing with other “exceptions”) suggests that compulsory license remedies to SEP abuse should be based on Article 31 TRIPS. Cf. further S. Reyes-Knoche (2013), in J. Busche, P. Stoll & A. Wiebe (Eds.), TRIPS, Article 30, paras. 7 et seq.; Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 2000, DSR 2000:V, p. 2289; D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, No. 2.342.

  57. 57.

    As a sample, see for Spain Article 222 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil; for Germany § 325 Zivilprozessordnung; for Poland Article 366 Kodeks Post powania Cywilnego; for France Article 480 Nouveau Code de procédure civile.

  58. 58.

    BGH (2009), GRUR 2009, 694, in particular 695-697.

  59. 59.

    For a more detailed critique, see H. Ullrich (2010), Comment on the German Federal Supreme Court Decision Orange Book Standard, IIC 2010, 337; D. Hötte (2009), Urteilsanmerkung zu BGH Orange-Book-Standard, MMR 2009, 686; G.-K. De Bronett (2009), Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Anmerkungen zum “Orange-Book-Standard”-Urteil des BGH, WuW 2009, 899; S. Barthelmeß & N. Gauß (2010), Die Lizenzierung standardessentieller Patente im Kontext branchenweit vereinbarter Standards unter dem Aspekt des Artikel 101 AEUV, WuW 2010, 626.

  60. 60.

    European Commission (2012), Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Samsung on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents, press release of 12 December 2012, IP/12/1448; European Commission (2013), Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents, press release of 6 May 2013, IP/13/406. On the interpretation of the press releases’ wording LG Düsseldorf (2013), GRUR Int. 2013, 547, 549; A. Verhauwen (2013), “Goldener Orange-Book-Standard” am Ende? – Besprechung zu LG Düsseldorf, Beschl. v. 21. 3. 2013 – 4 b O 104/12, GRUR 2013, 558, 559. On the parallel US approach P. Picht (2013), Von eDate zu Wintersteiger – Die Ausformung des Article 5 Nr. 3 EuGVVO für Internetdelikte durch die Rechtsprechung des EuGH, GRUR Int. 2013, 29.

  61. 61.

    LG Düsseldorf (2013), GRUR Int. 2013, 547; with background details A. Verhauwen (2013). “Goldener Orange-Book-Standard” am Ende? – Besprechung zu LG Düsseldorf, Beschl. v. 21. 3. 2013 – 4 b O 104/12, GRUR 2013, 558.

  62. 62.

    Article 40 TRIPS applies to court-ordered compulsory licenses as well; O. Brand (2013), in J. Busche, P. Stoll & A. Wiebe (Eds.), TRIPS, Article 40, para. 16.

  63. 63.

    In detail on the appropriate shaping of compulsory SEP licenses P. Picht (2014), Strategisches Verhalten bei der Nutzung von Patenten in Standardisierungsverfahren aus der Sicht des europäischen Kartellrechts, pp. 519 et seq.

  64. 64.

    With a focus on copyright, see A. Katz & P.-E. Veel (2013), Beyond Refusal to Deal: A Cross-Atlantic View of Copyright, Competition, and Innovation Policies, 79 Antitrust L.J. 2013, 139.

  65. 65.

    H. Ullrich (2010), Patente und technische Normen: Konflikt und Komplementarität in patent- und wettbewerbsrechtlicher Sicht, in M. Leistner (Ed.), Europäische Perspektiven des Geistigen Eigentums, pp. 14, 85 et seq.

  66. 66.

    R. Merges & J. Kuhn (2009), An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, Cal. L. Rev. 2009, 21 et seq.

  67. 67.

    H. Ullrich (2010), Patente und technische Normen: Konflikt und Komplementarität in patent- und wettbewerbsrechtlicher Sicht, in M. Leistner (Ed.), Europäische Perspektiven des Geistigen Eigentums, pp. 14, 85 et seq.

  68. 68.

    Article 28(2) TRIPS reads: “Patent owners shall also have the right to […] conclude licensing contracts”.

  69. 69.

    Article 28(1) TRIPS reads: “A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product”.

  70. 70.

    D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS-Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, No. 2.342.

  71. 71.

    On those and further “exceptions” under Article 30 TRIPS, see S. Reyes-Knoche (2013), in J. Busche, P. Stoll & A. Wiebe (Eds.), TRIPS, Article 30, paras. 27 et seq.

  72. 72.

    With proposals for a more generic application of Article 30 TRIPS, see Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS (Version 1.0 of 15 April 2014), esp. paras. 22 et seq.

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  1. Max-Planck-Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Peter Picht

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  1. Peter Picht
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Correspondence to Peter Picht .

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  1. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Hanns Ullrich

  2. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Reto M. Hilty

  3. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Matthias Lamping

  4. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Josef Drexl

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© 2016 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Picht, P. (2016). From Transfer of Technology to Innovation Through Access. In: Ullrich, H., Hilty, R., Lamping, M., Drexl, J. (eds) TRIPS plus 20. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol 25. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48107-3_15

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