Abstract
Malebranche’s so-called Conservation is Continuous Creation Argument (CCCA) for Occasionalism can be construed as an instance of the Generalized Exclusion Argument. This shows that the CCCA and the two stages of the Supervenience Argument are isomorphic with respect to each other. This allows interlocutors in these disparate areas of philosophy to engage in fruitful dialogue.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
These arguments are called ‘global’ according to Lee (2007) because they purport to show that all things other than God are causally impotent. Malebranche has also offered so-called ‘local’ arguments for Occasionalism. These arguments purport to show that some things, like finite minds or finite bodies, are causally impotent.
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While there are some who dispute the coherence of this theological slogan, I will grant its truth for the sake of exploring the CCCA. For an interesting discussion on the conceptual difference between creation and conservation see Craig (1998).
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This is an idea that has roots in Descartes. For more on this see Gorham (2004).
- 5.
I admit that synchronic causation departs from the ‘standard’ idea of causation (if there is such a thing) but I don’t see why it is impossible. The analysis of causation is, after all, a large, complicated, and unsettled area of research. Besides, even if we grant that physical causation is always diachronic it does not follow that mental causation or divine causation must also be diachronic. Malebranche, after all, assumes that divine causation is possible and it is not evident that he takes this to be a diachronic relation.
- 6.
Alfred Freddoso (1988) argues that defenders of Occasionalism, in light of Aristotelian arguments against Occasionalism, have good reason to adopt the so-called ‘no-nature’ view of creaturely essences. Creaturely essences, at the very least, sit uneasily with Occasionalism. It would force on God additional work that seems gratuitous given Malebranche’s convictions concerning the simplicity and economy of divine volitions.
- 7.
In an interesting article Quinn (1988) argues that on any of the three most prominent contemporary analyses of causation Occasionalism is not secured.
- 8.
This is very similar, going back to the previous chapter, to Princess Elisabeth’s Worry regarding the possibility of mental causation within a Cartesian substance dualist framework. Her worry is largely dismissed today because her analysis of causation is no longer deemed satisfactory. Interestingly Kim (2005) considers a similar move in discussing the closure principle. It is open to physicalists to push a strong form of closure, one that rules out nonphysical causes to begin with. While this effectively dispenses with the Supervenience Argument and makes physically irreducible mental properties causally impotent this also ends the prospects of debate from the outset and is therefore a move, according to Kim, to be resisted.
References
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Lim, D. (2015). Occasionalism. In: God and Mental Causation. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47426-6_2
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