Abstract
According to incentive problem of cooperative innovation in knowledge chain which is composed of production enterprises and scientific research institutions, this paper puts forward the game model of the simultaneous presence of adverse selection and moral hazard problems based on the principal-agent theory and game theory. Further more, the effective contract incentive mechanism is established. Under this mechanism, scientific research institutions weigh the pros and cons, choose the contracts in consistent with it’s knowledge stock quality and pay the appropriate level of efforts, standardize and restrict the research institutes of the behavior, reduce agency problems in the cooperative innovation among organizations in knowledge chain.
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Acknowledgments
This work is supported by the Youth Project of National Natural Science Foundation: Research on collaborative innovation mechanism and stability evaluation of the “strategic emerging industry innovation ecosystem” (Grant No. 71303271), and Youth Project of Ministry of Education, Humanities and Social Science Fund: Study on the Strategic Alliance of patent implementation based on cooperative innovation of organizations (Grant No.13YJC630246).
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Li, J., Wang, X., Zhou, Q. (2015). Study on the Incentive Contracts of Knowledge Chain Organizations’ Cooperative Innovation Under Mixed Asymmetric Information. In: Xu, J., Nickel, S., Machado, V., Hajiyev, A. (eds) Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 362. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47241-5_66
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47241-5_66
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