Abstract
In order to resolve owner’s insufficient incentives to supervisor arising out of information asymmetry, this paper adopts principal-agent theory and constructs a ternary structure consisting of owner, contractor, and supervisor. On the condition of information verifiability and partial information verifiability, two owner-supervisor moral hazard models under the influence of contractor are constructed respectively to facilitate quantitative study on project management. Results show in the bill of quotation mode, partial verifiable information can make the owner grant more incentives to the supervisor and that the working capability of the contractor can exert positive influences on these incentives while the capability of the supervisor would negatively affect incentives.
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The research projects of the Social Science and Humanity on Young Fund of the Ministry of Education (No. 14YJC630020).
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Zhao, L., Zhong, S. (2015). Study on Owner’s Incentives to Supervisor Under a Ternary Structure. In: Xu, J., Nickel, S., Machado, V., Hajiyev, A. (eds) Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 362. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47241-5_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47241-5_12
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