Abstract
In an evolutionary game, players are interpreted as populations—of animals or individuals. The probabilities in a mixed strategy of a player in a bimatrix game are interpreted as shares of the population. Individuals within the same part of the population play the same pure strategy. The main ‘solution’ concept is the concept of an evolutionary stable strategy.
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In the literature also called equilibrium points, critical points, stationary points.
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Peters, H. (2015). An Introduction to Evolutionary Games. In: Game Theory. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_8
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