Abstract
A game in extensive form specifies when each player in the game has to move, what his information is about the sequence of previous moves, which chance moves occur, and what the final payoffs are. Such games are discussed in Chaps. 4 and 5, and also occur in Chaps. 6 and 7. The present chapter extends the material introduced in Chaps. 4 and 5, and it may be useful to (re)read these chapters before continuing.
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Notes
- 1.
See also the Notes to this chapter.
References
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Kuhn, H. W. (1953). Extensive games and the problem of information. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games II (Annals of Mathematics Studies 28) (pp. 193–216). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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van Damme, E. C. (1991). Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria. Berlin: Springer.
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Peters, H. (2015). Extensive Form Games. In: Game Theory. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_14
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