Abstract
Non-malleable codes, introduced as a relaxation of error-correcting codes by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs (ICS ’10), provide the security guarantee that the message contained in a tampered codeword is either the same as the original message or is set to an unrelated value. Various applications of non-malleable codes have been discovered, and one of the most significant applications among these is the connection with tamper-resilient cryptography. There is a large body of work considering security against various classes of tampering functions, as well as non-malleable codes with enhanced features such as leakage resilience.
In this work, we propose combining the concepts of non-malleability, leakage resilience, and locality in a coding scheme. The contribution of this work is three-fold:
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1
As a conceptual contribution, we define a new notion of locally decodable and updatable non-malleable code that combines the above properties.
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2
We present two simple and efficient constructions achieving our new notion with different levels of security.
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3
We present an important application of our new tool – securing RAM computation against memory tampering and leakage attacks. This is analogous to the usage of traditional non-malleable codes to secure implementations in the circuit model against memory tampering and leakage attacks.
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Keywords
- Security Parameter
- Instruction Function
- Private Information Retrieval
- Cryptology ePrint Archive
- Decodable Code
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Dachman-Soled, D., Liu, FH., Shi, E., Zhou, HS. (2015). Locally Decodable and Updatable Non-malleable Codes and Their Applications. In: Dodis, Y., Nielsen, J.B. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9014. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46494-6_18
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