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German Report

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Antitrust in the Groceries Sector & Liability Issues in Relation to Corporate Social Responsibility

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Abstract

In Germany, there are various kinds of CSR policies. As the introduction already suggests, CSR policies may be adopted by or together with NGOs, business associations or consumer organisations, and they may address questions of external (e.g., eco/social sponsoring, eco/social-friendly branding) or internal policy (e.g., treatment of employees). With regard to legal consequences, the main distinction depends on whether or not a CSR policy falls within the definition of a code of conduct (Verhaltenskodex) according to Section 2 subsection 1 No. 5 of the Act Against Unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, UWG). This provision states that codes of conduct “shall mean an agreement or set of rules which defines the conduct of entrepreneurs who have undertaken to be bound by the code in relation to business sectors or individual commercial practices, without such obligations having been imposed by statutory or administrative provisions”. By contrast, the definition of CSR is broader, encompassing any social or environmental issue a business addresses without being legally obliged to do so. Consequently, while all codes of conduct can be CSR policies, not all CSR policies are codes of conduct according to the definition of the UWG. As will be analysed in the following paragraphs, the UWG is capturing all CSR policies—or rather their violation— regardless of their specific form as long as they can be qualified as “commercial practices” (cf. Section 2 subsection No. 1 UWG). However, different sections of the UWG—with different preconditions—will apply. While the material law seems fit to encompass all CSR policies there are some concerns by the present author regarding enforcement.

The author would like to thank Carmen Appenzeller for help with editing this report. The report was written in May 2013 and has only been slightly updated for publication. References are kept to a minimum.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Any German legislation cited in this report is available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/.

  2. 2.

    In this country report, the English translation of the UWG provided by the German government is used. It is available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/.

  3. 3.

    See the definition of CSR in the Communication of 22 March 2006 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee “Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole of Excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility” (COM (2006) 136 final) p. 2: corporate social responsibility (CSR) is “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. It is about enterprises deciding to go beyond minimum legal requirements and obligations stemming from collective agreements in order to address societal needs. Through CSR, enterprises of all sizes, in cooperation with their stakeholders, can help to reconcile economic, social and environmental ambitions.” Cf. also the new, broader definition used in Communication of 25 October 2011 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “A renewed EU strategy 2011–14 for Corporate Social Responsibility” (COM (2011) 681 final), p. 6: “responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society”; cf. also the recent Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups, OJ L 330 of 15.11.2014, p. 1, recital 3; cf. Schrader, Nachhaltigkeit in Unternehmen, ZUR 2013, pp. 454 et seq.; Lanfermann, EU-Richtlinienvorschlag zur Offenlegung von nicht-finanziellen Informationen: Ist eine Pflicht notwendig?, BB 2013, pp. 1323–1325.

  4. 4.

    The German version is available at https://www.wettbewerbszentrale.de/de/branchen/ecommerce/pressemitteilungen/_pressemitteilung/?id=237.

  5. 5.

    The German version is available at http://www.werberat.de/verhaltensregeln.

  6. 6.

    Cf., for the relevance of CSR policies in environmental protection, www.bmub.bund.de/P407/.

  7. 7.

    Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh of May 13, 2012, available at http://www.laborrights.org/creating-a-sweatfree-world/resources/bangladesh-fire-and-building-safety-agreement.

  8. 8.

    Cf. for a list of participating companies, mostly from Europe, http://www.industriall-union.org/bangladesh-accord-on-fire-and-building-safety-released.

  9. 9.

    “‘Commercial practice’ shall mean any conduct by a person for the benefit of that persons or a third party’s business before, during, or after, the conclusion of a business transaction, which conduct is objectively connected with promoting the sale or the procurement of goods or services, or with the conclusion or the performance of a contract concerning goods or services; ‘goods’ shall be deemed to include immovable property as well, and ‘services’ also rights and obligations”.

  10. 10.

    For a different view, pointing out that CSR policies are made on a voluntary basis and therefore should not entail any legal consequences; cf. the references in Balitzki, Werbung mit ökologischen Selbstverpflichtungen, GRUR 2013, p. 671 at n. 16. It has to be noted that voluntariness is no longer part of the new definition put forward by the Commission in COM (2011) 681 final, p. 6. Cf. also Directive 2014/95/EU (n. 3) which imposes a duty to provide a non-financial report on companies meeting a certain threshold. Member States have to implement the Directive until December 2016.

  11. 11.

    Of 27.05.1896, RGBl. p. 145.

  12. 12.

    Of 03.07.2004, BGBl. I, p. 1414.

  13. 13.

    Of 22.12.2008, BGBl. I, p. 2949. Cf., e.g., Köhler, Die Umsetzung der Richtlinie über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken in Deutschland, in Augenhofer (ed), Die Europäisierung des Kartell- und Lauterkeitsrechts, 2009, pp. 101–116. The UWG has been amended several times since then. Currently there is a proposal for another amendment as it has been noted that the implementation of the UCPD (n. 14) did not take into account all requirements set out in the Directive, cf. WRP 2014, 1373. The proposal is not dealt with in this paper.

  14. 14.

    Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), OJ L 149 of 11.6.2005, p. 22. Note that the definition of commercial practice given in Art. 2 lit. d UCPD varies from the one in Section 2 subsection 1 No. 1 UWG in that it requires a direct connection between the commercial practice and the promotion, sale or supply of a product to a consumer.

  15. 15.

    Cf. BGH GRUR 2011, p. 432 – FSA-Kodex.

  16. 16.

    Cf., e.g., BGH GRUR 1991, p. 545 – Tageseinnahmen Mitarbeiter; BGH GRUR 1995, p. 595 – Kinderarbeit; BGH GRUR 1995, p. 742 – Arbeitsplätze bei uns.

  17. 17.

    BGH GRUR 1987, p. 534 – McHappy-Tag.

  18. 18.

    Cf. on codes of conducts under the UWG Kopp/Klostermann, Vorsicht Falle: Verhaltenskodizes im reformierten Lauterkeitsrecht des UWG, CCZ 2009, pp. 155–159.

  19. 19.

    Cf., e.g., Birk, Corporate Responsibility, unternehmerische Selbstverpflichtungen und unlauterer Wettbewerb, GRUR 2011, p. 199.

  20. 20.

    Cf., e.g., Alexander, Verhaltenskodizes im europäischen und deutschen Lauterkeitsrecht, GRUR-Int. 2012b, p. 967.

  21. 21.

    Cf., e.g., Alexander, Verhaltenskodizes im europäischen und deutschen Lauterkeitsrecht, GRUR-Int. 2012b, p. 967.

  22. 22.

    Cf. Keller, in Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (eds) Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2013, § 2 para 165. The term “code owner” (Article 2 lit. f UCPD) was not implemented into German law but still has to be considered. According to Article 2 lit. f UCPD, authorities or organisations, e.g. consumer organisations, can also be code owners. However, as pointed out earlier, it is not required that such organisations are involved in the adoption of a code.

  23. 23.

    With German Corporate Governance Code, we refer to the Corporate Governance Code, which was adopted by the Governance Commission and introduced by the German Ministry of Justice; cf. http://www.dcgk.de/de/.

  24. 24.

    For a different opinion, cf. Alexander, Verhaltenskodizes im europäischen und deutschen Lauterkeitsrecht, GRUR-Int. 2012b, p. 968; Bornkamm, in Köhler/Bornkamm (eds) Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2015, § 5 para 5.163. In the view of the latter author, the corporate governance code is not a code of conduct as it is not the result of an agreement between businesses. However, according the definition used in the UCPD, as well as in the UWG, a set of rules developed by a code owner – which can be any entity – can be a code of conduct as well.

  25. 25.

    CJEU, joined cases C-261/07, VTB-VAB, and C-299/07, Galatea BVBA, ECR 2009 I-02949; CJEU, case C-304/08, Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, ECR 2010 I-00217 ; CJEU, case C-540/08, Mediaprint, ECR 2010 I-10909.

  26. 26.

    Keller, in Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig, UWG, 2013, § 2 para 159.

  27. 27.

    Cf. Article 2 UCPD.

  28. 28.

    Cf. Recital 7 UCPD.

  29. 29.

    Cf., e.g., Hoeren, Das neue UWG und dessen Auswirkungen auf den B2B-Bereich, WRP 2009, p. 793; for a different view cf. Alexander, Verhaltenskodizes im europäischen und deutschen Lauterkeitsrecht, GRUR-Int. 2012b, p. 970.

  30. 30.

    However, it has included No. 26 of Annex I of the UCPD into Section 7 subsection 2 UWG; thus, the Annex of the UWG only contains 30 practices.

  31. 31.

    Bornkamm, in Köhler/Bornkamm (eds) Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2015, Anhang zu § 3 Abs 3 Nr. 1 para 1.4.

  32. 32.

    It has to be noted that none of the organisations referred to actually endorses codes of conduct.

  33. 33.

    Cf., e.g., Dreyer/Weidert, in Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (eds) Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2013, Anh. § 3 Abs. 3 No. 2 para 3.

  34. 34.

    It has to be noted that where commercial practices towards consumers are concerned, Section 5 UWG has to be applied in conjunction with Section 3 subsection 2 UWG (instead of in conjunction with Section 3 subsection 1 UWG). Sentence 1 of Section 3 subsection 2 UWG reads as follows: “Commercial practices towards consumers shall be illegal in any case where they do not conform to the professional diligence required of the entrepreneur concerned and are suited to tangible impairment of the consumer’s ability to make an information-based decision, thus inducing him to make a transactional decision which he would not otherwise have made.” To ensure that the UWG is in line with the UCPD, the first requirement of Section 3 subsection 2 UWG (breach of professional diligence) may not be applied to Section 5 UWG; cf. for a different view (Section 3 subsection 1 UWG) Köhler, in Köhler/Bornkamm (eds) Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2015, § 3 para 8, 8f.

  35. 35.

    Cf. Birk, Corporate Responsibility, unternehmerische Selbstverpflichtungen und unlauterer Wettbewerb, GRUR 2011, p. 198.

  36. 36.

    Köhler, Richtlinienumsetzung im UWG – eine unvollendete Aufgabe, WRP 2013, p. 407.

  37. 37.

    BGH GRUR 2007, p. 247 – Regenwaldprojekt I.

  38. 38.

    Birk, Corporate Responsibility, unternehmerische Selbstverpflichtungen und unlauterer Wettbewerb, GRUR 2011, p. 203; Bornkamm, in Köhler/Bornkamm (eds) Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2015, § 5 para 4.176.

  39. 39.

    Wiebe, in Fezer (ed), Lauterkeitsrecht – Kommentar zum Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, Vol. 1, 2010, § 4-S2 para 38.

  40. 40.

    For a different view, cf. Fezer, Das Informationsgebot der Lauterkeitsrichtlinie als subjektives Verbraucherrecht, WRP 2007, p. 1029; Wiebe, in Fezer (ed), Lauterkeitsrecht – Kommentar zum Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, Vol. 1, 2010, § 4-S2, para 94.

  41. 41.

    So far, there is only one decision by the CJEU regarding the interpretation of Article 7 UCPD; cf. CJEU, case C-122/10, Ving Sverige, ECR 2011 I-03903. There is one preliminary ruling pending regarding the definition of "invitation to purchase", cf. case C-476/14, submitted by the BGH in October 2014.

  42. 42.

    Cf. on the legal situation before e.g., Kort, Zur wettbewerbsrechtlichen Beurteilung gefühlsbetonter Werbung, WRP 1997, pp. 526–531; cf. on the use of CSR policies relating to pharmaceutical products Heil/Klümper, Die Werbung mit der sozialen Verantwortung – “Social Sponsoring” im Bereich der Arzneimittelwerbung, PharmR 2008, p. 226.

  43. 43.

    BGH GRUR 2007, p. 247 – Regenwaldprojekt I; Seichter, Das Regenwaldprojekt – Zum Abschied von der Fallgruppe der gefühlsbetonten Werbung, WRP 2007, pp. 230–237; cf. also BGH GRUR 2006, p. 75 – Artenschutz, where the BGH held that “environmental sponsoring” was permitted under unfair competition law; cf. Hartwig, Der BGH und das Ende des Verbots “gefühlsbetonter Werbung”, NJW 2006, p. 1326; cf. on the permissibility of “shocking advertisement” BVerfG GRUR 2001, p. 170; Hartwig, Image Advertising Under Unfair Competition Law and the Benetton Campaign, IIC 2001, pp. 777–794; Wassermeyer, Schockierende Werbung, GRUR 2002, pp. 126–134.

  44. 44.

    CJEU, case C-304/08, Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, ECR 2010 I-00217; CJEU, case C-540/08, Mediaprint, ECR 2010 I-10909.

  45. 45.

    Cf., generally, on the implementation of Art. 8, 9 UCPD in Section 4 No. 1 UWG e.g. Köhler, in Köhler/Bornkamm (eds) Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2015, § 4 para 1.7.

  46. 46.

    A violation of a code of conduct does not lead to a violation of Section 4 No. 11 UWG either; cf. below Sect. 26.2.2.1.

  47. 47.

    First Report on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), COM (2013) 139 final, p. 23; it is disputed in Germany whether the violation of a code of conduct can have indicative effects or not; cf. Köhler, in Köhler/Bornkamm (eds), Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2015, § 2 para 115.

  48. 48.

    Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, OJ L 31 of 01.02.2002, p. 1 as last amended by Regulation (EU) No 652/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 laying down provisions for the management of expenditure relating to the food chain, animal health and animal welfare, and relating to plant health and plant reproductive material, amending Council Directives 98/56/EC, 2000/29/EC and 2008/90/EC, Regulations (EC) No 178/2002, (EC) No 882/2004 and (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decisions 66/399/EEC, 76/894/EEC and 2009/470/EC, OJ L 189 of 27.06.2014, p. 1.

  49. 49.

    Cf., e.g., Schrader, Nachhaltigkeit in Unternehmen, ZUR 2013, p. 452.

  50. 50.

    Cf., e.g., Armbrüster, in Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, Vol. 1, 2012, § 119 para 29.

  51. 51.

    “Associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members.”

  52. 52.

    Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, OJ L 110 of 01.05.2009, p. 30.

  53. 53.

    Elimination means a claim to stop an unfair commercial practice (Beseitigungsanspruch).

  54. 54.

    Cf., for the procedure followed by the Centre for Protection against Unfair Competition, http://www.wettbewerbszentrale.de/media/getlivedoc.aspx?id=32204 at p. 3.

  55. 55.

    Lorenz, in Säcker/Rixecker (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, Vol. 3, 2012, § 477 para 15; cf. Ohly, in Piper/Ohly/Sosnitza, Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2014, § 4 para 11/7b.

  56. 56.

    BGH GRUR 2011, p. 638 – Werbung mit Garantie.

  57. 57.

    Köhler, in Köhler/Bornkamm (eds), Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2015, § 3 para 8e; cf. Köhler, Richtlinienkonforme Gesetzgebung statt richtlinienkonforme Auslegung: Plädoyer für eine weitere UWG-Novelle, WRP 2012, p. 257.

  58. 58.

    Cf., e.g., Fezer, Das wettbewerbsrechtliche Vertragsauflösungsrecht in der UWG-Reform, WRP 2003, pp. 127–147.

  59. 59.

    Köhler, in Köhler/Bornkamm (eds), Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2015, Einleitung para 7.5, but exempting criminal provisions from this limitation; Ahrens, in Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (eds.) Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2013, Einleitung G para 135.

  60. 60.

    Westermann, in Säcker/Rixecker (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, 2012b, § 437 para 1; Westermann, in Säcker/Rixecker (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, 2012a, § 434 para 19. If the seller acted with fault, the buyer can also claim damages.

  61. 61.

    Cf., generally, on the cessation of claims to consumer centres Piekenbrock, in Vorwerk/Wolf (eds.), BeckOK ZPO, 2014, § 79 paras 13 et seq.

  62. 62.

    According to Section 2 No. 2 UWG, “‘Competitor’ shall mean any person who has a concrete competitive relationship with one or more entrepreneurs supplying or demanding goods or services”.

  63. 63.

    Cf. Söbbing, Außerordentliche Kündigung wegen Verletzung eines Code of Conduct?, GWR 2014, pp. 78–82.

  64. 64.

    Köhler, in Köhler/Bornkamm (eds), Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2015, § 4 para 11.30; BGH GRUR 2006, p. 773 – Probeabonnement; BGH GRUR 2011, p. 431 – FSA-Kodex.

  65. 65.

    Cf., e.g., Bornkamm, in Köhler/Bornkamm (eds), Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2015, § 16 para 7.

  66. 66.

    Bornkamm, in Köhler/Bornkamm (eds), Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2015, Einleitung para 7.5.

  67. 67.

    For a detailed analysis of Section 10 UWG, cf., e.g., Alexander, Nutzen und Zukunft der Gewinnabschöpfung in der Diskussion, WRP 2012a, pp. 1190–1197; Goldmann, in Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (eds), Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2013, § 10 para 5.

  68. 68.

    Köhler, in Köhler/Bornkamm (eds), Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2015, UKlaG § 13 para 4.

  69. 69.

    For details cf. Bergmann/Goldmann, in Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (eds), Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2013, Vorbemerkungen zu §§ 8 ff. para 13.

  70. 70.

    For details, cf. Bergmann/Goldmann, in Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (eds), Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 2013, Vorbemerkungen zu §§ 8 ff. para 13.

  71. 71.

    Cf., e.g., http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/story/2013/06/29/toronto-bangladesh-protest.html.

  72. 72.

    http://rankabrand.org/.

  73. 73.

    But cf. critically, e.g., Kocher/Wenckebach, Recht und Markt, KJ 2013, p. 24, in the context of working conditions.

  74. 74.

    Cf., for a recent discussion of the legal situation and enforcement mechanisms, Henning-Bodewig/Liebenau, Corporate Social responsibility (CSR) – verbindliche Standards des Wettbewerbsrechts?, GRUR Int 2013,756.

  75. 75.

    Even Ökotest points out that it is not able to take CSR policies fully into account as it is not able to monitor compliance; cf. http://www.oekotest.de/cgi/index.cgi?artnr=10591&gartnr=91&bernr=04.

  76. 76.

    Cf., e.g., Augenhofer, Some questions on enforcement and individual redress – the example of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, in Geimer/Schütze/Garber (eds.), Europäische und internationale Dimension des Rechts, Festschrift für Daphne-Ariane Simotta, LexisNexis, 2012, pp. 39–56, with further references.

  77. 77.

    Cf., in this regard, the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress”, COM(2013) 401/2 of 11.06.2013.

  78. 78.

    Cf., e.g., Zimmer, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, Wettbewerbsrecht: GWB, 2007, § 1, para 2; for the relationship between antitrust law and CSR cf. Lübbig, Nachhaltigkeit als Kartellthematik, WuW 2012, pp. 1142–1155.

  79. 79.

    Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ C 11 of 14.01.2011, p. 1, hereafter “Guidelines”.

  80. 80.

    Bechtold, Leitlinien der Kommission und Rechtssicherheit – am Beispiel der neuen Horizontal-Leitlinien, GRUR 2012, p. 108. It also has to be taken into account that according to para 310 of the Guidelines (n. 79), “[a]greements for testing and certification go beyond the primary objective of defining the standard and would normally constitute a distinct agreement and market”.

  81. 81.

    For a critical assessment of the non-application of Article 101 TFEU, cf. Schweitzer, Standardisierung als Mittel zur Förderung und Beschränkung des Handels und des Wettbewerbs, Anm. zu EuGH 12.07.2012, C-171/11, EuZW 2012, p. 770.

  82. 82.

    Guidelines (n. 79) para 293.

  83. 83.

    Cf. also Guidelines (n. 79) para 296.

  84. 84.

    On the other hand, CSR policies may also lead to less choice due to the fact that those companies not complying with the CSR could be forced out of the market as the majority of the consumers won’t buy their products anymore given this non-compliance with environmental standards set in the CSR.

  85. 85.

    Cf., e.g., Ellger, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, EU Wettbewerbsrecht, 2012, Artikel 101 Abs. 3 AEUV, paras 513 et seq.; Nordemann, in Loewenheim/Meessen/Riesenkampff (eds), Kartellrecht, 2009, § 2 GWB, paras 138 et seq.

  86. 86.

    Commission Decision of 24.01.1999, 2000/475/EC – CECED, OJ L 187 of 26.07.2000, p. 47, paras 52 et seq.

  87. 87.

    Cf. Guidelines (n. 79) para 18 at n. 14. These guidelines do not contain a separate chapter on “environmental agreements”, as had been the case in the previous guidelines. Standard setting in the environment sector, which was the main focus of the former chapter on environmental agreements, is more appropriately dealt with in the standardisation chapter of these guidelines. In general, depending on the competition issues, “environmental agreements” are to be assessed under the relevant chapter of these guidelines, be it the chapter on R&D, production, commercialisation or standardisation agreements. Also making this point, cf. Lübbig, Nachhaltigkeit als Kartellthematik – Ein Beitrag über die zunehmende Verrechtlichung eines diffusen, aber bedeutsamen Begriffs, WuW 2012, p. 1153.

  88. 88.

    Cf., e.g., Bundeskartellamt, WuW/E DE-V pp. 1392, 1402 – Altglas.

  89. 89.

    Cf., e.g., Nägele/Jacobs, Zwangslizenzen im Patentrecht, WRP 2009, pp. 1062–1074; cf. also OLG Karlsruhe MMR 2011, p. 469 – UMTS Standard.

  90. 90.

    For the application of the essential facilities doctrine by the CJEU, cf., e.g., CJEU, case C-241/91, Magill, ECR 1995 I-00743; CJEU, case C-418/01, IMS Health, ECR 2004 I-05039; for the application by the BGH, cf., e.g., BGH NJW 2013, p. 1095 – Fährhafen Puttgarden II.

  91. 91.

    One might also have to distinguish the facts in the decision CJEU, case C-385/07, Der Grüne Punkt, ECR 2009 I-06155, from those in the example given in 26. 4.2. since in the case before the CJEU, the undertaking was charging a service fee that was disproportionate with regard to the economic value of the service provided.

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  1. Civil Law, European Private Law, Comparative Law and Market Regulation through Consumer Law and Competition Law, Humboldt-University, Berlin, Germany

    Susanne Augenhofer (Professor)

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    Pranvera Këllezi

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    Bruce Kilpatrick

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Augenhofer, S. (2015). German Report. In: Kobel, P., Këllezi, P., Kilpatrick, B. (eds) Antitrust in the Groceries Sector & Liability Issues in Relation to Corporate Social Responsibility. LIDC Contributions on Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45753-5_26

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