Abstract
Prêt à Voter is an end–to–end verifiable voting scheme, that uses paper based ballot forms that are turned into encrypted receipts. The scheme was designed to be flexible, secure and to offer voters a familiar and easy voting experience. Secrecy of the vote in Prêt à Voter relies on encoding the vote using a randomized candidate list in the ballots. In a few variants of Prêt à Voter a verifiable shuffle was used in the ballot generation phase in order to randomize the candidates. Verifiable shuffles are cryptographic primitives that re–encrypt and permute a list of ciphertexts. They provide proofs of correctness of the shuffle and preserve secrecy of the permutation. This paper proposes a new verifiable shuffle “D–Shuffle” that is efficient. We provide a security proof for the D–Shuffle. Furthermore, we show that using the D–shuffle for generating ballots in Prêt à Voter scheme ensures its security against: “Authority Knowledge Attack” and “Chain of Custody Attack”.
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Khader, D. (2014). D–Shuffle for Prêt à Voter. In: De Decker, B., Zúquete, A. (eds) Communications and Multimedia Security. CMS 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8735. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44885-4_9
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