Simulation-Based Cyber-Attack Assessment of Critical Infrastructures

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing book series (LNBIP, volume 191)

Abstract

Nations, more than ever, depend on the correct functionality of critical infrastructures. In order to deliver their services, critical infrastructure providers often rely on information technologies. Thus, cyber attacks can lead to severe impacts within a nation’s critical infrastructure landscape causing deep scars to health, safety and economic wealth. To provide the demanded service level of critical infrastructures and to reduce the impacts of disruptions and unavailability of components during attacks, it is essential to have a comprehensive understanding of the linkages between providers on the one side and to have the capabilities to identify vulnerabilities of systems and their consequences if exploited on the other side. Therefore, in this paper, we present a agent-based modeling and simulation approach facilitating the assessment of critical infrastructure entities under attack. To demonstrate the capabilities we further provide a motivational example how our approach can be used to perform simulation-based evaluation of cyber attacks. We further provide an overview of our simulation prototype.

Keywords

Cyber attacks Critical infrastructures protection Agent-based modeling and simulation Anticipation games Distributed denial of service 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work has been supported by the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) under the Austrian Security Research Programme KIRAS.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Insitute of IT Security ResearchSt. Pölten University of Applied SciencesSt. PöltenAustria

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