Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic Decisions

  • Maximilian Drees
  • Sören Riechers
  • Alexander Skopalik
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8768)
Cite this paper as:
Drees M., Riechers S., Skopalik A. (2014) Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic Decisions. In: Lavi R. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8768. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the budget is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order of the strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets. The complexity of the optimal solution as well as existence, complexity and quality of equilibria are analyzed. Finally, we show that the time an ordered budget game needs to convergence towards an equilibrium may be exponential.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maximilian Drees
    • 1
  • Sören Riechers
    • 1
  • Alexander Skopalik
    • 1
  1. 1.Heinz Nixdorf Institute & Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of PaderbornGermany

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