Abstract
In 1956, Hugh Everett, then a PhD student at Princeton, proposed his “relative state” formulation of quantum mechanics. John Wheeler, who was Everett’s advisor, recognized the originality and importance of such a proposal, but he denied that its non-conventional approach to measurement questioned the orthodox view. Indeed, Wheeler made serious efforts to obtain the blessing of Niels Bohr for Everett’s ideas. These efforts gave rise to a lively debate with the Copenhagen group, the existence and content of which have been only recently disclosed by the discovery of unpublished documents. The analysis of such documents opens a window on the conceptual background of Everett’s proposal, and illuminates at the same time some crucial aspects of the Copenhagen view of the measurement problem. Also, it provides an original insight into the interplay between philosophical and social factors which underlay the postwar controversies on the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
This chapter is a roughly reproduction of Stefano Osnaghi, Fábio Freitas, and Olival Freire Jr, “The Origin of the Everettian Heresy,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 40, 97–123, 2009. Some references were updated and references and footnotes were adjusted and minor changes were made in the text in order to adjust to the book’s style. Spelling was kept as in the original paper. We are grateful to Elsevier for allowing its reproduction. Credits and acknowledgments are recorded in the original paper.
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Notes
- 1.
John A. Wheeler to Alexander Stern, 25 May 1956, WP (Series 5—Relativity notebook 4, p. 92).
- 2.
See Freire Jr. (2004), Freire Jr. (2005), and Byrne (2007). See also Freitas (2007). After the appearance of our paper Osnaghi et al. (2009), other works have dealt with the context of this debate in Copenhagen over Everett’s thesis, see Byrne (2010) and Everett et al. (2012). For our review on the latter, see Freire Jr (2014).
- 3.
- 4.
Cassinello (1994) contains some historical remarks concerning the origin of Everett’s thesis. E. B. Shikhovtsev, Biographical sketch of Hugh Everett, III, 2003 Niels Bohr Library, American Institute of Physics, College Park, MD, Unpublished paper (http://www.hep.upenn.edu/~max/everett/everettbio.pdf) provides more information. Both papers, however, overlook the discussions which took place with the Copenhagen group.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
Referring to the attitude of American physicists towards the early debate on the foundations of quantum mechanics, Cartwright (1987) has observed that “Americans in general had little anxiety about the metaphysical implications of the quantum theory; and their attitude was entirely rational given the operationalist-pragmatist-style philosophy that a good many of them shared.” According to Kragh (1999, p. 211), the “interest in foundational problems among the Americans [. . .] went in different directions and was on a less grand scale than in Denmark and Germany.” See also Sopka (1980, pp. 3.67–3.69) and Assmus (1992).
- 8.
- 9.
See Kuhn (1970).
- 10.
In 1957, Rosenfeld was requested to give an opinion about the possible translation of Louis de Broglie’s La théorie de la mesure en mécanique ondulatoire into English. The quotation is from the (negative) referee’s report he wrote on that occasion (Léon Rosenfeld. Report on: Louis de Broglie, La théorie de la mesure en mécanique ondulatoire (Paris: Gauthier-Villars), 1957, RP, Niels Bohr Archive, Copenhagen, Unpublished paper).
- 11.
Léon Rosenfeld to Niels Bohr, 14 Jan 1957, BSC (reel 31).
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
The term was probably introduced by Heisenberg in his contribution to the volume celebrating Bohr’s 70th birthday (Pauli 1955). The usage of such a label was criticised by Rosenfeld, because it implicitly allowed the existence of other interpretations (Freire Jr. 2005, p. 28). Howard (2004) suggested that Heisenberg had in fact personal reasons—namely, the wish to break his isolation after WWII—for assimilating his own position to that of Bohr, whose ideas on complementarity he actually never endorsed.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
Rosenfeld’s Report contains further considerations about the treatment of measurement in the textbooks of quantum mechanics: “The nearest to a really good treatment is found in Landau and Lifschitz’s outstanding treatise: but it is too short and not explicit enough to be a real help to the student. The only books which are purposely devoted to an exposition of the principles are v. Neumann’s aforementioned treatise and a little book by Heisenberg: the first is (as stated above) misleading in several respects, the second is too sketchy and on the subject of measurements it even contains serious errors (however surprising this may appear, the author being one of the founders of the theory). As to Bohr’s authoritative article, it is in fact only accessible to fully trained specialists and too difficult to serve as an introduction into this question.” (Rosenfeld, 1957, op. cit.)
- 18.
“Bohr tended to see it as a problem of generalizing the classical framework in order to avoid contradictions between two mutually incompatible classical concepts, both necessary in the description of experiments. His solution was complementarity.” In contrast, “to von Neumann, [. . .] the problem of measurement meant the mathematical problem of proving that the formalism gave the same predictions for different locations of the ‘cut’ between observer and object” (Kragh 1999, p. 214). In the 1960s this difference in the approach to measurement gave rise to what has been called the “Princeton school”. This term refers in particular to Eugene Wigner’s view of measurement; see Home and Whitaker (1992) and Freire Jr. (2007).
- 19.
“The Copenhagen interpretation [. . .] is a mixed bag, consisting of the errors and misunderstandings and superficialities of many people. [. . .] Hence, putting your hand into this bag you may come up with almost anything you want”. Paul Feyerabend, letter to Imre Lakatos, 28 Jan 1968, in Lakatos et al. (1999, p. 127). Feyerabend is here defending Bohr’s original view against Popper’s criticisms, and arguing that Popper mispresented Bohr, just as “almost all physicists” did.
- 20.
- 21.
- 22.
In a conversation with Everett, which occurred in the 1970s, Charles Misner, who had been Everett’s roommate at Princeton and a student of Wheeler’s, recalled that, as an undergraduate, he was “taught by people who had learned quantum mechanics in the 1930s.” He remarked that “to them, quantum mechanics was really a big philosophical change, and they were shocked by the whole ideas,” whereas he and Everett “[. . .] felt that well, you know, every new course in physics you get some new kind of nonsense which seems to make sense a little bit later [. . .].” (Hugh Everett interviewed by Charles Misner, May 1977, p. 9, EP.)
- 23.
See e.g. Bohr (1949).
- 24.
See e.g. Jammer (1966, Sect. 3.4.2), Forman (1971), Brush (1980).
- 25.
This observation does not apply solely to the old guard of the Copenhagen school. “Some of the most vitriolic comments directed at people who questioned the Copenhagen Doctrine were given by Rosenfeld. He’s written some papers that have taken the young people who were wanting to probe a little more deeply to task”. (Bryce S. DeWitt & Cecile M. DeWitt-Morette interviewed by Kenneth W. Ford, 28 Feb 1995, p. 18, AIP.) Rosenfeld’s attitude is apparent from his letters, some of which are quoted in the remainder of this paper. In 1972, he wrote for example to Frederik Belinfante: “Not only [. . .] is it futile to speak of two Copenhagen schools; but it is even wrong to speak of one Copenhagen school; there has never been any such thing and I hope there will never be. The only distinction is between physicists who understand quantum mechanics and those who do not.” Léon Rosenfeld to Frederik J. Belinfante, 22 Jun 1972, RP. Feyerabend argued that the vagueness of the principles defining the Copenhagen interpretation allowed its defendants “to take care of objections by development rather than by reformulation”, a procedure which—he added—“serves to create the impression that the correct answer has been there all the time and that it was overlooked by the critic.” Hence, according to Feyerabend, the attitude of Bohr and his followers “has very often been one of people who have the task to clear up the misunderstandings of opponents rather than to admit their own mistakes” (Feyerabend 1964, p. 193, quoted in Home and Whitaker 1992, pp. 258–259). Beller (1999a, p. 191) has described the dialectical strategy of the Copenhagen scholars as “the rhetoric of finality and inevitability”, arguing that they “advocated their philosophy of physics not as a possible interpretation but as the only feasible one.” This attitude was often pointed out by those who, like Einstein, were dissatisfied with the Bohr–Heisenberg “religion” Albert Einstein to Erwin Schrödinger, 31 May 1928, apud Murdoch (1987, p. 101); see also Heilbron (2001, pp. 222–223). Thus for example, in a paper that appeared in Physics Today in 1954, Henry Margenau (1954, p. 9) observed that Bohr’s complementarity “relieved its advocates of the need to bridge a chasm in understanding by declaring that chasm to be unbridgeable and perennial; it legislated a difficulty into a norm.”
- 26.
In one of his Dublin seminars (1949–1955), Schrödinger remarked: “Philosophical considerations about quantum mechanics have gone out of fashion. There is a widespread belief that they have become gratuitous, that everything is all right in this respect for we have been given the marvellously soothing word of complementarity [. . .]” (Apud Bitbol 1996a, pp. 212–213).
- 27.
- 28.
See Bitbol (1996a).
- 29.
As late as in 1970, DeWitt (1970, p. 159), in introducing what he called the “’conventional’ or ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation”, observed: “If a poll were conducted among physicists, the majority would profess membership in the conventionalist camp, just as most Americans would claim to believe in the Bill of Rights, whether they had ever read it or not.”
- 30.
- 31.
For an elementary account of Bohm’s theory, see Barrett (1999). The role played by Bohm’s Marxist ideas in his search for a new interpretation of quantum mechanics is discussed in Forstner (2008). For an analysis of the reception of Bohm’s proposal, see Freire Jr. (2005). A survey of the “causal interpretations” proposed in the early 1950’s can be found in Scheibe (1973, p. 2). See also Jammer (1974, pp. 287–288).
- 32.
See Körner (1957). Karl Popper, who was not able to attend, sent a written report.
- 33.
Rosenfeld advised Bohr not “to waste his time in reading [the proceedings of the conference]”, but rather suggested that Petersen might look through them and tell him “about the worse nonsense” he would find there. (Léon Rosenfeld to Niels Bohr, 21 Oct 1957, BSC, reel 31.)
- 34.
“This comedy of errors [the attempt to develop a “theory of measurement” based on the “causal interpretation” of quantum mechanics] would have passed unnoticed, as the minor incident in the course of scientific progress which it actually is, if it had not found powerful support in the person of L. de Broglie, who is now backing it with all his authority.” (Rosenfeld 1957, op. cit.)
- 35.
- 36.
Heisenberg (1955, p. 23). Such statements are not unusual in the literature of the 1950s. Schrödinger, for example, repeatedly criticised the collapse of the wave function (Bitbol 1996a, p. 111): see for instance Schrödinger (1953, pp. 18–20). See also Margenau (1958), in which the objections of de Broglie are discussed (pp. 31–32). (Margenau’s own criticisms went back to the 1930s.)
- 37.
- 38.
Thus, for example, in a paper of 1958, Bohr (1963, p. 3) stressed that the description of atomic phenomena has “a perfectly objective character, in the sense that no explicit reference is made to any individual observer.” It is worth noting that, in 1957, Fock, who had been a prominent and tenacious advocate of complementarity in the Soviet Union, visited Copenhagen and had a few conversations on the philosophical significance of quantum mechanics with Bohr. According to the Soviet commentators, Bohr’s efforts to avoid any “subjectivist” ambiguity in his late writings were an outgrowth of such conversations (Graham 1988, pp. 311–313).
- 39.
See Graham (1988). Heisenberg’s epistemic interpretation of the wave function was often considered to imply a “subjectivist” view, see Stapp (1994), Howard (2004). Since Heisenberg was considered to be a member of the “Copenhagen school”, the charge of subjectivism was sometimes extended to Bohr; Howard (2004) discusses in particular the use of this rhetorical strategy in Popper’s writings.
- 40.
These aspects are discussed in Sect. 3.7.
- 41.
See e.g. Bell (2004, pp. 188–189). A good example is provided by the celebrated course of theoretical physics of the Soviets Lev Landau and Evgenij Lifshitz (whose first edition in English, supervised by John Bell, appeared in 1958). Their account of measurement, which was traditionally considered to be quite close to Bohr’s (Bell said that it was perhaps “the nearest to Bohr that we have”; Ibid, p. 217), postulated—in Bell’s words—that macroscopic systems “spontaneously” jump into a definite macroscopic configuration which, in the case of a “classical” apparatus, corresponds to an eigenstate of the “reading” (i.e. a so-called “pointer state”).
- 42.
See Margenau (1963) and references therein.
- 43.
See Jammer (1974, pp. 488–490).
- 44.
- 45.
For Everett’s biography, see Byrne (2010). The information about Everett’s curriculum is taken from the Princeton alumni file, GAR.
- 46.
From Dicke’s textbook (Dicke and Wittke 1960) we can conjecture that the course paid little attention to interpretive issues.
- 47.
In 1957, Bohr earned the Atoms for Peace Award. In reply to Wheeler’s congratulations, Bohr wrote to him: “In these weeks I have with gratitude dwelt with many memories and not least with our cooperation through the years and your faithful friendship.” (Niels Bohr to John A. Wheeler, 12 Apr 1957, BSC, reel 33). Bohr received the Award at a ceremony which was attended by President Eisenhower and for which Wheeler delivered an address.
- 48.
- 49.
Thus, for example, referring to the necessity to dispel the misunderstandings which could arise from Everett’s work, Wheeler wrote to him: “This appallingly difficult job I feel you (among very few in this world) have the ability in thinking and writing to accomplish”. And, alluding to Bohr, he added: “The combination of qualities, to accept corrections in a humble spirit, but to insist on the soundness of certain fundamental principles, is one that is rare but indispensable; and you have it. But it won’t do much good unless you go and fight with the greatest fighter.” (John A. Wheeler to Hugh Everett, 22 May 1956 [2nd letter], ME.)
- 50.
Everett interview, op. cit., p. 9. Petersen was educated at the University of Copenhagen and became Bohr’s assistant in 1952. According to Everett, he spent 1 year in Princeton (Hugh Everett to Max Jammer, 19 Sep 1973, ME). This occurred probably in 1954–1955, because Petersen accompanied Bohr when Bohr visited Princeton in the autumn of 1954 (see Sect. 3.6). (Felicity Pors, priv. comm., 16 Oct 2007.)
- 51.
Ibid, p.10.
- 52.
Hugh Everett to Aage Petersen, 31 May 1957, WP (Series I—Box Di—Fermi Award #1—Folder Everett). See also Hugh Everett to Aage Petersen [draft], summer of 1956, ME.
- 53.
- 54.
According to Everett’s recollection, Einstein said that he “could not believe that a mouse could bring about drastic changes in the universe simply by looking at it”. However, the quotation might have been reported to Everett by others, since in his 1977 interview (op. cit., p. 4) he did not remember having attended the seminar.
- 55.
Everett interview, op. cit., p.4. Wheeler (1979b) reported a few occasions when he and Einstein discussed issues of fundamental physics. In May 1953, for example, Einstein invited Wheeler and his students to his home for tea and answered questions about his view of quantum mechanics.
- 56.
Von Neumann and Wigner were not directly involved in the public debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics in the 1950s. However, von Neumann’s persistent concern with the epistemological issues raised by quantum mechanics is borne out by the efforts he devoted to the revision of the English translation of his book (Freire Jr. 2005, p. 27). See also Rédei and Stöltzner (2001), and, with regard to von Neumann’s opinion on Bohm’s proposal, (Stöltzner 1999). As for Wigner, his dissatisfaction with Bohr’s complementarity predated his involvement in the debates of the 1960s (Freire Jr. 2007; Camilleri 2009). Interestingly, in the notes taken by Wheeler in Copenhagen in 1956 (John A. Wheeler, Notes taken in Copenhagen, 3 May 1956, ME), Aage Petersen refers to von Neumann’s theory of measurement as “von N[eumann] + Wig[ner]” “stuff”.
- 57.
In the interview with Everett (op. cit., p. 5), Misner says: “You probably already had these quantum mechanical ideas and just needed someone to talk to about them and he [Wheeler] was obviously the kind of person who. . .”
- 58.
Feynman might have read some version of Everett’s dissertation (or might have been informed about it by Wheeler), since at the beginning of 1957 he already knew the general lines of Everett’s work (see Sect. 3.6).
- 59.
As we will see in Sects. 3.4 and 3.5, two important sources of inspiration for Everett’s work were the hidden variable theories on the one hand, and Schrödinger’s “wave interpretation” on the other. Schrödinger was sent a pre-print of Everett’s paper in 1957, but, in so far as we know, he did not reply.
- 60.
Everett interview, op. cit., pp. 9–10.
- 61.
See Barrett (1999, p. 65).
- 62.
See Alexander Stern to John A. Wheeler, 20 May 1956, ME; Wheeler, Notes, 1956, op. cit; Hip J. Groenewold to Hugh Everett and John A. Wheeler, 11 Apr 1957, ME.
- 63.
The paper was published in a collective volume edited by DeWitt and Graham (DeWitt et al. 1973). There is a letter from Everett to Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond (15 Nov 1977, EP) which seems to support the hypothesis that the title of the original manuscript was indeed changed in the process of publication.
- 64.
A copy of the long thesis was sent to Copenhagen in April 1956, and a second one seems to have followed a few weeks later (Everett to Petersen [draft], 1956, op. cit.).We were unable to locate either. However, a draft of the long thesis is deposited in the EP archive (Hugh Everett, 1956, Wave Mechanics Without Probability, EP (Box 1, Series II, Folder 1), Niels Bohr Library, American Institute of Physics, College Park, MD, Unpublished paper; hereafter Everett, 1956). It contains some handwritten corrections which were incorporated in the paper published in 1973. The EP manuscript lacks the cover (hence we can only guess its title). However, a cover with the title Wave Mechanics Without Probability, which might have belonged to the EP manuscript, was unearthed by Peter Byrne among the papers in possession of Everett’s son (Everett 2012 [1955a]). If the EP manuscript is the one that Everett sent to DeWitt in 1971 (after removing the cover, in which there appeared a title that Wheeler found inappropriate; John A.Wheeler to Niels Bohr, 24 Apr 1956, BSC, reel 34; also in WP, Series I, Box Boh-Bu, Folder Bohr, N. #2), this would explain why the title of the version published in DeWitt, Everett et al. (1973) differed from the original. Almost all of the unpublished documents concerning the origin and reception of Everett’s thesis are now published in Everett et al. (2012).
- 65.
See John A. Wheeler to Hugh Everett, 22 May 1956 [1st letter], WP (Box Di-Fermi #2, Folder Everett);Wheeler to Bohr, 24 Apr 1956, op. cit.; John A.Wheeler to Allen Shenstone, 28 May 1956, WP (Box Di-Fermi #2, Folder Everett); Groenewold to Everett & Wheeeler, op. cit.; Aage Petersen to Hugh Everett, 28 May 1956, ME.
- 66.
- 67.
For example, as pointed out by DeWitt (DeWitt interview, op. cit., p. 6), the first draft of the last chapter of the long thesis was probably written prior to Einstein’s death (April 1955), since Einstein is referred to as if he were still alive (Everett 1973, p. 112). Admittedly, the long thesis contains references to three books published in 1955, one of which (von Neumann’s Mathematical foundations) is also extensively quoted. Yet in the original manuscript of the long thesis deposited in the EP archive [(Everett 1956), “Wave mechanics without probability” [?]. EP (Box1, Series II, Folder 1)], the quotations from von Neumann’s book appear to have been added later. Moreover, the reference to a paper that appeared in an issue of the Supplemento al Nuovo Cimento printed on 22 November 1955 lacks the volume and page number (they were added in the version published in 1973), which suggests that Everett read the pre-print.
- 68.
Everett (1955a), “Objective vs subjective probability.” EP (Box 1, Folder 6). Printed in Everett (2012 [1955a]).
- 69.
The opening sentence of this manuscript (“Since the root of the controversy over the interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics lies in the interpretation of the probabilities given by the formalism, we must devote some time to discussing these interpretations”; Everett, 1955a) suggests that it was— or was intended to be—part of a larger work. Indeed, the structure of the paper resembles that of the introduction of the long thesis, although the projection postulate is not given the same central place. Moreover, in this early manuscript, Everett’s own proposal is not mentioned.
- 70.
Everett (1955b). “Quantitative measure of correlation.” EP (Box 1, Folder 6).
- 71.
Everett (1955c). “Probability in wave mechanics.” EP (Box 1, Folder 6). In particular, the “emergence” of objects from correlations is discussed by means of an example which is reproduced almost literally on p. 86 of the long thesis.
- 72.
Interestingly, in (Everett, 1956, op. cit.), the chapter on Observation, which forms the core of Everett’s proposal, appears to have been imported from an earlier (and arguably shorter) manuscript (witness the old numbering of pages which appears in the upper margin).
- 73.
Nancy Gore Everett, Diary, entry of 28 Mar 1956, ME (Peter Byrne, priv. comm.). Nancy was Everett’s wife.
- 74.
Everett interview, op. cit., p. 6; Hugh Everett to Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond, 15 Nov 1977, EP; Everett to Raub, 1980, op. cit.; Hugh Everett to Bill Harvey, 20 Jun 1977, EP, Series I-8. According to the recollection of Everett’s wife, who typed the manuscript (Everett interview, op. cit., p. 6), the thesis was written in the winter of 1954–1955 (Nancy Gore Everett, Calendar of events, EP, Box 1, Folder 1). (But this information could simply be inaccurate: the manuscript that Nancy Everett had in mind might actually be the second version, which was written in the winter of 1955–1956.)
- 75.
Everett to Petersen, 1957, op. cit.
- 76.
Everett probably had a working knowledge of German, and might have read von Neumann’s book in the original.
- 77.
This reading of von Neumann has been thoroughly criticised by Becker (2004). The way to understand the postulate of projection changes depending on one’s interpretation of the state vector. The interpretation that Everett seems to take as the “conventional” one is not inconsistent with that which seems to underlie some statements made by “orthodox” scholars. See, for example, Dirac’s assertion that “the theory describes the state of the world at any given moment by a wave function” (Institut International de Physique Solvay 1928; Bacciagaluppi and Valentini 2009). See Bitbol (2000, pp. 72–83) for a discussion.
- 78.
In a letter of 1973 to Max Jammer (op. cit.), Everett identifies the “probability interpretation of quantum mechanics” with the assertion that “somehow the measuring process [is] ‘magic’ and subject to a separate axiom governing the collapse of the wave function.”
- 79.
- 80.
Everett (2012 [1955a]).
- 81.
Everett to Jammer, 1973, op. cit.
- 82.
Everett (1955a, p. 4), in Everett (2012 [1955a]).
- 83.
The argument, which came subsequently to be known as the “Wigner’s friend” paradox, appeared in a paper of Wigner’s dated 1961. Given the resemblance between Wigner’s and Everett’s formulation, one may wonder whether Wigner picked up the argument from Everett’s thesis, which he might have read. (However, of course, the converse might also be true, i.e. Everett might have been inspired by discussions with Wigner.) In a paper of 1958, Schrödinger (1958, pp. 168–169) alludes to the same argument: “But jokes apart, I shall not waste the time by tritely ridiculing the attitude that the state-vector (or wave function) undergoes an abrupt change, when ‘I’ choose to inspect a registering tape. (Another person does not inspect it, hence for him no change occurs.) The orthodox school wards off such insulting smiles by calling us to order: would we at last take notice of the fact that according to them the wave function does not indicate the state of the physical object but its relation to the subject; this relation depends on the knowledge the subject has acquired, which may differ for different subjects, and so must the wave function.” This ironical presentation of the problem suggests that, had Schrödinger read the pre-print of Everett’s paper that he was sent by Wheeler, he would have found Everett’s arguments quite naïve. Nevertheless, Schrödinger was opposed to the epistemic interpretation of the state vector and he believed, like Everett, that “the Kopenhagen epistemology [. . .] leads to the physics of solipsism.” (Ibid.)
- 84.
Everett (1955a, p. 3). In Everett (2012 [1955a]).
- 85.
Everett (1973, p. 7). The principle was stated by Von Neumann (1955, p. 418) in the following terms: “[. . .] it must be possible so to describe the extra-physical process of the subjective perception as if it were in reality in the physical world—i.e. to assign its parts equivalent physical processes in the objective environment, in ordinary space.”
- 86.
Everett found the term “Copenhagen interpretation” in the above mentioned book edited by Pauli (1955), which is cited in the long thesis.
- 87.
The introduction and the conclusion of the long thesis were arguably written at different times. The first and third “interpretations” outlined in the conclusion are explicitly put into correspondence with the first and fourth “alternatives” appearing in the introduction (solipsism and hidden variables respectively). Everett avoids emphasising the correspondence between the second interpretation (Copenhagen) and the second alternative (dualistic view), but it is quite clear that he sees a link between them.
- 88.
Everett to Petersen, 1957, op. cit.
- 89.
Ibid. It is instructive to recall the discussion about the “relationship between Quantum and Classical concepts” which Everett found in Bohm’s textbook. In his presentation of the orthodox view, Bohm said that “in order to obtain a means of interpreting the wave function, we must [. . .] at the outset postulate a classical level in terms of which the definite results of a measurement can be realized.” He also asserted that “classical concepts cannot be regarded as limiting forms of quantum concepts”, and that “without an appeal to a classical level, quantum theory would have no meaning” (Bohm 1951, pp. 624–626).
- 90.
Everett to Petersen, 1957, op. cit.
- 91.
Hugh Everett to Bryce S. DeWitt, 31 May 1957, courtesy of Eugene Shikhovtsev.
- 92.
Interestingly, such an objection is not mentioned in Everett’s letter to Petersen, though the letter was written after the paper. This suggests that this objection reflected in fact a concern of Wheeler’s.
- 93.
Everett (1973, p. 113); Everett to DeWitt, 1957, op. cit.
- 94.
Bell (2004, pp. 93–99) made a comparison between Everett’s approach and de Broglie’s pilot wave theory. See also Barrett (1999, Chap. 5). This point is discussed by DeWitt in a letter sent to Wheeler and Everett in 1957. (Bryce S. DeWitt to John A. Wheeler & Hugh Everett, 7 May 1957, WP, Series I—Box Di—Fermi Award #1—Folder Everett).
- 95.
See e.g. Körner (1957, p. 61).
- 96.
Everett (1955a, p. 4), in Everett (2012 [1955a]).
- 97.
Everett to DeWitt, 1957, op. cit.
- 98.
Everett to DeWitt, 1957, op. cit.
- 99.
See for example Everett (1973, p. 116).
- 100.
Everett to DeWitt, 1957, op. cit.
- 101.
See Bitbol (1998, pp. 182–184).
- 102.
- 103.
Ibid, p.9.
- 104.
Everett (1955c, p. 9), in Everett (2012 [1955c]).
- 105.
- 106.
This is explicitly stated in a letter of 1980 (Everett to Raub, 1980, op. cit).
- 107.
- 108.
To be sure, this point of view is quite problematic. Its meaning and implications are analysed in the following subsections.
- 109.
This reasoning assumes that, in the conventional formulation, there is a straightforward link between state vectors and physical states. As we have seen, this assumption was part of Everett’s reading of von Neumann’s formulation.
- 110.
“We have a strong desire to construct a single all-embracing theory which would be applicable to the entire universe.” (Ibid, p. 135).
- 111.
Everett to DeWitt, 1957, op. cit.
- 112.
In this case too, it is interesting to compare Everett’s position to Schrödinger’s. Commenting on our “yearning for a complete description of the material world in space and time”, Schrödinger (1958, p. 169) remarked: “[. . .] It ought to be possible, so we believe, to form in our mind of the physical object an idea (Vorstellung) that contains in some way everything that could be observed in some way or other by any observer, and not only the record of what has been observed simultaneously in a particular case.”
- 113.
Everett’s mathematical work on correlations was probably undertaken independently of his reflection on quantum mechanics. Indeed, the chapter of the long thesis dedicated to correlation theory contains a lot of mathematical details that are not essential to the remainder. The chapter on correlation theory was not reproduced in the final dissertation. However, it gave rise to a paper (Everett 1955b), in Everett (2012 [1955b]), which remained unpublished (albeit Wheeler considered it “practically ready” for submission; John A. Wheeler to Hugh Everett, 21 Sep 1955, EP (Box 1, Folder 9)).
- 114.
Everett (1955c, p. 6), in Everett (2012 [1955c]).
- 115.
See Everett (1973, pp. 118, 137).
- 116.
Hugh Everett to Norbert Wiener, 31 May 1957, ME.
- 117.
Everett (1973, p. 78); see also p. 142.
- 118.
For example, the additivity requirement, which plays a crucial role in the deduction, is so chosen as “to have a requirement analogous to the ‘conservation of probability’.” (Ibid.) In his letter to Max Jammer (op. cit.), Everett insisted that his “deduction of the probability interpretation” was “just as ‘rigorous’ as any of the deductions of classical statistical mechanics, since in both areas the deductions can be shown to depend upon an ‘a priori’ choice of a measure on the space.” And he continued: “What is unique about the choice of measure and why it is forced upon one is that in both cases it is the only measure that satisfies a law of conservation of probability through the equations of motion. Thus, logically, in both classical statistical mechanics and in quantum mechanics, the only possible statistical statements depend upon the existence of a unique measure which obeys this conservation principle.”
- 119.
Stern to Wheeler (1956, op. cit).
- 120.
Everett (1955c, p. 5), in Everett (2012 [1955c]).
- 121.
Ibid, p. 8. In a note of 1956, Everett wrote: “Statistical ensemble of observers is, within the context of the theory, a real, in distinction to a virtual, ensemble!” (Notes on Stern’s letter, 1956, ME).
- 122.
This remark is contained in a note that Wheeler sent to Everett in September 1955 (Wheeler to Everett, 1955, op. cit.). That Wheeler was indeed referring to Probability in Wave Mechanics is actually only a conjecture, though a plausible one.
- 123.
Wheeler to Stern, 1956, op. cit.
- 124.
Wheeler to Everett, 1955, op. cit.
- 125.
There is a photograph, which appeared in a local journal, portraying Bohr holding a discussion with a group of students, and Everett is among them. See Picture 3.1.
- 126.
Wheeler to Everett, 1956 [I], op. cit.
- 127.
John A. Wheeler to Niels Bohr, 24 Apr 1956, BSC (reel 34). This letter contains a passage (in which Wheeler refers to the “second draft of the thesis of Everett”) that seems to confirm that Bohr already knew about Everett, and that the first version of the thesis had already been mentioned to him. That Petersen was acquainted with Everett’s former writings is suggested by a passage of a letter, in which, besides other things, he says: “I also had the opportunity to read the new draft of your thesis.” (Aage Petersen to Hugh Everett, 28 May 1956, ME; our emphasis).
- 128.
Wheeler to Everett, 1956 [I], op. cit. Alexander Stern was an American researcher then at the Institute of Theoretical Physics of Copenhagen.
- 129.
Wheeler to Everett, 1956 [II], op. cit.
- 130.
Ibid.
- 131.
Stern to Wheeler 1956, op. cit.
- 132.
Wheeler to Stern, 1956, op. cit.
- 133.
Wheeler to Everett, 1956 [I], op. cit.
- 134.
Wheeler to Everett, 1956 [II], op. cit.
- 135.
John A. Wheeler to Niels Bohr, 24 May 1956, BSC (reel 33).
- 136.
John A. Wheeler to Allen G. Shenstone, 28 May 1956, WP (Series I—Box Di—Fermi Award #1—Folder Everett).
- 137.
Wheeler to Everett, 1956 [II], op. cit. In the other letter of the same day, he says “I would like to feel happier than I do with the final product; then I would like to see it published in the Danish Academy in full—that’s the perfect place for it.” (Wheeler to Everett, 1956 [I], op. cit.)
- 138.
John A. Wheeler to Niels Bohr, Cable, 26 May 1956, BSC (reel 33).
- 139.
Aage Petersen to Hugh Everett, 28 May 1956, ME.
- 140.
Petersen to Everett, 1956, op. cit.
- 141.
Aage Petersen to John A. Wheeler, 26 May 1956, BSC (reel 33).
- 142.
Petersen to Everett, 1956, op. cit. To this suggestion, Everett replied: “[. . .] while I am doing it you might do the same for my work.” (Everett to Petersen [draft], 1956, op. cit.) Everett agreed to send a new copy of the thesis and remarked: “Judging from Stearn’s [sic] letter to Wheeler, which was forwarded to me, there has not been a copy in Copenhagen long enough for anyone to have read it thoroughly, a situation which this copy may rectify. I believe that a number of misunderstandings will evaporate when it has been read more carefully (say 2 or 3 times).”
- 143.
Petersen to Everett, 1956, op. cit.; Everett to Petersen [draft], 1956, op. cit.
- 144.
Wheeler to Shenstone, 1956, op. cit.; Petersen to Everett, 1956, op. cit. Everett to Petersen [draft], 1956, op. cit., Nancy Everett’s calendar of events, op. cit.
- 145.
GAR.
- 146.
Groenewold had been at the University of Groningen since 1951 (he became professor in 1955). He had made his doctorate at the university of Utrecht under the supervision of Rosenfeld, with a dissertation entitled On the Principles of Elementary Quantum Mechanics.
- 147.
Wheeler to Everett, 1956, op. cit. In the interview with Misner (op. cit., p. 6), Everett himself alludes to the risk of being enlisted in the army upon finishing his studies, and this circumstance is confirmed by DeWitt (Bryce S. DeWitt to Eugene Shikhovtsev, [w/d], courtesy of Eugene Shikhovtsev).
- 148.
Petersen to Everett, 1956, op. cit. Everett to Petersen [draft], 1956, op. cit., Nancy Everett’s calendar of events, op. cit.; DeWitt to Shikhovtsev, [w/d], op. cit.
- 149.
DeWitt interview, op. cit., p. 6.
- 150.
DeWitt to Shikhovtsev, [w/d], op. cit.
- 151.
Nor are the discussions with Bohr mentioned in Wheeler’s interviews deposited in the archives of the American Institute of Physics.
- 152.
Everett (1955a, p. 3), in Everett (2012 [1955a]); Everett to DeWitt, 1957, op. cit.
- 153.
Bryce S. DeWitt to John A. Wheeler, 20 Apr 1967. WP (Series I—Box Co-De Folder DeWitt). DeWitt refers to Wheeler (1957) (see below).
- 154.
Wheeler to Stern, 1956, op. cit.
- 155.
For example, Feynman, who attended the conference, made some critical remarks on “the concept of a ‘universal wave function’.” (This fact was brought to our attention by H. Dieter Zeh, who saw the report of the proceedings of the conference deposited in the Wright Air Development Center, Ohio.). This report is now published in DeWitt-Morette and Rickles (2011).
- 156.
DeWitt to Shikhovtsev, [w/d], op. cit.
- 157.
John A. Wheeler, Note, 10 Mar 1957, WP (Series I—Box Di—Fermi Award #1—Folder Everett).
- 158.
DeWitt to Wheeler, 1957, op. cit.; Wiener to Wheeler and Everett, 1957, op. cit.; Henry Margenau to John A. Wheeler & Hugh Everett, 8 Apr 1957, WP (Series I—Box Di—Fermi Award #1—Folder Everett).
- 159.
Groenewold to Everett and Wheeler, 1957, op. cit.
- 160.
Bohr to Wheeler, 12 April 1957, op. cit.
- 161.
Niels Bohr to John A. Wheeler, 6 Aug 1957, BSC (reel 33).
- 162.
Everett to Petersen, 1957, op. cit.
- 163.
Nancy Everett recalled that “during our visit [. . .] Niels Bohr was in his 80s and not prone to serious discussion of any new (strange) upstart theory.” Nancy Gore Everett to Frank Tipler, 10 Oct 1983, EP (Box 1, Folder 9). (Bohr was actually 73.) Wheeler gave a similar account in a letter to Max Jammer (19 Mar 1972, WP, Series I—Box I—Jason—Folder Jammer).
- 164.
Everett interview, op. cit., p.8
- 165.
Rosenfeld to Belinfante, 22 Jun 1972, op. cit. In a letter of 1971, Rosenfeld congratulated John Bell for having succeeded in giving “an air of respectability” to “Everett’s damned nonsense”. (Léon Rosenfeld to John S. Bell, 30 Nov 1971. RP.) (Rosenfeld referred to a talk given by Bell at an international conference held at the Pennsylvania State University, in which Bell had presented Everett’s theory as a “refurbishing of the idea of preestablished harmony”.) Rosenfeld’s words should of course be placed in the context of the 1970s (see Sect. 3.8). We are thankful to Anja Jacobsen for having brought the correspondence of Rosenfeld with Belinfante and Bell to our attention.
- 166.
Stern to Wheeler, 1956, op. cit. Stern is referring here to “Heisenberg’s recent attempt at a theory of elementary particles”, which he compares to Everett’s proposal.
- 167.
“[. . .] The entire formalism is to be considered as a tool for deriving predictions, of definite or statistical character, as regards information obtainable under experimental conditions described in classical terms and specified by means of parameters entering into the algebraic or differential equations of which the matrices or the wave-functions, respectively, are solutions. These symbols themselves, as is indicated already by the use of imaginary numbers, are not susceptible to pictorial interpretation.” (Bohr 1948, p. 314). Everett outlines Bohr’s instrumentalist conception of formalism in the long thesis (1973, p. 110). See Stapp (1972) for a discussion.
- 168.
Stern to Wheeler, 1956, op. cit.
- 169.
Wheeler, Notes, 1956, op. cit. When he read this sentence, Everett scrawled in the margin: “Nonsense!”.
- 170.
Groenewold to Everett and Wheeler, 1957, op. cit.
- 171.
Wheeler to Stern, 1956, op. cit.
- 172.
The quotations are from Wheeler to Stern, 1956, op. cit., and (Bohr 1948, p. 314) respectively.
- 173.
Everett (1957b, p. 142), and Aage Petersen to Hugh Everett, 24 Apr 1957, WP (Series I—Box Di—Fermi Award #1—Folder Everett).
- 174.
Wheeler to Everett, 1956 [I], op. cit. In his notes (op. cit.), Wheeler reports that Petersen, recalling that Everett blamed Bohr for his “conservative” attitude, retorted: “Bohr would say Everett much too class[ical], not in math but in recognize new features. Just as in past formalisms, the whole problem the tough one was to find the right words to express the content of the formalism in acceptable form.”
- 175.
Stern to Wheeler, 1956, op. cit. See Sect. 3.7.4 for further discussion.
- 176.
For Bohr, what is relative (to a given experimental context) is not the property itself, but rather the very possibility of attributing a given property to a system. For a discussion see (Murdoch 1987, Chap. 7). It is telling that, in his epistemological writings, Bohr preferred the term “behaviour” to that of “property” (Ibid, p. 135). The meta-contextual connotation that the notion of “property” has in ordinary language must have appeared confusing to Bohr when applied to atomic systems.
- 177.
Wheeler, Notes, 1956, op. cit.
- 178.
See e.g. Murdoch (1987, pp. 145–146).
- 179.
DeWitt to Everett and Wheeler, 1957, op. cit.
- 180.
Hip Groenewold to Hugh Everett and John A. Wheeler, 11 Apr 1957, WP (Series I—Box Di—Fermi Award #1—Folder Everett). For a discussion see (Teller 1981). In the light of these considerations, and in spite of the differences emphasised by both parties in the debate, one could be tempted to point out some connections between Bohr’s and Everett’s approaches. On the one hand, by taking into account Everett’s emphasis on correlations, one might argue that Bohr’s interpretation of the state vector requires no projection postulate at all. On the other hand, Bohr’s notion of complementarity might be helpful in interpreting Everett’s principle of the relativity of states. According to such a principle, the properties possessed by a system at a given instant depend critically on the basis chosen to expand the universal wave function; see Barrett (1999). One may assume the existence of some “internal” mechanism which selects a preferred basis. But as long as this is not done, the arbitrary choice of the preferred basis that determines which sort of (relative) properties are attributed to a system (for instance, a definite value for position, but not for momentum) looks very much like the Bohrian choice between “complementary” contexts. For a discussion see (Bitbol 1998, pp. 286–293).
- 181.
Stern to Wheeler, 1956, op. cit.
- 182.
Groenewold to Everett and Wheeler, 1957, op. cit.
- 183.
They indicated “rather clearly” that his critics had “had insufficient time to read” his work. This and the following quotations are taken from Everett’s notes on Stern’s letter, 1956, ME.
- 184.
- 185.
Léon Rosenfeld to Frederik J. Belinfante, 24 Aug 1972, RP.
- 186.
Rosenfeld to Belinfante, 22 Jun 1972, op. cit.
- 187.
Léon Rosenfeld to Frederik J. Belinfante, 24 Jul 1972. RP.
- 188.
Ibid.
- 189.
“Now, the crux of the problem which worries Wigner so much is that the reduction rule appears to be in contradistinction with the time evolution described by Schrödinger’s equation. The answer, which was of course well known to Bohr, but has been made formally clear by the Italians [Daneri, Loinger and Prosperi], is that the reduction rule is not an independent axiom, but essentially a thermodynamic effect, and accordingly, only valid to the thermodynamic approximation.” Rosenfeld to Belinfante, 24 July 1972, op. cit.
- 190.
See e.g. Stapp (1972).
- 191.
Wheeler, Notes, 1956, op. cit.
- 192.
Stern to Wheeler, 1956, op. cit.
- 193.
Groenewold to Wheeler and Everett, 1957, op. cit.
- 194.
See Bitbol (1996b, pp. 256–269) for a critical analysis.
- 195.
Petersen to Everett, 1957, op. cit.
- 196.
Everett (1973, p. 111). Everett regarded this position as “conservative”.
- 197.
Everett to Petersen, 1957, op. cit. See Sect. 3.4.2.
- 198.
Ibid. See also Wheeler (1957, p. 151).
- 199.
Wheeler, Notes, 1956, op. cit. Bohr often remarked that the use of imaginary numbers in quantum theory prevents one from interpreting the quantum formalism “as an extension of our power of visualization” (Bohr 1998, p. 86). Also, he liked to mention the discovery of irrational numbers as an example of how concrete problems (e.g. measuring the diagonal of the square) may lead us to extending the use of ordinary concepts (in the example: rational numbers) (Petersen 1985, pp. 301–302).
- 200.
Léon Rosenfeld to Saul Bergmann, 21 Dec 1959, RP. The letter answered the request for “an opinion about Everett’s point of view on the presentation of the principles of quantum mechanics” formulated by Saul M. Bergmann of the Boston Laboratory for Electronics.
- 201.
Petersen to Everett, 1957, op. cit.
- 202.
In his paper of 1957 (pp. 151–152), Wheeler says: “The results of the measurements can be spelled out in classical language. Is not such ‘language’ a prerequisite for comparing the measurements made by different observing systems?”.
- 203.
Wheeler to Stern, 1956, op. cit.
- 204.
Wheeler, Notes, 1956, op. cit.
- 205.
Wheeler to Stern, 1956, op. cit.
- 206.
- 207.
Rosenfeld, 1957, op. cit. Rosenfeld is here alluding to David Bohm and other “young physicists, who, misled partly by v. Neumann’s ideas, partly by preconceived philosophical opinions, were unable to understand the real problems underlying the formulation of quantum theory, and [. . .] undertook to reform quantum theory according to their own liking, and to develop, as they put it, a ‘causal interpretation’ of this theory.” However, since the report was written in 1957, it is likely that Everett’s work had some role in exacerbating Rosenfeld’s irritation.
- 208.
Wheeler, Notes, 1956, op. cit.
- 209.
See Bohr (1939). In that paper, Bohr asserted: “In the system to which the quantum mechanical formalism is applied, it is of course possible to include any intermediate auxiliary agency employed in the measuring process.” (Bohr 1998, p. 104). In one of the above mentioned letters, referring to Wigner’s allusions to a special role played by consciousness in the measuring process, Rosenfeld asserted that the opinion according to which the “recording process is not entirely describable by quantum mechanics” was “simply wrong”. (Rosenfeld to Belinfante, 24 Jul 1972, op. cit.).
- 210.
Groenewold to Everett and Wheeler, 1957, op. cit. The term “super-observer”, which Wheeler uses in his paper of 1957 (p. 152), is possibly reminiscent of some analogous remark made during the discussions in Copenhagen.
- 211.
- 212.
Wheeler, Notes, 1956, op. cit.
- 213.
Petersen to Everett, 1957, op. cit.
- 214.
Groenewold to Everett and Wheeler, 1957, op. cit.
- 215.
Rosenfeld to Bergmann, 1959, op. cit.
- 216.
Petersen to Everett, 1957, op. cit.
- 217.
John A. Wheeler to Niels Bohr, 24 Apr 1956, BSC (reel 34).
- 218.
Stern to Wheeler, 1956, op. cit. The letter quoted by Stern is now lost.
- 219.
The quotation is from the letter of Groenewold to Wheeler and Everett (op. cit.). The “external observation” reading of Bohr’s approach was arguably based on his frequent remarks emphasising “the necessity of describing entirely on classical lines all ultimate measuring instruments which define the external conditions of the phenomenon, and therefore of keeping them outside the system for the treatment of which the quantum of action is to be taken essentially into account.” (Bohr 1998, p. 107).
- 220.
Petersen to Everett, 1957, op. cit.
- 221.
Wolfgang Pauli to Niels Bohr, 15 Feb 1955 (Pauli et al. 1994, p. 43). Pauli uses this expression to denote Einstein’s view. Hooker (1991, p. 507) has described such a view as one in which the objectivity of the physical description depends on its ability “to put [us] into the models as objects in such a way as to take [us] out of the picture as subjects.”
- 222.
Accordingly, Bohr’s idea of completeness, like that of objectivity, had little to do with the possibility of providing an all-encompassing model of the universe, including observers. What counted, instead, was the ability to answer all the possible questions that can be concretely framed in an experimental context. As Hooker (1991, p. 507) puts it: “To be Bohr-objective is to achieve simultaneously both an empirically adequate, exhaustive and symbolically unified description of the phenomena we can produce and an accurate portrayal of the conditions under which such phenomena are accessible to us.” Hence “Bohr-objectivity cannot consist in removing the knowing subject from the representation of reality—precisely to the contrary.” From Bohr’s point of view, the “restrictions” that the instrumentalist interpretation of formalism allegedly imposed upon the scope of quantum theory did not deprived us of any portion of physical knowledge. On the contrary, they were (in a Kantian sense) constitutive of knowledge. For an analysis of the Kantian aspects of Bohr’s philosophy see for example (Honner 1987; Murdoch 1987; Faye 1991; Kaiser 1992; Chevalley 1994).
- 223.
See Wheeler to Everett, 1956 [I], op. cit.; (Byrne 2010).
- 224.
Werner (1964). At the conference, Everett was invited to outline his approach, which he did, insisting particularly on the “deduction” of the standard probabilistic interpretation. In reply to questions about the status of branches, Everett examined the case in which an observer performs a sequence of measurements on an ensemble of identical systems. In this case, he argued, each “element” of the resulting superposition of states “contains the observer as having recorded a particular definite sequence of results of observation”. He concluded that any such element can be identified as “what we think of as an experience”, and that “it is tenable to assert that all the elements simultaneously coexist.” To the remark of Podolsky: “It looks like we would have a non-denumerable infinity of worlds”, Everett answered: “Yes.” (Proceedings of the Conference on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Xavier University, Cincinnati, 1962; deposited at the American Institute of Physics.)
- 225.
Shikhovtsev (2003) mentions in particular an invitation by Wheeler to give a seminar at Princeton in 1959. Everett’s paper was cited in the philosophical works of Margenau (1963), Shimony (1963), and Petersen (1968). It was not cited in the famous papers on the measurement problem that Wigner wrote in that period (Wigner 1961, 1963). In 1963, referring to Everett in a letter, Wigner observed: “The state vector, as he imagines it, does not convey any information to anyone, and I don’t see what its role is in the framework of science as we understand it.” (Eugene Wigner to Abner Shimony, 24 May 1963, WigP (Box 94, Folder 1). The limited impact of Everett’s work is discussed by Freire Jr. (2004) based on the statistics of the citations that it received in the decade that followed the publication. See also Picture 3.2.
- 226.
DeWitt interview, op. cit, p. 7.
- 227.
“I read it and I was stunned, I was shocked.” (DeWitt interview, op. cit., p. 7). However, for a more detailed analysis of DeWitt's ideas, see Hartz (2013).
- 228.
Everett to DeWitt, 1957; op. cit.; DeWitt interview, op. cit., p. 7.
- 229.
See Freire Jr. (2004).
- 230.
DeWitt to Shikhovtsev, [w/d], op. cit.; Bryce S. DeWitt to Olival Freire, pers. comm., 29 Jun 2002.
- 231.
The paper in which DeWitt presented the famous Wheeler–DeWitt equation relies on Everett’s approach in order to provide an interpretive framework for “the state functional of the actual universe” (DeWitt 1967).
- 232.
DeWitt (1968).
- 233.
Hugh Everett to Bill Harvey, 20 Jun 1977, EP (Series I–8). The book was published in 1973.
- 234.
DeWitt interview, op. cit., p. 15.
- 235.
Shikhovtsev (2003).
- 236.
Everett to Harvey, 1977, op. cit.
- 237.
Everett to Lévy-Leblond, 1977, op. cit.
- 238.
DeWitt asserted many years later: “Everett always took the attitude—and I got this from Charlie Misner as well—that he was not really strongly committed to this.” (DeWitt interview, op. cit., p. 15.) DeWitt confirmed this opinion in a recent letter, arguing that Everett “was lackadaisical and couldn’t care less if other physicists would accept his views.” (DeWitt to Shikhovtsev, [w/d], op. cit.) It is likely that the reception of his ideas in Copenhagen diminished Everett’s original enthusiasm. In any case, even in his last years, Everett maintained that the relative state formulation was the “simplest” and the “only completely coherent approach” “to come to grips with the paradoxes of the measurement process”, and that the alternative proposals were “highly tortured and unnatural” and “by far more artificial and unsatisfactory.” Everett to Jammer, 1973, op. cit.; Everett to Raub, 1980, op. cit.
- 239.
For instance, in a paper about cosmology of 1962, in which he mentioned the “so-called ‘universal wave function’”, Wheeler (1962) cited his own assessment, but not Everett’s paper.
- 240.
Everett interview, op. cit., p. 8.
- 241.
DeWitt interview, op. cit., p. 7; DeWitt to Shikovtsev, [w/d], op. cit.
- 242.
Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond to Hugh Everett, 17 Aug 197[7], EP. In a lecture reported in the proceedings of the School “Enrico Fermi” of 1977, Wheeler says: “Imaginative Everett’s thesis is, and instructive, we agree. We once subscribed to it. In retrospect, however, it looks like the wrong track” (Wheeler 1979a, p. 396).
- 243.
Everett to Raub, 1980, op. cit. Wheeler’s temporary interest for Wigner-like approaches coincided with his efforts to clarify the question as to whether Bohr’s views did involve any reference to consciousness [see Wheeler’s letters to Aage Bohr in Freire Jr. (2007) and Chapter 4, this book. See also Wheeler and Zurek (1983, p. 207) and Wheeler (1981)].
- 244.
Everett interview, op. cit., p. 8.
- 245.
John A. Wheeler to Paul Benioff, 7 Jul 1977; and 7 Sep 1977, EP.
- 246.
According to DeWitt, “one of the very first things he did when he arrived [at the University of Texas] was actually to invite and pay for Everett to come.” (DeWitt interview, op. cit., p. 15.) Furthermore, according to Shikhovtsev (2003), Wheeler planned to bring Everett back to theoretical physics in the framework of a project which aimed to create a working group devoted to the quantum theory of measurement at the Institute for Theoretical Physics in Santa Barbara, but the whole project was eventually abandoned.
- 247.
Wheeler’s idea of a “participatory universe” (Wheeler and Zurek 1983, pp. 182–183) can be said to have inspired a number of attempts to “go beyond” Bohr’s view of measurement along the lines of the relative state formulation [see e.g. Omnès (1992), Rovelli (1996), Zurek (1998)]. In some of these approaches, the explicit inclusion of the observer in the quantum description of the universe is supposed to enable one to dismiss the postulate of projection; see Barrett (1999). Furthermore, in order to demonstrate the “emergence of a classical world from a quantum universe” (a definitely Everettian idea), the advocates of such approaches have sometimes put forward evolutionary arguments reminiscent of those sketched by Wheeler in the discussion with the Copenhagen group; see Vaidman (2002) for a list of references, and Bitbol (1996b, pp. 414–418) for a discussion.
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Freire Junior, O. (2015). The Origin of the Everettian Heresy. In: The Quantum Dissidents. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44662-1_3
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