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Language Change and the Force of Innovation

  • Roland Mühlenbernd
  • Jonas David Nick
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8607)

Abstract

Lewis [L1] invented signaling games to show that semantic meaning conventions can arise simply from regularities in communicative behavior. The behavioral implementation of such conventions are so-called signaling systems. Previous research addressed the emergence of signaling systems by combining signaling games with learning dynamics, and not uncommonly researchers examined the circumstances preventing the emergence of signaling systems. It has been shown that by increasing the number of states, messages and actions for a signaling game, the emergence of signaling becomes increasingly improbable. This paper contributes to the question of how the invention of new messages and extinction of unused messages would change these outcomes. Our results reveal that this innovation mechanism does in fact support the emergence of signaling systems. Furthermore, we analyze circumstances that lead to stable communication structure in large spatial population structures of interacting players.

Keywords

Signaling System Reinforcement Learning Lateral Inhibition Simulation Step Communicative Success 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roland Mühlenbernd
    • 1
  • Jonas David Nick
    • 2
  1. 1.Eberhard Karls Universität TübingenGermany
  2. 2.Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule ZürichSwitzerland

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