Abstract
The fight against hard-core cartels1 is ranked high on the agenda of many competition authorities around the world these days. The efforts of the European Commission (EC) and other institutions are reflected in policy reforms such as new fining guidelines or leniency programmes and also in improved cartel enforcement. While the European Commission decided only ten cartel cases in the 1995–1999 period, the number increased to 30 in the period from 2000–2004 and to 33 in the 2005–2009 period.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hüschelrath, K., Schweitzer, H. (2014). Public Enforcement of Anti-Cartel Laws – Theory and Empirical Evidence. In: Hüschelrath, K., Schweitzer, H. (eds) Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe. ZEW Economic Studies, vol 48. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43975-3_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43975-3_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-43974-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-43975-3
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)