Abstract
Quasi-particles emerge in solids. In the context of the debate on scientific realism, their concept is puzzling. While quasi-particles seem to be fake entities rather than full fledged physical particles, they can nevertheless be used as markers, etc., in crystals. This has led some authors (e.g., Gelfert) to argue that, even though one can use them as technological tools, they cannot be said to ‘exist’ in the way ordinary particles do. Hence they seem to counter Hacking’s reality criterion, “If you can spray them, they exist.” However, this line of reasoning misses the crucial point that quasi-particles are real collective effects of the constituents of a solid. In order to spell out the way in which they do or don’t exist, i.e., their ontological status, their particle properties are discussed in detail. It is instructive to compare them with the field quanta of a quantum field, on the one hand, and subatomic matter constituents, on the other. All these particle concepts differ substantially from the classical particle concept. Not only does this discussion shed light on the specific way in which quasi-particles exist, but it may also clarify the ontological status of quantum phenomena in general.
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- 1.
Mach 1883, p. 466.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
See Bohm 1952.
- 5.
Kuhn 1962.
- 6.
Maxwell 1962.
- 7.
Van Fraassen 1980.
- 8.
- 9.
Hacking 1983, pp. 22–25.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
Wigner 1939.
- 13.
It should be noted, however, that Wigner 1939 does not deal with particles, but with the solution of field equations.
- 14.
For a discussion of the distinction between preparation and detection, and wave--particle duality in physical practice in general, see Falkenburg 2007, Chap. 7.
- 15.
Talk given at the annual meeting of the German Physical Society in Hannover, March 2003.
- 16.
For more details, see Falkenburg 2007, Sect. 7.3.
- 17.
See Falkenburg 2007, Sect. 6.5.
- 18.
For the following, see Anderson 1997.
- 19.
The following sections are based on Falkenburg 2007, Sect. 6.4.4, which gives a much more detailed account.
- 20.
Anderson 1997, pp. 97–99.
- 21.
See Anderson 1997, pp. 15–28.
- 22.
This approach is strikingly similar to the application of the formalism of quantum field theory to bacteria which is explained by Meyer-Ortmanns in her contribution to this book (Sect. 2.2.4). In both cases the approach is phenomenological, making use of a formal analogy between the phenomena under investigation and the phenomena of particle creation and annihilation described by quantum field theory. In the case of quasi-particles, however, the analogy extends to the dynamic properties of the entities which are created and annihilated.
- 23.
- 24.
For Rutherford scattering, there is indeed an exact formal correspondence between the classical and the quantum case. This matter of fact underlies the definition of form factors in nuclear and particle physics; see Falkenburg 2007, pp. 136–137.
- 25.
See Anderson 1997, pp. 102–104.
- 26.
Anderson 1997, p. 116. In the following, Anderson mentions that the analogy ends at the divergences of quantum field theory, which fortunately do not occur when calculating the interactions of quasi-particles.
- 27.
One way of dealing with this problem is the “full renormalization” approach, which is once again similar to renormalization in quantum field theory; see Anderson 1997, p. 120.
- 28.
See Falkenburg 2007, Chap. 4.
- 29.
- 30.
Gelfert 2003, p. 255.
- 31.
Gelfert 2003, p. 257.
- 32.
Gelfert 2003, p. 259.
- 33.
Gelfert 2003, p. 259.
- 34.
Van Fraasen 1980, pp. 58–60, interprets this example as a case for empiricism, an interpretation that can be challenged, however; see my discussion in Falkenburg 2007, Sect. 2.6.
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Falkenburg, B. (2015). How Do Quasi-Particles Exist?. In: Falkenburg, B., Morrison, M. (eds) Why More Is Different. The Frontiers Collection. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43911-1_12
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