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LISS 2014 pp 615-625 | Cite as

A Network Formation Model for Social Object Networks

Conference paper

Abstract

Social networks can be differentiated according to the type of entities that are represented within them. Entities in human networks can act strategically to maximize their own payoffs during interactions with other humans. However, entities in social object network (e.g., SaaS service network) are not able to perceive the environment and act strategically upon that at any time. This paper contends that existing network formation models lack sufficient attention to social object networks. Therefore, we propose a new network formation model, through which we are able to explain how a SaaS service network emerges during the service composition procedure by service developers. The new network formulation model not only considers the usage frequency and reputation but also the similarity of the functionalities of the main SaaS services. It also explains how social objects (e.g., SaaS services) benefit from establishments of links between each other in the network.

Keywords

Software-as-a-service network Network formation model Social object networks 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program, Dept. of Industrial EngineeringCollege of Engineering, Seoul National UniversitySeoulSouth Korea

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