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Supply Chain Coordination based on Effort and Service Level with False Failure Returns

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LISS 2014
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Abstract

This paper studies supply chain contracts strategy under service level constraint with one manufacturer and one retailer when demand is uncertain and dependent on effort and price. False failure returns model is built under decentralized supply chain. To solve the problem of double marginalization, two contracts, including the traditional buy-back contract and the contract based on rebate and penalty are designed to coordinate the supply chain. As the results have shown, the contract based on rebate and penalty could better coordinate the supply chain. Retailer’s effort is encouraged by rebate and penalty and whether to improve the service level to gain a larger profit should be further concerned with cost and benefit.

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Acknowledgments

This research was funded by the Lab of Logistics Management and Technology and supported by NSFC (Grant No. 71390034)

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Correspondence to Meng Su .

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Su, M., Lan, H. (2015). Supply Chain Coordination based on Effort and Service Level with False Failure Returns. In: Zhang, Z., Shen, Z., Zhang, J., Zhang, R. (eds) LISS 2014. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43871-8_192

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