Abstract
This paper reports a series of thirty-four experiments that are designed to test the adequacy of several alternative theories of group choice under “majority rule” when no Condorcet point (core) exists. The games we use in these experiments seek, in particular, to establish as much separation as possible between the predictions of several alternative solution concepts and, thereby, to provide a critical test of these competing theories. Briefly, our results strongly support the competitive solution notions for n-person game theory [cf., McKelvey /Ordeshook /Winer], but they provide little if any support for the V-set, the (math) Bargaining Set, Asscher’s [19761 Ordinal Bargaining Set, M°, and several solutions based on vulnerability. The first section of this essay defines and discusses the various solution theories. Section 2 describes our experimental design, and Sections 3 and 4 review the results of these experiments.
This research is supported by an NSF Grant #SOC77-15267 to Carnegie-Mellon University-We also wish to thank Rod Gretlein for technical assistance in computation of the various solutions reported herin and Ed Packel and M. Maschler for comments on an earlier draft.
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References
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McKelvey, R.D., Ordeshook, P.C. (1979). An Experimental Test of Several Theories of Committee Decision Making Under Majority Rule. In: Brams, S.J., Schotter, A., Schwödiauer, G. (eds) Applied Game Theory. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_9
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