Abstract
Games with Stages: Introduction and Examples. The Notion of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Applications: Entry Deterrence and Stackelberg Equilibrium (Proposition 5.1). Contestable Markets: Existence, Uniqueness and Optimality of Sustainable Prices (Proposition 5.2). Optimal Rules for Public Firms (Proposition 5.3). Effects of Divisionalization (Proposition 5.4). Revelation Games: Effects of Manipulation (Propositions 5.5–6). Indeterminacy of Equilibria (Proposition 5.7). Choice of Technique (Proposition 5.8).
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Corchón, L. (1996). Two Stage Games. In: Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 442. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22531-8_6
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