Abstract
The subject allotted to me seems to indicate the following agenda:
-
(1)
Present a model which indicates how X-inefficiency can arise in public bureaucracy;
-
(2)
Outline the stages of investigation designed to determine its extent; and
-
(3)
Consider how far there are built-in incentives to remove it.
I gladly acknowledge my indebtness to my colleague Martin Ricketts, particularly in respect of the formulation of the model in section 8.2. of this paper.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Blankart, Ch. B. (1980), “Bureaucratic Problems in Public Choice: Why Do Public Goods Still Remain Public?” in: K. W. Roskamp (ed.), Public Choice and Public Finance, Proceedings of the 34th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance 1978 in Hamburg, Paris: Editions Cujas, pp. 155–167.
Chapman, L. (1979), Your Disobedient Servant, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Pengu in Books.
Courant, P. N., E. M. Gramlich and D. L. Rubinfeld (1979), “Public Employee Market Power and the Level of Government Spending”, American Economic Review, 69, pp. 806–817.
Fiorina, M. F. and R. G. Noll (1978a), “Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: Institutional Design in the Public Sector”, American Economic Review, 68 (Papers and Proceedings), pp. 256–260.
Fiorina, M. F. and -R. G. Noll (1978b), “Voters, Bureaucrats and Legislators”, Journal of Public Economics, 9, pp. 239–254.
Forte, F. and A. di Pierro (1980), “ A Pure Model of Public Bureaucracy”, Public Finance, 35 (no. 1, Festschrift: Paul Senf ), pp. 91–100.
Heclo, H. and A. Wildaysky (1974), The Private Government of Public Money, London: Macmillan.
Jacoby, H. (1973), The Bureaucratization of the World, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Leibenstein, H. (1978), “On the Basic Proposition of X-Inefficiency Theory”, American Economic Review, 68 (Papers and Proceedings), pp. 328–332.
Meyes, T. A. J. (1979), Some Experience with the Control of the Growth of Public Expenditure in the Netherlands, I EA Conference on The Grants Economy and Collective Consumption, Cambridge (unpublished).
McFadden, D. (1976), “The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Empirical Evidence”, Bell Journal of Economics, 7, pp. 55–72.
Orzechowski, W. (1977), “Economic Models of Bureaucracy: Survey Extensions and Evidence”, in: Th. E. Borcherding (ed.), Budgets and Bureaucrats, Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 229–259.
Peacock, A. T. (1979), The Economic Analysis of Government and Related Themes, Oxford: Mart in Robertson.
Pigou, A. C. (1952), Economics of Welfare, 4th ed., London: Mcmillan.
Eichhorn, P. and P. Friedrich (1976), Verwaltungsökonomie I, Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Illich, I. (1975), „Über die Grenzen der Medizin“, in: F. Duve (ed.), Technologie und Politik, 2, Reinbek: Rowohlt Taschenbuchverlag, pp. 55–62.
Leibenstein, H. (1966), “Allocative versus ‘X-Efficiency’ ”, American Economic Review, 56, pp. 392–415.
Leibenstein, H. (1978a), X-Inefficiency Xists-Reply to an Xorcist’; American Economic Review, pp. 203–211.
Leibenstein, H. (1978b), General X-Efficiency. Theory and Economic Development, New York — London — Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Leibenstein, H. (1978c), “On the Basic Proposition of X-Inefficiency Theory”, American Economic Review, 68 (Papers and Proceedings), pp. 328–332.
Needleman, M.L. and C.E. Needleman (1974), Guerrillas in the Bureaucracy, New York: Wiley.
Orzechowski, W. (1977), “Economic Models of Bureaucracy: Survey, Extensions, and Evidence”, in: Th. E. Borcherding (ed.), Budgets and Bureaucrats: The Sources of Government Growth, Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 229–259.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1983 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Peacock, A. (1983). Public X-Inefficiency: Informational and Institutional Constraints. In: Hanusch, H. (eds) Anatomy of Government Deficiencies. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-21610-1_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-21610-1_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-21612-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-21610-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive