Abstract
Questions of efficiency and inefficiency in the public sector have concerned economics ever since the optimal use of resources to achieve specific ends became the major concern of this discipline.
The author acknowledges the capable assistance of Lothar Thürmer in preparing the paper. Thanks are also due to Wolfgang Stolper who helped in editing the English.
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Hanusch, H. (1983). Inefficiencies in the Public Sector: Aspects of Demand and Supply. In: Hanusch, H. (eds) Anatomy of Government Deficiencies. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-21610-1_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-21610-1_1
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