Zusammenfassung
Ziel des Kapitels „Spieltheorie und Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung“ ist es, Anwendungsmöglichkeiten der spieltheoretischen und der experimentellen Methoden in der wirtschaftspolitischen Beratung im Speziellen und in der wissenschaftlichen Beratung im Allgemeinen aufzuzeigen. Dies erfolgt an ausgewählten Themengebieten, die wir zum einen als dafür geeignet halten und denen wir zum anderen unser Forschungsinteresse widmen. Diese Darstellung ist in keinem Fall umfassend. So wird beispielsweise auf die Diskussion der kooperativen Spieltheorie und deren Anwendungsmöglichkeiten verzichtet. Auch bei den von uns erwähnten Anwendungsgebieten der nicht-kooperativen Theorie werden nicht alle bisher bekannten Problemstellungen angesprochen, was durch die Beschränkung des Umfangs der Arbeit auch nicht möglich ist.
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Berninghaus, S.K., Ehrhart, KM., Kirstein, A., Seifert, S. (2002). Spieltheorie und experimentelle Ökonomie. In: Zimmermann, K.F. (eds) Neue Entwicklungen in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft. Studies in Contemporary Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-12571-7_9
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